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ABSTRACT 
CLAIR MORRISSEY: Grounding the Standing to Prosecute Atrocities 
(Under the direction of Gerald J. Postema)  
 
Crimes against humanity are widespread and systematic attacks on civilian 
populations, sometimes committed by officials of a state against citizens of that state. These 
atrocities are inhumane acts that intentionally make the lives of the victims impossible, 
intolerable or indecent. In the words of the International Criminal Court these crimes “shock 
the conscience of mankind.” In the aftermath of these atrocities victims and those who stand 
in solidarity with them call for justice. But who has the authority to answer this call for 
justice? More pointedly, if we are to respect the political autonomy of states, how could any 
international institution have the standing to prosecute perpetrators of a crime that has 
occurred solely within the borders of that state?  
In response to this question, I develop an Alternative Cosmopolitan Account (ACA), 
wherein I argue that an international tribunal could have the standing to redress these crimes 
in virtue of being part of a global institutional structure necessary for fulfilling the demands 
of justice, in particular, by making determinate the content of what we owe to one another as 
members of a global moral community. I begin my account with a commitment to minimal 
cosmopolitanism: that each person stands in a morally salient relationship with each other 
person, and that this requires that we view one another as objects of moral concern. I argue 
that the obligations we have to one another in virtue of this relationship are not determinate 
without a mediating political institution that can provide a coherent, univocal, enforceable 
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system of law. This problem of indeterminacy requires a global mediating institution that 
articulates both law between states (international law) and between individuals (cosmopolitan 
law), of which the prohibition on crimes against humanity is a part.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
THE IMPORTANCE OF JURISDICTION 
 
“Beth Hamishpath” - “the House of Justice” - are the first words of Hannah Arendt’s 
Eichmann in Jerusalem. Perhaps the most well-known and influential account of a post-
World War II Nazi prosecution does not begin with a description of the accused or of the 
atrocities he committed. Arendt’s account of the trial of Adolf Eichmann by the State of 
Israel begins with a physical description of the judges entering the chamber of the newly 
built courthouse, “Beth Ha’am” - “the House of the People.” It is a description of the location 
of the proceedings. She draws attention to the meaning imparted to the trial by where it took 
place – first the court itself, then the community represented by this particular court. Thus, 
the first character in Arendt’s report on Eichmann’s trial is the state of Israel, manifested in 
the Israeli institutions of justice. This way of beginning her account implies that to 
understand what follows one must first understand where it happened. This consciousness of 
jurisdiction, of the community or people doing the prosecuting (and whether this community 
has the legitimate standing to do so) permeates her account so completely it is even present in 
the title of the book – Eichmann in Jerusalem.  
Why does Arendt draw our attention so directly to the forum of Eichmann’s 
prosecution? An answer is present in her inclusion of part of Attorney General Gideon 
Hausner’s opening speech to the court, wherein he argued that given Eichmann’s particular 
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station in the Third Reich, the failure of the Nuremberg Tribunals to prosecute him had the 
effect of leaving “the Jewish tragedy out of the account.” Arendt asks of this argument,  
Did Mr. Hausner really believe the International Military Tribunal at 
Nuremberg would have paid greater attention to the fate of the Jews if 
Eichmann had been in the dock? Hardly. Like almost everyone else in Israel, 
he believed that only a Jewish court could render justice to Jews, and that it 
was the business of Jews to sit in judgment on their enemies. 1 
  
Arendt reports that this belief on the part of Hausner is situated in a context of 
almost universal hostility in Israel to the mere mention of an international 
court which would have indicted Eichmann, not for crimes ‘against the Jewish 
people,’ but for crimes against mankind committed on the body of the Jewish 
people.2  
 
Arendt presents us with what she observes as a widely held belief: it matters who prosecutes 
Eichmann. Arendt raises this question about the importance of jurisdiction for the 
prosecution of crimes against humanity from the perspective of the victims of the atrocities. 
Hers is a question born out of reflection on the importance and meaning of criminal trials for 
the victims of the crimes.  
The question of the standing to prosecute atrocities can also be forcefully raised from 
the perspective of those prosecuted. As an example of the same challenge posed from this 
other point of view: the International Criminal Court issued an arrest warrant for President 
Omar al-Bashir of Sudan in March of 2009 for crimes against humanity and war crimes. 
Sudan’s Ambassador to the United Nations Abdalmahmood Abdalhaleem Mohamad 
responded by saying:  
                                                 
1 Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil, Revised Edition (Gloucester, Mass: 
Peter Smith, 1994), 6.  
 
2 Ibid. 
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For us the ICC doesn't exist. We are not bound by its decisions and we are in 
no way going to cooperate with it. Indeed, the verdict that was announced 
today in the Hague does not deserve the ink used to print it.3  
 
Notice that rather than deny the charges leveled against al-Bashir, Mohamad tries to 
undermine the standing of this particular court to level the charges at all.  
It may be tempting to read Mohamad’s statement on behalf of al-Bashir as the last 
ditch efforts of a tyrant to remain free, or perhaps the knowing exploitation of a mere legal 
loophole. Knowing the nature and extent of the evils to which al-Bashir subjected the 
Sudanese people it is difficult to take seriously Mohamad’s assertion of al-Bashir’s rights. 
After all, this is what Mohamad is doing. He is challenging the prosecuting body to explain 
by what right it is indicting al-Bashir.  
Understood this way, as an assertion that the ICC must prove that its law is binding 
on al-Bashir, the charge raised by Mohamad on al-Bashir’s behalf requires a response. Part of 
what is horrific about the genocide in Sudan (although far from all of what is horrific about 
it) is the intentional use of violence by the powerful against the powerless. It is an extreme 
example of the misuse and abuse of power of the governing bodies by the officials of them. It 
represents the worst behavior of a thug, a tyrant. Recognizing this, we also recognize that 
prosecution of those who commit these atrocities must not abuse or misuse the political 
power of those prosecuting bodies, lest the prosecution be just another use of force by the 
powerful against the (relatively) powerless. There are many requirements on the full justice 
of the prosecuting body, the first of which is that it exercises its power by right. That is, the 
prosecuting body has the standing to do so in the first place.  
                                                 
3 Elisa Burchett, “Sudan’s Response to ICC Arrest Warrant,” U.N. Observer and International Report, March 4, 
2009, www.unobserver.com . 
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In different ways both Arendt and Mohamad raise the same question: Could an 
international tribunal have the standing to prosecute perpetrators of crime against humanity, 
and if so, in virtue of what does it have this standing? I call this the jurisdiction question and 
it is the leading question of this thesis. The aim of this dissertation is to answer the 
jurisdiction question, by arguing that the international community (as such) does have the 
standing to prosecute perpetrators of crimes against humanity when the states in which the 
crimes occur are either unwilling or unable to do so.  
 
THE JURISDICTION QUESTION IN FOCUS 
I have given this question the proper name “The Jurisdiction Question.” However, it 
is important to notice that it is a question of a more general kind. Jurisdictional questions 
arise in contexts other than that of crime against humanity and international criminal law. 
Examples familiar to those within the United States are the frequent constitutional challenges 
regarding whether some domain of action falls within the purview of the federal government 
or the individual states. For instance, whether specification of the second amendment’s right 
to bear arms is rightly determined and articulated for individuals by the particular states in 
which they reside, or by the federal government. More generally, the jurisdictional questions 
arise whenever an institution presents itself as rightfully holding a perpetrator of a crime 
accountable. 
Moreover, this judgment of ‘legitimate interest’ or standing is a normative judgment 
that cannot be answered by merely looking to the world and its institutions and asking 
whether the body has the kind of sheer power to do so. Recall that this question is motivated 
by the need to show that one is not acting as a mere thug. A justification for jurisdiction 
requires a normative explanation that does not reduce to ‘it is more powerful’ (or offers, at 
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least, an explanation for why ‘more powerful’ counts as an answer to this normative 
question).   
There are two elements of jurisdictional questions in general that one must answer 
when engaging with problems of jurisdiction. The first is the question of who: what 
community, society, group or institution (perhaps, through a representative) has the standing 
to prosecute or otherwise redress the transgression? Notice that the ‘who’ aspect of the 
question is phrased such that only a community or group counts as an adequate answer to it. I 
have framed the question this way to emphasize the political/legal nature of jurisdiction. We 
are asking which body stands in the proper relation to the individual such that the body can 
hold that individual accountable or otherwise enforce particular norms.  
The second jurisdictional question is the question of why: in virtue of what does this 
(or any) community, society, or group, have this standing? This is straightforward as a 
question, but it is important to say a word about the kinds of things that can count as answers 
to it. What kinds of reasons, values, principles, can be appealed to in answering this ‘why’ 
element of the jurisdiction question? Rather than give a substantive list in response to this 
question, I suggest we think of it functionally. Arguments that answer the why element of the 
jurisdiction question explain the normative importance of, or moral or political reasons 
relevant to the existence or scope of the power of a particular institution. This is in contrast to 
arguments that give a moral argument for punishment or harsh treatment of the perpetrators 
of these crimes that does not view the question as political. 
I used the language of ‘proper relation’ and ‘standing’ above to indicate that this 
normative judgment is about a kind of authority to hold accountable. However, invoking 
‘authority’ in this context can be misleading. By authority I do not mean to indicate that 
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questions of jurisdiction reduce to questions of legitimacy. We can judge that some 
community has the standing to hold accountable, but that the institutions that represent that 
community fail to be fully legitimate. Perhaps they are corrupt, or undemocratic. Returning 
to our domestic example of specification of the second amendment, we would not say that 
settling this issue of jurisdiction relies on establishing whether (or to what extent) the US 
government and the state of North Carolina are legitimate. Jurisdiction is a matter of the 
relevant communities and their institutions having a legitimate interest (or exclusive interest, 
or overriding interest) in the norm violated or specified.  
This issue of jurisdiction is distinct from questions of standing familiar from the 
philosophical literature on moral responsibility. The standing at issue in this discussion is not 
merely a question of who can appropriately blame perpetrators of crime against humanity for 
what they have done through interpersonal interactions, or even actions in the public sphere 
that are aimed at holding people accountable (for instance in the press).  Jurisdiction 
questions ask whether some community, represented in some way through formal political 
and legal institutions, stands in the proper relationship to the perpetrator, such that it can 
utilize these institutions to hold that perpetrator accountable.  
Answering the jurisdiction question establishes only a necessary condition on what 
we may call the legitimate prosecution of crime against humanity (as opposed to a sufficient 
condition for such a prosecution). What I discuss in this thesis is the question of which 
communities have the standing to prosecute crime against humanity. There are important 
further questions about what prosecuting bodies would have to be like in order to exercise the 
power to prosecute legitimately. One may think that they must be created democratically, or 
at least, be created by the consent of the governed. The resources I develop to answer the 
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jurisdiction question will give us a place to begin answering these further questions, but 
discussion of them will not fall within the scope of this project. Although distinct from these 
further questions, the jurisdiction question is importantly related to important questions about 
whether and why an institution has the political authority to legislate and define law, full 
stop. As we will see, arguments for the need for and standing of institutions of law (and not 
merely the prosecuting court) are important in answering the jurisdiction question.   
I have made a point of clarifying the nature and scope of the jurisdiction question 
because the moral severity of crimes against humanity creates the danger of ignoring the 
importance of the question. For example, prosecuting someone for his central role in the 
systematic amputation and mutilation of hundreds of thousands of people in Sierra Leone 
seems so clearly to be an appropriate exercise of the power of law, that we risk submerging 
the question of whether the group doing the prosecuting has the standing to do so in the first 
place. The extreme nature of the evils in question can give rise to a desire to punish 
perpetrators that ignores the question of the right to do so.  
 
A NOTE ON APPROACH 
My project falls within the tradition of philosophical exploration of the moral 
foundations of justice. This locates my project at the intersection of ethics, political 
philosophy and the philosophy of law. I aim to provide arguments and analyses concerning 
the normative justification of different legal or political institutions that have, as Rawls may 
describe them, justice as their first virtue.4 In this project those legal and political institutions 
are criminal prosecutions of those who violate public international law, particularly the 
prohibition on crime against humanity.  
                                                 
4 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Original Edition (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971), 3. 
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My approach to answering the jurisdiction question is heavily influenced by Allen 
Buchanan’s work on international justice. Laying out his methodological commitments in 
building a moral theory of international law in Justice, Legitimacy and Self-Determination, 
Buchanan begins with the contention that “a moral theory of international law is needed, both 
for responsible criticism of the status quo and for guiding progress toward a better state of 
affairs.”5 By this, he means that  
there is a need for self-conscious, systematic moral reasoning, the attempt to 
produce an interrelated, mutually supporting set of prescriptive principles that 
will provide substantial guidance for at least most of the more important 
issues with which international law must deal or which it could profitably 
address.6 
 
Buchanan claims that developing a moral theory of the international law is instrumentally 
valuable. It is necessary (though clearly not sufficient) to work out a moral theory of the 
international law if we are to improve the international law itself.  
 Seeing the value of a moral theory of the law as essentially instrumental generates 
other methodological commitments for Buchanan. He argues that to give a moral theory of 
the international law one must engage in a great deal of institutional thinking. That is, the 
theory must respect the fact that the law is instantiated, enforced, and produced by 
institutions, and that it is these institutions that need to come to reflect the principles that the 
moral theory proscribes. The theorist must take seriously the fact that reform of international 
law is reform of international institutions. I follow him in adopting an institutional outlook.  
With that said, I disagree with Buchanan that the sole or primary value of building a 
moral theory of international law is the instrumental value this practice has for the reform of 
                                                 
5 Allen Buchanan, Justice, Legitimacy and Self Determination: Moral Foundations for International Law, (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 29.  
 
6 Buchanan, 15. 
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international legal institutions. I follow Iris Marion Young in her observation that “politics is 
partly a struggle over the language people use to describe social and political experience.”7 
Insofar as politics serves this role in the lives of individuals and communities, we should 
recognize that part of the use people put the moral-political concepts to centrally concerns 
understanding the experiences of others, and coming to appreciate our own experiences as of 
a certain kind. The value of building and developing a moral theory of institutions of justice 
is, at least in part, engaging in this public discussion that incorporates, builds, and challenges 
concepts that are important for making sense of who we are, how we are related to one 
another, and what we have experienced (individually and collectively).  
 
OUTLINE OF THE PROJECT 
The project unfolds in five stages: (A) an analysis of ‘crime against humanity’ taking 
into account both the legal definition and the moral conception of atrocity, (B) an exploration 
of and argument against traditional ways of framing and answering the jurisdiction question, 
concluding with the need for a cosmopolitan strategy for answering the question, (C) study of 
models of the relationship between the status of sovereignty and the nature of international 
justice or international law, (D) reflection on the motivation for and content/commitments of 
cosmopolitanism as understood in this argument, (E) an argument built upon this 
understanding of the basic moral relationship of cosmopolitanism for the international 
community’s standing to prosecute crimes against humanity.  
In Chapter One I develop an account of ‘crime against humanity’ that takes into 
account both the legal tradition in which the concept emerged and is currently embedded, as 
well as moral consideration of the nature of atrocities. I argue that crimes against humanity 
                                                 
7 Iris Marion Young, “The Five Faces of Oppression,” Philosophical Forum, XIX (1998): 270.  
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are widespread and systematic attacks on civilian populations, often carried out by the 
governments under which the civilians live that exploit the vulnerability of the civilians and 
cause them harm that deprives (or seriously risks depriving) them of the basics that make life 
possible, tolerable or decent. This account of crime against humanity puts into clear focus the 
difficulty of the jurisdiction question. Crimes against humanity can be, and often are, 
perpetrated by officials of the governing bodies under which the victims live. This poses a 
unique jurisdictional puzzle that is difficult for traditional theories of international justice to 
address, because the attacks can occur wholly within the boundaries of a presumed to be 
sovereign state (and thus, off limits for any external interference).  
Chapter Two addresses this jurisdictional puzzle directly. I formulate the puzzle as a 
three-step argument against the standing of external bodies to prosecute crimes against 
humanity, called the Nuremberg Problem. I then present and evaluate three different 
strategies for solving the Nuremberg Problem: the War-Nexus Approach (as utilized by the 
framers of the London Charter for the Nuremberg Tribunals), the Harm to Humanity 
Approach (as formulated by Larry May) and the Conditional Sovereignty Approach (as 
formulated by Andrew Altman and Christopher Heath Wellman. In evaluating these 
approaches I develop four criteria for an adequate account. Namely, that the account be 
appropriately consistent with the general principles of public international law, that it explain 
the standing of the international community as such, that it explain the importance of states 
and domestic political communities and that it respect the victims of crimes against 
humanity, and in doing so, make adequate room for the moral standing of individuals in its 
account of standing.  
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In response to the shortcomings of the approaches I evaluate in Chapter Two, Chapter 
Three begins building a new answer to the Nuremberg Problem with a critical discussion of 
different models of the status of state sovereignty and the nature and content of international 
justice. I discuss models and arguments concerning the status of sovereignty from Thomas 
Hobbes, Immanuel Kant, Michael Walzer and John Rawls – arguing that the best way to 
understand the status of sovereignty is as articulated and shaped, at least in part, by 
international law and procedures of international justice. I end with the suggestion that in 
light of this discussion an Alternative Cosmopolitan Account (ACA) is a promising direction 
for responding to the Nuremberg Problem.  
Chapter Four takes up this suggestion and fills out the content of the ACA’s 
cosmopolitan commitment. I argue that cosmopolitanism, properly understood, need not be a 
political claim, but rather points to a kind of basic moral relationship that exists between all 
human beings. This relationship can be characterized as co-membership in the moral 
community, and further described as exhibiting three important features. The important 
features being: co-members take one another as participants rather than objects, value being 
able to justify actions, rules and institutions to one another, and engage in social practices 
that manifest or realize this co-member relation.  
Chapter Five uses the analysis of the cosmopolitan commitment developed in Chapter 
Four to build the full ACA through an argument for the standing of the international 
community as such to hold perpetrators of crime against humanity accountable. I conclude by 
returning to the Nuremberg Problem and evaluating the ACA as a response in light of the 
four features of a good account developed in Chapter Two.  
  
 
CHAPTER ONE 
CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: MORAL AND LEGAL CONCEPTIONS 
 
MORAL AND LEGAL USES OF “CRIME AGAINST HUMANITY” 
 
The term “crime against humanity” has an important and complicated place in our 
constellation of normative concepts. It is often used as a way to identify atrocious evils and 
in an expression of condemnation for those who perpetrate them. When we call the genocide 
in Darfur a crime against humanity, we mean to express that it is an extreme evil. 
Additionally, within the context of the constantly expanding and evolving international 
criminal law “crime against humanity” has another role in our set of normative resources. It 
is a violation of international law. 
Illustrations of the complexity of this and related concepts are found with relative 
frequency in the public sphere. Former Secretary of State Colin Powell recognized the 
genocide in Darfur as genocide in 2004. Prior to Powell’s formal recognition, citizens of the 
United States clearly knew of the moral evils taking place in Darfur, and used the term 
‘genocide’ to refer to them. In fact, knowledge of the evils explains why Powell visited 
Sudan charged with the task of determining whether to recognize the events as genocide. Yet, 
his formal declaration that the atrocities were genocide changed the political discourse as 
well as the political relationship between the state of United States of America and the state 
of Sudan.  
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This complicated relationship between the moral and political or legal uses of certain 
concepts exists for the term “crime against humanity” as well. The Rome Statute of 1998, 
which established the International Criminal Court, begins by recognizing “that during this 
century millions of children, women and men have been victims of unimaginable atrocities 
that deeply shock the conscience of mankind.”8 The term “crime against humanity” is used 
later in this document to capture, in part, what is meant by unimaginable, unspeakable, 
unthinkable evil. However, the instrument does so through a formal legal articulation of 
particular actions that count as violation of public international law (as will be discussed in 
more depth below).  
Despite the attempt to codify the unimaginable atrocities in this statute, these evils are 
importantly unlike what most of us think of as crime. Richard Vernon points to Hannah 
Arendt’s claim that “[the Nazi’s guilt for the Holocaust], in contrast to criminal guilt, 
oversteps and shatters any and all legal systems,” as a way to capture the seeming 
discontinuity between the reality of the unimaginable evils and the language of law and 
crime.9 Recognition of this complexity poses an initial challenge to those working with the 
concept ‘crime against humanity.’ One must resolve the apparent tension created when legal 
and political bodies codify prohibitions of certain kinds of actions using tools available from 
these perspectives that can seem insufficient for the task of capturing the nature of the evils.  
Vernon notes that in response to this worry about the sufficiency of political-legal 
frameworks for capturing the nature of crime against humanity we could go in another 
theoretical direction and recast the use of ‘crime against humanity’ as merely a technical term 
                                                 
8 UN General Assembly, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (last amended January 2002), 17 
July 1998, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9, available at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b3a84.html.   
 
9 Richard Vernon, “What is Crime Against Humanity?” Journal of Political Philosophy, 10 (2002): 231.  
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in international law. This would allow us to give a definition of crime against humanity in the 
following way: crimes against humanity are whatever violates a rule held to be authoritative 
by international bodies or by general consent. However, as Vernon goes on to argue, the 
question “what is crime against humanity?” resists being answered in this way for reasons 
related to the pre-theoretical, extra-legal aspect (what I refer to as the moral use of the 
concept) of the term “crime against humanity.” 
To begin, “if the offence lay in the fact that it is prohibited, then every violation of 
international law would become ‘crime against humanity’ and nothing would remain to 
distinguish this category (except its name).”10 That is, if we use the term crime against 
humanity to mean (merely) international crime or violation of international law, we lose 
focus on the particular kind of evil to which the term is meant to refer: the unspeakable evils 
that shock the conscience of mankind. After all, certain kinds of technical treaty violations 
will be violations of international law, but fall short of shocking any consciences at all, let 
along that of all mankind. 
Vernon’s initial objection, as formulated, may appear superficial or easily answered. We 
could simply respond by stipulating that “crime against humanity” does not refer to all 
transgressions of international law, but only a particular, narrow range of violations. 
Although this response avoids this particular formulation of the worry, there is something 
more behind the objection that remains unaddressed. The worry is that if we define crimes 
against humanity in the first instance as a violation of international law, we have missed 
something important about crime against humanity. We have gotten the order of explanation 
wrong. These evils, like many other crimes, are not wrong because they are prohibited by 
law. Rather, they are prohibited because they are wrong. Moreover, they are wrong whether 
                                                 
10 Vernon, 231. 
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or not they are prohibited, and even if they were prohibited for reasons other than that they 
are wrong.  
This leads Vernon to a second way of explaining the tension between the moral and legal 
uses of the term: “no uncritical history of the evolution of the idea can square it with the 
ordinary history of law.”11 The idea that crime against humanity is a technical notion within 
international law ignores the history of our concept of crime against humanity. It was 
originally introduced in the Nuremberg Charter, when there was yet no law or legal 
mechanism to condemn it. It was introduced in the law to capture a unique kind of evil, it is 
not thought of as a unique evil because it is named as one in the law. As Vernon writes, 
crime against humanity “expressed a sense of moral outrage before it became an international 
offense.”12 Again, we see the importance of recognizing the moral judgment that these evils 
are evils as independent from the political attempt to hold perpetrators of these evils 
accountable through legal prosecution. With these related considerations Vernon has refined 
the challenge posed to those interested in ‘crimes against humanity’. The challenge is to 
explain what crimes against humanity are, in a way that respects these two different 
perspectives – the legal and the moral.  
The aim of this chapter is to explore these two seemingly distinct if not wholly 
different uses of “crime against humanity” and the relationship between them. In identifying 
the legal definition and the moral conception as distinct but not wholly different, I mean to be 
drawing attention to how thinking about ‘crime against humanity’ through the moral lens and 
through the legal lens are different ways of looking at roughly the same events or states of 
affairs. Under the description of the concept as a moral notion we pay attention to the nature 
                                                 
11 Vernon, 231. 
 
12 Vernon, 232.  
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of atrocity, of extreme evils intentionally carried out against fellow human beings. Under the 
description of the concept as a legal notion we pay attention to the particular formulation of 
what counts as a crime against humanity under the law, and how the international legal 
bodies have drawn the necessary and sufficient conditions for application of the term.13 
This conceptual investigation into crime against humanity is in service of the overall 
aim of this thesis. Recall, our guiding question asks: does the international community have 
the standing to prosecute crime against humanity? In order to answer this question we need 
to be clear on what crimes against humanity are in the first place. To do this, we need a good 
understanding of the international law with respect to crimes against humanity, but we do not 
want our answer to the jurisdiction question to be hostage to the particular legal definition of 
crime against humanity as it is at this moment. Moreover, we need resources for evaluating 
and bringing to bear considerations that support or undermine the existence of such laws 
(with their attendant definitions).   
As I indicated in the Introduction, this thesis is not a piece of legal scholarship. It 
answers a philosophical question about standing, and I aim to work with a conception of 
crime against humanity that is appropriate to this task. To that end, this chapter carves out a 
distinct category of actions or events at issue in the jurisdiction question by identifying 
morally important aspects from both the public international law as it has developed and 
moral reflection on the kinds of atrocities the law is designed to pick out. Carving out this 
category not only provides us with a starting point for answering the jurisdiction question, 
but answers Vernon’s challenge by supplying an account of the nature of crime against 
humanity that respects the potentially divergent moral and legal perspectives.  
                                                 
13 The necessary and sufficient conditions given by the public international law are made all the more difficult 
to identify and work with by the development of the law, itself, and debates about the ex post facto nature of the 
prosecutions for crimes against humanity.  
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This chapter has three primary sections. The first presents the legal definition of 
crime against humanity, identifying what I take to be the three central features of it for our 
investigation. The second presents Claudia Card’s atrocity paradigm as a way into the moral 
conception of atrocity and a lens through which to view the morally salient elements of the 
legal definition. Finally, I present an analysis of crimes against humanity that meets Vernon’s 
challenge by respecting these two distinct perspectives and uses of the concept. 
 
THE LEGAL DEFINITION OF CRIME AGAINST HUMANITY 
Understanding the legal definition of crime against humanity is more difficult than 
merely turning to the requisite page in our international legal code and reading off a 
definition. In part, as we shall see, the complexity comes from the fact that the definition has 
been modified over time and has been employed somewhat differently by different courts 
and tribunals. In part, this complexity comes from the nature and evolution of international 
criminal law. Like many areas of public international law, international criminal law has 
developed in a haphazard and sporadic way.  
This dynamism is reflected by the difficulty scholars have had not only articulating and 
isolating those acts that are international crimes, but also identifying the criteria for 
international criminalization. As an example of this confusion and complexity: the 
International Law Commission (ILC) produced a Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace 
and Security of Mankind in 1991. It contained 26 distinct types of criminal acts, and was 
seen by the international community as “overreaching and ambiguous.”14 After a great deal 
of debate, a new text, reduced to 5 types of criminal acts from the original 26, was produced 
                                                 
14 M. Cherif Bassiouni, Introduction to International Criminal Law (Boston: Hotei Publishing, 2003), 113. 
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in 1996. The recognized international crimes being: aggression, genocide, crimes against 
humanity, crimes against the United Nations and associated personnel, and war crimes. 
Although now generally accepted as an international crime, the prohibition on crimes 
against humanity is relatively new in public international law. The term “crime against 
humanity” was introduced into the law, and thus popular parlance, in 1945 by the 
International Military Tribunal (IMT) through the London Charter. 15 Although the term was 
introduced by the IMT, similar language to that of “crime against humanity” can be found in 
international criminal law prior to 1948.  In particular, the Martens Clause, found in the 
preamble to the 1899 Hague Convention on the Laws and Customs of War on Land, invokes 
the laws of humanity; which itself is relied heavily on in the Treaty of Versailles to condemn 
the Armenian Genocide and characterize its perpetrators as enemies of humanity.16 Before 
the 20th century, hostes humani generis, “the enemies of humanity” was a term used as early 
as the 1600’s to apply to pirates, and again in the 1800’s to apply to slave-traders. This in 
turn was derived from the Roman Law concept of jus gentium - the law of nations/peoples - 
used to pick out those laws common to all peoples of the Roman Empire.17 
The first explicit legal definition of crime against humanity is found in Article 6 of the 
International Military Tribunal’s London Charter: 
murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts 
committed against any civilian population, before or during the war; or 
persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds in execution of or in 
                                                 
15 Theodor Meron, The Humanization of International Law (Boston: Brill Academic Publishers, 2006), 95.  
 
16 International prosecutions were never conducted in response to the Armenian Genocide for political reasons. 
However, the international response to the genocide helped to establish the legal claim that the international 
community has an interest in actions that occur within the territory of a presumed to be sovereign state.  
 
17 Bassiouni, Chapter 3.  
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connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or 
not in violation of the domestic law of the country where perpetrated.18 
 
There are three central features of this definition relevant to the aims of our current 
investigation. The first is (1) crimes against humanity are defined in relation to war. The 
London Charter recognizes crimes against humanity when they are committed against the 
backdrop of or as essential elements in a state’s build up to or execution of aggressive war. 
The second is (2) crimes against humanity are committed against civilian populations. The 
emphasis on populations indicates that crimes against humanity are something more than or 
other than a series of one-off acts. Rather, they are large-scale, and carried out against a 
definable group of people. Finally, (3) the definition is notably silent on who can be charged 
with this crime. It leaves open the possibility that it is the officials of a citizen’s own state 
that are the perpetrators.  
This final element of the definition is particularly important for the jurisdiction 
question. We are accustomed to thinking of international crimes as (things like) war crimes – 
acts that cross borders, committed by the representatives of one state against representatives 
of other states, or against civilians of other states. The prohibition on crime against humanity, 
to the contrary, is a prohibition on what a state (or representatives of it) can do both to its 
own civilians and to civilians of other nations.  
Rather than work through each appearance of “crime against humanity” in public 
international law, I will move to the most recent. The International Criminal Court’s Rome 
Statute contains the now standard definition of crime against humanity, which is derived 
from the way the crime was defined by the IMT as well as for the International Military 
                                                 
18 United Nations, Charter of the International Military Tribunal – Annex to the Agreement for the prosecution 
and punishment of the major war criminals of the European Axis (“London Charter”), 8 August 1945, available 
at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b39614.html .   
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Tribunal of the Far East, the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia and the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. The Rome Statute defines crime against 
humanity as: 
any of the following acts when committed as part of a widespread or 
systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of 
the attack:   
 
(a) Murder;  (b) Extermination;  (c) Enslavement; (d) Deportation or forcible 
transfer of population; (e) Imprisonment or other severe deprivation of 
physical liberty in violation of fundamental rules of international law;  (f) 
Torture; (g) Rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, 
enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence of comparable 
gravity;  (h) Persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on 
political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender as defined in 
paragraph 3, or other grounds that are universally recognized as impermissible 
under international law, in connection with any act referred to in this 
paragraph or any crime within the jurisdiction of the Court;  (i) Enforced 
disappearance of persons;  (j) The crime of apartheid;  (k) Other inhumane 
acts of a similar character intentionally causing great suffering, or serious 
injury to body or to mental or physical health.19 
 
Returning to the three important features of the London Charter’s definition – we can see 
how the legal concept has changed over time. (1) Crimes against humanity are no longer tied, 
essentially and by definition, to war. It is possible for something to count under the law as a 
crime against humanity without it having taken place as part of a state’s building toward or 
engaging in aggressive (that is, territorial border-crossing) war.20 (2) The International 
Criminal Court’s definition maintains and amplifies the importance of the large-scale nature 
of the crime. Whereas the London Charter merely mentioned that crimes against humanity 
occur against populations (rather than particular individuals) the current definition explicitly 
states that the actions against the population must be widespread and systematic. What 
                                                 
19 Rome Statute, Article 7.  
 
20 This feature of crimes against humanity has significant consequences for arguments concerning jurisdiction 
that I will take up in Chapter Two. 
  21
“widespread and systematic” means remains a matter of debate, but for present purposes it is 
enough to note that the definition builds in an emphasis on the scope as well as the severity 
of the suffering. (3) The International Criminal Court’s definition remains silent on who can 
be charged with this crime. So, it too leaves open the possibility that it is the officials of a 
citizen’s own state that are the perpetrators.  
 
A MORAL CONCEPTION OF ATROCITY: CARD’S ATROCITY PARADIGM 
 Rather than attempt to present, arbitrate and evaluate a survey of the concept of evil 
from the history of moral theory, in this section I will present (in order to work closely with) 
Claudia Card’s articulation of the nature of evil in The Atrocity Paradigm: A Theory of Evil. 
Instead of giving the moral conception of atrocity, I will be working with a (particularly 
illuminating) conception of atrocity. Card’s theory is particularly helpful for our purposes 
because her explicit aim is to “articulate a conception of evil that captures the ethically most 
significant, most serious publicly known evils of [Card’s] lifetime.”21 She aims to give a 
moral account of evil that covers the central cases of crime against humanity, and so, we are 
guaranteed to be referring to at least some of the same events.22  
 Card’s atrocity paradigm is also especially helpful for our purposes because she self-
consciously incorporates insights from different moral theories. The definition of evil Card 
develops is not from within a particular normative theory, but is meant to stand on its own. 
For Card, “evils are foreseeable, intolerable harms produced by culpable wrong doing.”23 
This definition reflects both the importance of harm that is privileged in the Utilitarian 
                                                 
21 Claudia Card, The Atrocity Paradigm: A Theory of Evil (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 5.  
 
22 As will be discussed below, crimes against humanity can be thought of as a subset of the Card’s atrocities. 
Not all atrocities will be crimes against humanity, but all crimes against humanity will be atrocities.  
 
23 Card, 3. 
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tradition, and also to the importance of the psychological state of the wrongdoer, as is the 
focus of the Stoic tradition (Kant included). With this definition, like many that appear prima 
facie plausible to the point of being uncontroversial, the devil is in the details. To understand 
what actually counts as an evil in Card’s theory we need to more fully understand the two 
major components of it: intolerable harm, and culpable wrongdoing. Before turning to these 
important components, I will introduce Card’s project a bit more thoroughly, including her 
use of atrocities as paradigm cases of evil.  
 As just mentioned, Card takes “atrocities” as paradigm cases for the purpose of 
constructing her theory of evil. Rather than define atrocities themselves (as the theory of evil 
is meant to provide this) Card begins with a list of well-known atrocities:  
the Holocaust; the bombings of Hiroshima, Nagasaki, Tokyo, Hamburg and 
Dresden; the internment of Japanese Americans and Japanese Canadians 
during World War 11; the My Lai massacre; the Tuskegee syphilis 
experiments; genocides in Rwanda, Burundi, and East Timor; the killing fields 
of Cambodia; the rape/death camps of the former Yugoslavia; and the threat to 
life on our planet posed by environmental poisoning, global warming, and the 
destruction of  rain forests and other natural habitats. 
 
 These are particular instances of more general kinds of evils:  
genocide, slavery, torture, rape as a weapon of war, the saturation bombing of 
cities, biological and chemical warfare unleashing lethal viruses and gases, 
and the domestic terrorism of prolonged battery, stalking and child abuse.24  
 
One of Card’s reasons for starting with atrocities as paradigms of evil is a commitment to 
understanding evils as evils and a commitment to valuing the victims’ point of view.  
In the first case, Card claims that it is important to begin with a conception of 
atrocities as evils rather than evil. That is, as a set of terrible events (or terrible series of 
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events, actions, etc), rather than “a metaphysical force….or a demonic psychology.”25 This 
leads to the second commitment made by the atrocity paradigm: the primacy of the 
experience of the victims and the focus on their point of view in the creation of the theory. 
By beginning with harm, we focus on the fact that atrocities are not merely committed they 
are suffered. This emphasis directs us to the victims’ experiences and testimonies as primary 
sources for understanding the nature of atrocity and evils.  
 With that background on Card’s project, recall from above that “intolerable harm” is 
the first component of her theory of evil. Although pointing to the list of atrocities gives us a 
first pass intuitive understanding of what she could mean by “intolerable harm,” we need to 
be clearer on what, exactly, is meant by this term.  
 To begin, intolerable harm is severe harm. Where severity of harm: 
is a function of such factors as (1) intensity of suffering, (2) effects on one’s 
ability to function (to work, for example) and (3) on the quality of one’s 
relationship with others, (4) how containable the harm is (what Bentham 
quaintly called its ‘fecundity’), (5) how reversible, (6) possibilities of 
compensation, and also (7) durability and (8) the number of victims.26 
 
In saying that the severity of harm is a function of different factors Card does not mean to 
assert a straightforward harm calculus. In the first place, it is not clear that many of the 
dimensions on this list can be quantified (for example, the impact of the event on the quality 
of one’s relationships with others). Rather, what she means to suggest is that “harm” is 
multifaceted, and the most severe evils will be extreme instances of harm along its various 
dimensions.  
 Beyond merely articulating the dimensions of harm, we can give a more general 
explanation of what makes harm severe. Severe harm:   
                                                 
25 Card, 9. 
26 Card, 14. 
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deprives, or seriously risks depriving, others of the basics that are necessary to 
make a life possible and tolerable or decent (or to make a death decent). Such 
basics includes uncontaminated food, water and air; sleep; freedom from 
severe and prolonged pain and from debilitating fear; affective ties with other 
human beings; the ability to make choices and act on them; and a sense of 
one’s own worth as a person.27  
 
That is, severe harms are intolerable harms, where intolerable is a normative concept.  Card 
defines a tolerable life as “at least minimally worth living for its own sake and from the 
standpoint of the being whose life it is, not just as a means to the ends of others.”28 Again, 
what exactly this amounts to and the justification for taking it as a conception of a “tolerable” 
life is much more than we need to get into here. What is important for our purposes is the 
attempt to isolate and focus on that kind of harm that makes one’s life possible, harms that 
make it impossible to live a minimally decent human life. This standard is clearly tied to the 
point of view of the subject of the harms. But, given the extreme nature of the harms, the 
subjectivity does not threaten to explode the list or undermine its integrity. Rather, the point 
is to emphasize the experience of the victim, and recognize some (reasonable) room for 
variation across particular persons. 
 With this brief overview of Card’s understanding of intolerable harm, we can see that 
intolerable harm alone is not sufficient for capturing the unique nature of atrocities. To see 
this, take the example of contaminated water. The second cholera pandemic (caused by 
drinking contaminated water) reached Paris in 1832, killing 20,000 people in that city alone. 
Although this involves widespread severe harm, it is not the same as the other atrocities on 
Card’s list.  As she writes: 
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severe and unremitting pain or humiliation, debilitating and disfiguring 
diseases, starvation, extreme impotence, and severe enforced isolation are 
evils when they are brought about or supported by culpable wrongdoing.29  
 
Intolerable harm can be brought about by a natural disaster, or by a series of terrible 
coincidental events outside the control of human agency. People whose lives are 
characterized by these non-intentionally inflicted harms live what Card refers to as “wretched 
lives,” and deserve our support in the alleviation of these conditions, but they are not victims 
of atrocities. Atrocities involve not just severe harm, but intentionally inflicted severe harm. 
Card names this second element of atrocities “culpable wrongdoing,” the further discussion 
of which I now turn.  
 Harms are evils when they are both severe/intolerable (as discussed above) and when 
they are: (1) reasonably foreseeable (or appreciable) and (2) culpably inflicted (or tolerated, 
aggravated or maintained). Thus, the element of ‘culpable wrongdoing’ amounts to a king of 
intentional infliction of intolerable harm. Rather than fully explore the distinctions and 
definitions that provide Card with the tools to build a more robust theory of culpable 
wrongdoing, I will present only those relevant to understanding what Card means by 
“intentional infliction.” To understand this aspect of the definition we need to make at least 
two distinctions: evil intentions from evil motives and evildoers from evil persons.   
 According to Card, an evil intention is “a culpable intention to do someone 
intolerable harm, or to do something with that foreseeable result, even if the intention does 
not succeed.”30 Where, “evil deed” refers to cases where the intention is successful, and 
where culpability can involve:   
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(1) the aim to bring about intolerable harm, (2) the willingness to do so in the 
course of pursuing an otherwise acceptable aim or in adhering to some other 
value or principle, or (3) the failure to attend to risks or take them seriously.31  
 
The creation of a statewide plan to exterminate an ethnic minority, the knowing 
implementation of an economic policy that will result in the death of thousands of citizens 
and failing to address an infrastructural feature of a city that puts the lives of thousands at 
risk will all count as culpable intentions.  
 Keeping in mind the goal of explaining the nature of atrocities, we ought to note that 
it is often insufficient to work solely with concepts appropriate for evaluating whether an 
individual is evil. Often, the intolerable harms are carried out through formal institutions, or 
are otherwise the result of the functioning of such institutions. So, a definition of evil 
institution is needed:  
An institution, law or practice is evil not only when its purpose is inhumane 
(as with bullfighting) but also when it is reasonably foreseeable by those with 
power to change it that intolerably harmful injustices will result from its 
normal or correct operation (as many believe true of capital punishment).32 
 
We can imagine a non-evil institution whose offices are filled with evil persons, or we can 
imagine an evil institution where the offices are filled with non-evil persons. For our 
purposes, we need not settle these issues either, but follow Card in the suggestion that we 
should allow for the existence of evil institutions and be sure to clarify whether we are 
attributing the evil-status to particular individuals or to institutions themselves.  
Card’s analysis of atrocity demonstrates the potential for diversity among the 
members of the class of atrocities. Her aim is to identify the features shared by all atrocities. 
Our investigation, on the other hand, has a narrower scope. We are interested in just those 
atrocities that are crimes against humanity. This analysis of culpability in the conception of 
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atrocities, and the distinctions needed to understand the full breadth of atrocities, suggests a 
means by which to further differentiate kinds of atrocities. In particular, not all atrocities are 
crimes against humanity, and the distinctions within ‘culpable wrongdoing’ provide 
resources to draw on in carving out this subset. The web of distinctions can better help us 
distinguish this narrower classification, while locating it within a larger set of atrocities. The 
next section is devoted to distinguishing crime against humanity as a subset of the moral 
category of atrocity, using the features of crime against humanity as identified in the legal 
definition. 
 
AN ANALYSIS OF CRIME AGAINST HUMANITY  
 
 Now that we have both the legal definition and the Atrocity Paradigm on the table, 
we can move to directly addressing the aim of this chapter - giving an analysis of ‘crime 
against humanity’ that can meet the challenge posed by Vernon. To begin the analysis, let’s 
start with the first clause of the legal definition: crimes against humanity are widespread and 
systematic attacks on civilian populations. I take this brief clause as our starting point and the 
heart of the definition of crime against humanity.   
Crimes against humanity differ, initially, from other evils insofar as they are 
widespread and systematic. They are attacks on a large number of people, executed 
according to some kind of plan, or by a body capable of systemic of systematic attacks. 
These two aspects of the scope of the crime – that it is widespread and systematic – pick out 
for attention two different features of these evils. ‘Widespread’ indicates that there are a large 
number of victims, or that the attack was an attack on a large number of people. ‘Systematic’ 
on the other hand, points to scope of the perpetrator and the execution of the attack. Only 
certain kinds of entities or agents will be capable of executing a systematic attack on a 
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population – namely, one with multiple individuals engaged in executing the attack and 
organized in such a way that coordinated action is possible.33  
This initial aspect of the analysis invites gray area with respect to which atrocities 
count as crime against humanity. For example, paying attention to whether harm is 
widespread and brought about by an entity capable of coordinated execution of the attack, 
and according to some kind of plan or intention to cause this harm – we may wonder if 
something like Mao’s Great Leap Forward, or the social and economic policies enacted by 
the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia that resulted in mass starvation count as crime against 
humanity. These economic and social policies seem clearly to meet the criteria of affecting a 
large number of people, in a systematic way. However, we may think that they are not the 
same as the killing fields in Cambodia, or the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. I think this kind of 
fuzzy border or gray case is appropriate. With the Holocaust, apartheid in South Africa, and 
the rape camps in Yugoslavia we have paradigm cases of crimes against humanity to guide 
our analysis. That all of the horrific harms that governments have caused their own people 
fail to fall within one natural class, but rather have similarities and differences along a 
number of dimensions, should be expected.  
With this expectation of a family resemblance rather than a natural kind – we can still 
do more work to try to differentiate crimes against humanity from other large-scale atrocities. 
The emphasis on ‘civilian populations’ in the analysis of crimes against humanity points to a 
morally important relationship between the perpetrators and the victims. Crimes against 
humanity are a unique moral category, in part because the victims of the attacks are in 
                                                 
33 Crimes against humanity are widespread and systematic in my analysis. The International Criminal Court 
tends to treat these features of atrocities disjunctively, such that crimes against humanity are widespread, or 
systematic or both. I suspect this is because the court is subject to a standard of proof, which can be met more 
clearly for the ‘widespread’ criterion than the ‘systematic’ criterion.  
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positions of extreme vulnerability (often, to the perpetrators). To explain this element more 
clearly, consider the nature of the relationship between a government and those who live 
under it. We often think of governments as entities whose purpose includes the protection of 
those subject to them. They consist of institutions whose functions include not only the 
coordination of citizens (rules for driving on the same side of the road, zoning regulations, 
and the like) but also the protection of the citizens from both one another and from external 
threats. Thus, when a group of citizens is attacked by their own government or governmental 
officials (or the government is powerless or negligent enough to sit idle while the citizens are 
attacked by another internal group), we cannot help but see the victims as particularly and 
woefully vulnerable. The entity charged with the security of the citizens against this kind of 
attack, is now directly attacking them (or standing idly by).  
People are dependent on and vulnerable to the governments under which they live. 
Human beings have needs in virtue of the kinds of lives they live: human beings have bodies 
that can become sick and suffer pain from assault, many live in communities that require not 
only day to day coordination, but are themselves required for many of our pursuits 
(cultivation of relationships, including family and friends, careers, hobbies). What I have 
called pursuits are valued by those whose pursuits they are, and engaging in them, cultivating 
them, and enjoying them require a great deal of time, energy and focus. In order for us to 
pursue these goods, human beings need to entrust a great deal of day to day security and 
coordination to the governments in which they live. Thus, governments are entrusted with 
material goods, and powers. People are not merely dependent on their governments for these 
things, but can be said to entrust (by participation in the institution, including obeying the 
laws, payment of taxes and the like) the government with these goods.  
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Trust is an important feature of a person’s relationship to her government. One cannot 
help, for the most part, but depend on a government. This dependence and trust is reflected in 
many features of governments. We often create rules for our institutions that attempt to 
render the dependence reasonable, or otherwise, rescindable. Many governments build in 
systems of representation and election that can remove officials, or build in mechanisms for 
sanctioning officials. The entrusting of the officials is often indicated by public oaths, and 
swearing-in ceremonies. In many ways, we view positions of power in governments as “at 
the will” of the community, as positions of privilege.  
  Not only do people depend on their governments, by entrusting them with certain 
powers and resources, governments often enjoy a monopoly on force in order to carry out the 
purposes of the institutions. In order for a government to carry out its aims, it needs access to 
resources, including militaries and police forces. It needs mechanisms of coercing 
compliance with certain rules in order to achieve the ends for which we need a government in 
the first place, and it often requires some mechanism for ensuring the safety of the citizens 
from those outside.   
Moreover, governments often exercise their coercive power with the presumption of 
legitimacy. In order for a government to effectively accomplish its ends, citizens must trust it 
to do so. That is, part of the entrusting of the government with the resources to use coercive 
force often involves the presumption that day-to-day this power is being used justly. If each 
individual were to engage in constant and perpetual oversight of the actions of the 
government, the purpose of having the government would be undermined. Again, we often 
build in more and less formal mechanisms of oversight, but the point of doing so is that 
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individuals can assume (and often do) that the government is acting by rights in any 
particular case.  
This dependence on those in power is a description of people in general; however, it 
is exaggerated in contexts that unfortunately describe many areas of the world: radical 
poverty, deeply rooted racial or tribal animosities, and systematic power inequalities. 
Poverty, conflict and inequality make lives difficult to live well and precarious. Moreover, 
those who are radically poor, or engaged in internal violent conflicts, have limited resources 
to appeal to or draw on for aid. It is these features of some communities that governments are 
able to address through the centralization of resources and powers. Governments can try to 
mitigate or change systematic features of a community, and those in power are trusted to 
address.  
Returning to the aim of this discussion, giving an analysis of crimes against 
humanity, we have moved to understanding crimes against humanity as attacks on groups of 
people who have entrusted their resources for protection to some government. The people 
attacked remain dependent (as above) on the government for its protection. Thus, when the 
government or those in power attack civilians using the resources meant to protect them (or 
do nothing to stop an attack) the vulnerability of the civilians is being exploited. Those 
attacked have (perhaps necessarily) given over certain goods and powers that are now being 
used against them. The entity one would turn to for protection or aid is the attacker, or 
complicit in the attack.34  
Keeping in mind Card’s analysis of atrocities in general, we can see that crimes 
against humanity, understood as exploitations by the government of the extreme vulnerability 
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of the civilians, are only a subset of the evils she describes. In particular, these kinds of evils 
are those in which intolerable harm is caused, or is otherwise the result of, evil institutions. 
The institutions at issue are governments, and the ‘evil’ nature of them is a kind of perversity. 
It is not only that the institution has an evil aim or purpose, but that the institution’s purpose 
is abandoned and inverted. 
What remains from our initial characterization of crimes against humanity is an 
analysis of ‘attack.’ Attacks are characterized by causing severe harm. As in Card’s theory of 
evil, the legal definition of crime against humanity places a central importance on the 
severity of harm caused to the victims. Recall that part of the legal definition includes a list 
of actions that when done systematically to a great number of people constitute crime against 
humanity:  
(a) Murder;  (b) Extermination;  (c) Enslavement; (d) Deportation or forcible 
transfer of population; (e) Imprisonment or other severe deprivation of 
physical liberty in violation of fundamental rules of international law;  (f) 
Torture; (g) Rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, 
enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence of comparable 
gravity;  (h) Persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on 
political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender as defined in 
paragraph 3, or other grounds that are universally recognized as impermissible 
under international law, in connection with any act referred to in this 
paragraph or any crime within the jurisdiction of the Court;  (i) Enforced 
disappearance of persons;  (j) The crime of apartheid… 
 
These actions are among the most horrific things that can be carried out by human beings 
against other human beings. However, presented merely with the list, we can ask: why these 
actions and not others? Card’s atrocity paradigm can help us explain in virtue of what 
something would or could appear on the list of terrible actions that constitute crime against 
humanity: they cause severe harm. 
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Take, for example, the use of rape, from (g) of the legal definition. Victims of rape in 
war often report extremely intense suffering both at the time of the rape and in the aftermath 
of it. It often severely impairs the ability of the victims to move forward and function not 
only day to day, but to pursue projects and plans in the future, and it compromises the 
victim’s ability to trust others, and thus adversely affects not only her current relationships, 
but potential future relationships. The harm of rape in war is not containable, that is, it seems 
to bleed out into all other aspects of the life of the victim, it is not reversible, it stays with the 
victim for a lifetime, and it is unclear what could even count as “compensation” for it.  
Finally, rape as a weapon of war is just that, a strategic and systematic use of rape against a 
population of victims as a means of conducting war.35  
 The terrible actions that constitute crime against humanity are those that cause severe 
harm, understood as severe along these various dimensions of harm. Card’s further analysis 
of what makes harm severe, that it “deprives someone of the basics that are necessary to 
make a life possible and tolerable or decent” can serve as a more general characterization of 
the terrible actions that constitute the legal definition. That is, crimes against humanity are 
attacks on civilian populations that exploit the vulnerability of the civilians and cause them 
harm that deprives (or seriously risks depriving) them of the basics that make life possible, 
tolerable or decent.  
One might worry about this emphasis on severe harm as a way to explain why the 
terrible actions in the legal definition are what they are. One may think that something else 
explains why those terrible actions make the list and not others. In particular, one may find it 
attractive to explain the principle for sorting the relevant ways of harming a large number of 
                                                 
35 For example, in the Bosnian War the estimated number of victims of rape as a weapon of war is between 
20,000-50,000 people. 
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civilians in a systematic way in terms of basic human rights rather than harm. I prefer the 
latter for two reasons. The first, following Card, Young and Arendt, is the importance of 
keeping central to our theorizing the victims of the crimes. By focusing on the harm to the 
victims, we keep central the orientation to evil as evils that are suffered. The rights 
framework runs the risk that Vernon poses above, of over ‘legalizing’ the moral core of the 
conception of crime against humanity by describing it in a way that victims do not relate to 
or feel alienated by. Vernon’s challenge is to give an account that makes sense of the evils 
experienced by the victims, and the language of rights can be (if not parochial in the 
derogatory sense) alien to and alienating for the victims. Although one can experience an 
action as having one’s rights violated, it may be that only in certain kinds of societies do 
people conceptualize their experiences this way. It is not that I object to there being a legal 
definition of crime against humanity at all (as clearly I am relying on just that in this project). 
Rather, I prefer to give a characterization of the events the legal definition picks out that is 
located as much as possible in the experience of the victims, rather than in a political 
framework.  
Moreover, one need not hold that appeals to human rights are nothing more than 
“non-sense on stilts” to recognize that there are theoretical problems with positing basic 
human rights that are better to avoid if one can. The first is that it is difficult to identify what 
‘basic human rights’ are, both in terms of their normative grounding and a specified form. 
The aim of my appeal to severe harm is to explain why the terrible actions on the list are the 
terrible actions on the list (makes life impossible, intolerable or indecent). In order for a basic 
human rights approach to do so, we would have to know what the basic human rights are. 
That is, we would need to see some kind of list or specification of the rights. However, once 
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we generate such a list of basic human rights, we can raise the same question of it that we did 
for the list of terrible actions in the definition of crime against humanity: why these and not 
something else?  Answering this requires giving the normative foundations for the basic 
human rights. Not only would this risk taking us too far a field of our project, it may well 
lead us right back to an account similar to that of severe harm developed by Card.   
In my view, rather than get stuck in the mire of basic human rights it is better to refer 
to something that we will all agree exists, even if its boundaries are somewhat blurry. There 
are identifiable ways in which peoples’ lives can be made impossible or intolerable, and 
suffering can be worse along a number of dimensions. Crimes against humanity are, in part, 
characterized by being very bad along a number of the dimensions of suffering, such that 
they make people’s lives if not impossible, than indecent or intolerable.  
With this brief digression, we can end this analysis with a positive account of what 
crimes against humanity are, that respects both the legal and the moral uses of the term. 
Crimes against humanity are widespread and systematic attacks on civilian populations, 
where widespread refers to the number of the victims, and systematic refers to both the 
nature of the perpetrators (organized in such a way and powerful enough that they are 
capable of executing a plan of attack) and the manner of the execution. Finally, ‘attack’ picks 
out those things that governments do to their citizens that exploit the vulnerability of the 
civilians to the government itself that cause severe harm that deprives or risks depriving 
people of the basics that make life possible, tolerable or decent.  
That crimes against humanity can be and often are committed by governments against 
their own people makes them a particularly interesting and important category for 
international justice. Often, international justice and international law is primarily concerned 
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with the behavior and rights of states with respect to one another. This leaves things like 
crimes against humanity under-explored or out of the picture entirely. In particular, crimes 
against humanity raise a unique challenge to accounts of international jurisdiction, because 
the normative resources often available to answer this question consist of those appropriate 
for governing the relationships between states, rather than the behavior of states or 
governments with respect to their own people. The complexity of the jurisdiction question for 
crime against humanity, and the problems with the traditional resources for addressing it, are 
the subject of the next chapter.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER TWO  
 
THE NUREMBERG PROBLEM AND ITS PROBLEMS 
 
 
THE NUREMBERG PROBLEM 
 
In Chapter One I developed an analysis of “crime against humanity” as widespread 
and systematic attacks on civilian populations that exploit the vulnerability of the civilians 
and cause them harm that deprives (or seriously risks depriving) them of what makes life 
possible, tolerable or decent. These attacks can occur wholly within the territory of a state 
and be perpetrated by the officials of that government. This feature of crimes against 
humanity creates a unique jurisdictional puzzle. Crimes against humanity are unlike war 
crimes or crimes of aggression that clearly cross borders and potentially endanger the safety 
and security of members of other states. We could cite the fact that war crimes or crimes of 
aggression involve harm to, or at least the interests of, other states as reason for them falling 
under the jurisdiction of the international (as opposed to some domestic) criminal law. 
However, prima facie, this kind of reason is unavailable for crime against humanity. This 
puzzle about crimes against humanity is at the heart of this project, and is captured by the 
question guiding this thesis: Could an international tribunal have the standing to prosecute 
perpetrators of crime against humanity, and if so, in virtue of what does it have this 
standing? 
This jurisdiction question can be, and often is, formulated as an argument against the 
standing of external bodies to prosecute crimes against humanity. I call this argument the 
  38
Nuremberg Problem. The aim of this chapter is to evaluate three strategies for ‘solving’ the 
Nuremberg Problem. I begin by presenting the Nuremberg Problem, and the three standard 
responses to it. For each strategy I present a particular account that represents the general 
approach, as well as challenges to and worries about both the particular accounts and the 
general approach. I conclude with the suggestion that to respond to the Nuremberg Problem 
we first need a better understanding of the status of sovereign states.  
The Nuremberg Problem is the following a short argument against the prosecution of 
crimes against humanity by bodies external to the state in which the crimes have been 
committed: 
(1) A sovereign state has the right against external bodies to non-interference 
with respect to the governing prerogatives of that state. (Premise) 
 
(2) A political or legal response to self-regarding events is a governing 
prerogative of a sovereign state. (Premise) By definition, a self-regarding 
event is an event that occurs wholly within the territorial boundaries of a 
single sovereign state, is carried out only by members of that state, and is 
carried out only against members of that state. 
 
(3) So: A sovereign state has the right against external bodies to non-
interference with respect to a legal response to self-regarding events. (1, 2) 
 
This first part of the argument establishes a plausible right of states to political autonomy. 
Sovereign states have a right against other individuals, groups, communities, and the like 
actively becoming involved, against the will of the officials of the state, with the governing 
prerogatives (including the appropriate responses to wrong doing or violations of law) that 
concern only citizens of the state in question.  
(4) Crimes against humanity (i.e., systematic and widespread attacks on 
civilians by the civilians’ sovereign state) can occur wholly within the 
territorial boundaries of a sovereign state, are carried out only by members of 
that state, and are carried out only against members of that state. (Premise) 
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(5) So: Crimes against humanity can be self-regarding events. (4, definition of 
self-regarding) 
 
Steps 4 and 5 restate the jurisdictionally salient aspects of crimes against humanity, and 
locate the crimes as self-regarding events. They are evils conducted by perpetrators capable 
of widespread and systematic attacks on a civilian population. This includes officials of the 
state in which the civilian population in question resides, and thus, it can be the case that 
some atrocities concern only citizens of the state in question. Moreover, they can take place 
exclusively within the physical territory of a state (they can fail to physically cross borders 
into the domain of other states), further reinforcing that the crimes against humanity in 
question can be matters that concern only members of the state in which they occur.  
(6) So: sovereign states can have a right to non-interference against external 
bodies with respect to the legal response to crimes against humanity in some 
cases (viz., those cases where the crime against humanity is a self-regarding 
event). (3,5) 
 
No community or group other than the one involved in the atrocities, or operating 
legitimately according to that state, can be justified in violating the state’s right against 
external interference to perpetrators of crime against humanity who are officials of a 
sovereign state and the crimes in question took place within the physical territory of that 
state.   
 
STRATEGIES FOR RESPONDING TO THE PROBLEM 
There are two broad strategies for solving the Nuremberg Problem: statist and 
cosmopolitan. Statists hold that international institutions or other external bodies can have 
standing to prosecute crimes against humanity in virtue of the fact that the atrocities in 
question cross the territorial borders (either physically or morally) of the states in which they 
occur. Statists accept the first part (steps 1-3) of the Nuremberg Problem argument, but deny 
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the premise in (4). They deny that crimes against humanity are rightly seen as falling 
exclusively within the political boundaries of the states in question. If the atrocities cross 
borders, the state in which they occur cannot reasonably claim that they are solely a matter of 
the self-governance of that state, as other states or the international community would have a 
legitimate interest in the events.   
Cosmopolitans, on the other hand, accept the second part of the Nuremberg Problem 
argument (steps 4 and 5), but deny the premise in (1). They deny that political and legal 
responses to crimes against humanity fall within the governing prerogatives of the state. That 
is, cosmopolitans hold that there are some events that concern only members of the state, and 
take place within the state, but do not fall within the governing prerogatives of the state. They 
argue that international institutions or other external bodies can have standing to prosecute 
perpetrators of crimes against humanity in virtue of protecting or ensuring the basic human 
rights (or well-being) of individual persons. When a state fails to do so (by perpetrating or 
allowing crimes against humanity) it no longer has a claim to the right to political autonomy 
and external bodies can have the standing to prosecute those responsible for the atrocities.  
 
STATIST STRATEGY: WAR NEXUS 
 
As mentioned above, the general statist strategy is to deny (4) in the Nuremberg 
Problem. The first way of doing so is to tie crimes against humanity to the physical 
transgression of borders. This position holds that an external body has jurisdiction when 
crimes against humanity either spill over the borders of a state, or they are part of the build 
up to or execution of aggressive war. Thus, these other states or the international society of 
which they are a part have the standing to hold the perpetrators accountable.  
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The drafters of the London Charter for the International Military Tribunal were 
clearly aware of the jurisdictional puzzle created by introducing crime against humanity as an 
international crime. The drafters resolved this puzzle quite straightforwardly for the situation 
they were charged with addressing. Recall from above the definition of crime against 
humanity found in the London Charter, that the drafters defined crime against humanity as:  
murder, extermination, enslavements, deportation, and other inhumane acts 
committed against any civilian population, before or during the war; or 
persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds in execution of or in 
connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal.36  [emphasis 
added] 
 
Most important for our purposes is the definitional relationship between crime against 
humanity and aggressive war. The drafters defined crimes against humanity in such a way 
that to count as crime against humanity, the acts committed against the civilian population 
must be connected to war or aggression on the part of the state perpetrating or permitting the 
atrocities. As it involves tying crimes against humanity explicitly and intentionally to war 
crimes and crimes of aggression this strategy is often referred to as the war nexus approach. 
The chief virtue of this approach is what I will refer to as its accessibility. By 
accessibility I mean that what is recommended by this statist argument is something that 
those subject to the international law can understand and see as at least possible or plausible 
revisions or extensions of the law as it is. At the time the argument was employed by the 
creators of the International Military Tribunal it comported well with a dominant view of the 
moral status of political borders. It was recognizable as a legitimate argument by those who 
were in a position to conduct the trials. Moreover, it was an insightful legal maneuver that 
allowed the allied powers to prosecute in the case at hand something that had never been 
                                                 
36 London Charter (1945).  
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prosecuted before. This accessibility manifests an important methodological commitment for 
approaches looking to ground the standing to prosecute atrocities: progressive conservatism.  
Progressive conservatism is the methodological requirement that “theory should build 
upon, or at least not squarely contradict, the more morally acceptable principles of the 
existing international legal system.”37 When giving a moral theory of international law it is 
important to work from the normative foundations that have been developed and (more or 
less) agreed to by the international community itself. The political and legal articulations of 
the normative foundations for institutions and foundational conventions have been developed 
over a great number of years by people from all over the world, and are the result of an 
intergenerational international political process. Respect for this process is important in order 
to fulfill the commitment articulated in the Introduction to this dissertation to building a 
moral theory of international law that is appropriately institutional.38  
Although the war nexus strategy for solving the Nuremberg Problem is 
straightforward and has proved to be successful in introducing crimes against humanity into 
international criminal law, the strategy loses its force when viewed as a general approach to 
grounding jurisdiction outside the state in which the crimes occurred. In the first case the war 
nexus definition of crime against humanity does not apply to all cases in which the officials 
of a state permit or perpetrate a widespread and systematic attack of their fellow citizens. The 
war nexus approach does not exhaust the salient category of crimes against humanity that 
was developed in Chapter One of this thesis. Insofar as we have identified an important 
                                                 
37 Allen Buchanan, Justice, Legitimacy, and Self-Determination: Moral Foundations for International Law 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), “Introduction.” 
 
38 Respect for this process and the outcomes of the intergenerational, international efforts does not imply 
complete subservience to the actual laws – but rather, engagement with them and recognition of them as 
important manifestations of a political process we should take seriously and learn from.  
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group of actions that ought to be criminalized, this strategy will not treat the category as a 
discrete class.  
One might think that it is not an objection to the war-nexus approach that it holds that 
an external body does not have standing with respect to all cases of crime against humanity. 
Even if crime against humanity does form a class of the kind I identified in Chapter One, it 
may be the case that external bodies’ standing to prosecute does not apply to each member of 
the class. The strength of this response to my objection relies on the nature and strength of 
the principle by which one splits the category of crime against humanity into those external 
bodies can prosecute and those they cannot. If the reason for holding that only some crimes 
against humanity are within the jurisdiction of external bodies is a morally important reason, 
the war nexus approach is not as problematic as I have presented it as.  
 The reason appealed to by the war nexus approach is the integrity of territorial 
boundaries of states. This approach holds that external bodies only have standing when the 
crimes against humanity cross or spill over the borders of the state in which they occur. The 
approach itself relies on the moral status of territorial borders implying that no external 
bodies have standing on the behavior of states with respect to their own people in the absence 
of the consent of the state whose borders are at issue (and only concerning those matters that 
the state has explicitly consented to being bound by). This reliance on a strong right to 
territorial integrity is a position that I challenge in more detail in Chapter Three, and so I will 
reserve the major discussion of the problems with this assumption there. Here I want to draw 
attention to the importance of the right of territorial integrity implicit in this approach, and 
how the viability of the approach relies on this assumption.  
 
 
  44
STATIST STRATEGY: HARM TO HUMANITY 
 
Turning now to the second statist approach - arguing that crimes against humanity 
harm humanity. The harm to humanity position holds that crimes against humanity harm not 
only the victims, but humanity or the international community itself. In this way, crimes 
against humanity are not confined within the states in which they occur. So, crimes against 
humanity fall outside the governing prerogatives of the state. Statists of this second kind 
argue that insofar as humanity is harmed, some body or institution representing humanity has 
the standing to prosecute the perpetrators of these crimes.  
The most thorough version of this approach is presented in Larry May’s Crime 
Against Humanity: A Normative Account. May’s argument begins with a defense of two 
foundational principles: the Security Principle (SP) and the International Harm Principle 
(IHP). The SP states:  
If a state deprives its subjects of physical security or subsistence, or is unable 
or unwilling to protect its subjects from harms to security or subsistence,  
a) then that state has no right to prevent international bodies from “crossing 
its borders” in order to protect those subjects or remember their harms;  
b) and then international bodies may be justified in “crossing the borders” of 
a sovereign state when genuinely acting to protect those subjects.39  
 
This first principle ties the sovereignty of a state to its willingness and ability to protect its 
subjects. SP is a way of rebutting the strong moral presumption against crossing the borders 
of a state. It does not claim that the international community should prosecute any time the 
security principle is breached. Rather, SP establishes in what set of circumstances it may be 
justified – those in which the sovereignty of the state in question does not have a moral 
presumption against interference (or a right to non-interference) because it fails to meet the 
requirements for sovereignty.  
                                                 
39 Larry May, Crimes Against Humanity: A Normative Account, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2005), 68. 
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 In defense of SP, May argues that when a state attacks or refuses to defend a group of 
its citizens, the citizens are no longer under an obligation to obey the laws of that state. This 
indicates, for May, that the state is no longer sovereign or can enjoy the rights of sovereignty. 
If the state is no longer sovereign, then there is no reason to grant it the moral presumption in 
favor of not crossing its borders or respecting its right to non-interference. Thus, international 
bodies could be justified in crossing its borders. Notice, the SP merely establishes that 
someone or other could legitimately cross the borders of the state to prosecute the 
perpetrators of the atrocities. This does not establish that it is the international community 
that uniquely has the jurisdiction to do so.  
To understand how May establishes that it is the international community as such that 
has the standing to prosecute, let us turn to his second principle: the International Harm 
Principle. The IHP states:  
Only when there is serious harm to the international community, should 
international prosecutions against individual perpetrators be conducted, where 
normally this will require a showing of harm to the victims that is based on 
non-individualized characteristics of the individual, such as the individual’s 
group membership or is perpetrated by, or involves, a State or other collective 
entity.40 
 
May presents this principle as explaining only the justification to prosecute particular evils 
and not a further specification of who has the jurisdiction to prosecute crime against 
humanity. I present IHP as doing the latter because without it playing this role, SP alone does 
not establish the standing of an international body that represents ‘humanity.’ 
With IHP we see that for May, “what sets paradigmatic international crimes apart 
from domestic crimes is that, in some sense, humanity is harmed when these crimes are 
                                                 
40 May, 83.  
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perpetrated.”41 This reflects the distinction between the criminal law and the public law more 
generally in the domestic setting.  As May writes,  
criminal law is a subset of public law – the harms that are the subject of 
prosecution are not private but public in the sense that the public is harmed 
when the individual is harmed by certain crime.42 [emphasis added] 
 
In international law those harms that are subject to international criminal prosecution are 
those that affect the relevant community, i.e. the world community or all of humanity, in the 
same way that crimes in the domestic setting are said to harm the (more) local community. 
Given this analogy it seems that at the foundation of May’s account is a commitment to 
thinking that being harmed (perhaps in a very particular way) grounds the jurisdiction to 
prosecute.  
 This leads to the next question for May’s analysis: how can humanity be harmed? He 
identifies three general ways of answering this question. (A) An individual human being is 
harmed, and thereby, the whole of humanity is also harmed. (B) Some significant 
characteristic of humanity is harmed, perhaps by harming it within each member of 
humanity. (C) All of mankind is harmed.  
May goes on to argue that (A) is not promising unless it can be made more 
intelligible. It is not clear what kind of part-whole relationship individual persons stand in 
with mankind as such. We could say that each individual person instantiates (or exemplifies, 
or participates in) the property “mankind.” However, this makes the claim that humanity has 
been harmed trivial, because it seems to imply that each time an individual is harmed, 
humanity is harmed. (C) is also unhelpful, because short of the most extreme cases 
imaginable (perhaps a nuclear war that results in the destruction of life on nearly all 
                                                 
41 May, 82. 
 
42 Ibid.  
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landmasses) an action will not directly harm each member of mankind. That leaves May with 
option (B): crimes against humanity are those acts that harm a significant characteristic of 
humanity.   
 May glosses ‘acts that harm a significant characteristic of humanity’ as those things 
that harm or otherwise assault the humanity of particular persons. Although he does not fully 
articulate what constitutes a person’s “humanity,” he argues that a person’s humanity is 
assaulted when she is picked out for bad treatment on the basis of having certain 
characteristics associated with membership in a particular social group and membership in 
that group is out of her control. He writes:  
If an individual is treated according to group-characteristics that are out of that 
person’s control, there is a straightforward assault on that person’s humanity. 
It is as if the individuality of the person were being ignored, and the person 
were being treated as a mere representative of a group that the person has not 
chosen to join.43 
 
When this happens the person’s individuality is ignored, because she is treated as a mere 
representative of some group and the membership is not her choice. This group-based harm 
is a kind of callous disregard for the individuality of the person, and in May’s terminology, 
an assault on her humanity. 
May claims that humanity has an interest in this kind of group-based harm to 
individuals, writing “in my view humanity has interests. One interest of humanity is that its 
members, as members not be harmed.”44 That ‘humanity’ can have interests is a difficult 
claim to understand. Recognizing this, May supports the claim by analogy to other kinds of 
groups that we can think of as having interests. For May, the claim that humanity has 
interests is 
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44 May, 82.  
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similar to the claim that a club has an interest that its members, as members, 
not be harmed. For when the club’s members are harmed in this way, the 
harms adversely affect the reputation or the club, and even the ability of the 
club to remain in existence.45 
 
This analogy is only meant to point us to the sense in which humanity can have an interest. I 
will return to this analogy and problems with it below.   
In understanding the claim that humanity has an interest, we also need to understand 
why humanity would have this interest in group-based harms to individuals. May’s argument 
is that:  
while the nature of the crime may be difficult to determine, the international 
community is likely to be harmed when the perpetrators of a crime do not 
react to the individual features of a person, but rather to those features that the 
individual shares with all, or very many others, or if the perpetrator of the 
harm is, or involves, a State or other collective entity rather than being merely 
perpetrated by an individual human person.46  
 
This explanation of humanity’s interest in group-based harms to individuals ties this harm 
directly to the risk of harm to others. The group ‘humanity’ has an interest in group-based 
harms to individuals, because the group-based harms to individuals represent a risk to the 
international community itself. More pointedly, May writes:  
Humanity is a victim when the intentions of individual perpetrators or the 
harms of individual victims are based on group characteristics rather than on 
individual characteristics. Humanity is implicated, and in a sense, victimized, 
when the sufferer merely stands in for larger segments of the population who 
are not treated according to individual differences among fellow humans, but 
only according to group characteristics.47  
 
This extended discussion of humanity’s interest in the group-based harms to individuals 
reveals two distinct ways in which humanity could come to have this interest. The first is that 
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the characteristic ‘one’s humanity’ is violated by group-based harms to individuals, and 
therefore, the group that shares this characteristic ‘humanity’ is implicated in the harm to the 
individual. The second is that group-based harms to individuals are important to the group 
‘humanity’ because they are the kinds of harms likely to cross-borders or affect a large 
number of people.  
With May’s position in view, we can now raise questions about it. I will focus on 
three interrelated worries. The first is whether ‘humanity’ is a sufficiently defined group such 
that it can have interests in the way May describes. The second is whether May has provided 
a sufficient explanation for why humanity has an interest in group-based harms to 
individuals. The third is whether the relationship between harm or interest and standing is 
sufficiently established.  
For the first, May acknowledges that humanity is not like a club, or a domestic 
political community, but maintains that analogies to clubs and domestic communities can 
shed light on the sense in which humanity can have interests and, be harmed in virtue of 
having these interests set back. For harm to be to the group qua group, rather than to the 
individual members of the group, we need a clear account of setting back the interests of the 
group as a group. For groups that take the form of voluntary associations, for example a 
school sports team, things that make the actions of the group impossible are clear cases of 
group harm.  
For example, damage to the gym that makes practicing impossible is harm to the 
basketball team, as a team. For cases like the ones at issue in this discussion, it is not clear 
how the actions cause this kind of set back to the group as a group. In saying this, I do not 
want to dismiss ‘humanity’ as a morally salient category, or claim that there is no sense to 
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saying that there are morally salient features of humans as such (something that I will return 
to in Chapter Four). Rather, I want to challenge whether we can think of humanity as a group 
that can be harmed as such.  
May claims that the analogy to voluntary associations is not meant to do the work in 
explaining how humanity can have an interest but merely to shed light on the truth of this 
claim. However, the plausibility of a group being harmed as a group seems to depend on the 
ability to isolate the group and attribute to it some goals, intentions or at least common 
purposes. We may be able to think of a domestic political community as this kind of entity, 
and yet not hold that members of this community are voluntary members in the way clubs 
are, to think that there are discrete aims of that community as a community. Perhaps, to 
protect its members from one another and outside threats or to provide its members with 
education, access to health care or other basic needs. We can sometimes identify the common 
purposes of a community in people’s behavior with respect to one another, or their 
participation in common practices that manifest discrete values, purposes or intentions.  
“Humanity” does not seem to be such a group. To what would we turn to understand 
the common purposes of humanity, such that we could attribute to it particular interests? It is 
not clear how to determine what the interests of humanity itself are. We may think that all of 
humanity has an interest in the continued life of humanity itself and those things that make 
this life possible (although, again, it is hard to know what would support this claim). It is this 
worry that seems to push May, initially, toward the view that harm to humanity is harm to a 
significant characteristic of humanity. Which moves to our second worry with May’s 
strategy. Even if humanity is a group that has interests, why would humanity as a group have 
an interest in group-based harms to individuals?  
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May appears to go back and forth between thinking that humanity has an interest in 
its members as members (that is, humanity harmed when ‘one’s humanity’ is harmed), and 
that humanity has an interest in group-based harm to individuals because these harms are 
potentially more dangerous to more people. It is important to keep these two different bases 
for attributing an interest to humanity distinct. The first runs into the worries and questions I 
raised above about the status of ‘humanity’ as a group, and how we could attribute to that 
group interests.  
The latter runs into the worries that May himself raised for option (A) above. In 
distinguishing different ways to give an analysis of harm to humanity, May argued against 
those who claim that humanity is harmed when human beings are harmed. He argued that 
this strategy posits a mysterious part-whole relationship between individual persons and 
humanity itself that is unintelligible. May’s second way of explaining why humanity has an 
interest in individual group-based harms seems to be a variant on this response. Rather than 
say that any time humanity is harmed when any individual human being is harmed, he claims 
that group-based individual harms harm humanity because they risk harm to a large number 
of people (either within a state or across borders). But, why should we think that the part-
whole relationship is any less mysterious when it is a large number of people instead of one 
person?  
One could avoid this collapse back into the metaphysical morass, by claiming that 
humanity has an interest in group-based individual harms because they risk crossing physical 
borders and destabilizing the international society. If this is the case, then May’s account of 
harm to humanity is not a distinct kind of approach to the Nuremberg Problem, but a 
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sophisticated version of the cross-physical borders approach, and subject to the same worries 
and objections.  
In presenting May’s argument to this point I have been using ‘standing’ and ‘interest’ 
nearly interchangeably. For May, a group’s having a legitimate interest in something is for 
that community to have the standing to hold one accountable for setting back that interest. 
Although May acknowledges a move between harm to humanity and the standing of the 
international community to prosecute crimes against humanity, he does not argue for the 
move. May merely points to the domestic case - to the difference between the public law 
broadly and the criminal law. This is not enough, I contend, for his project of establishing an 
external body’s jurisdiction. There remains a further question about why harm to humanity 
establishes the international community’s standing to prosecute perpetrators of crime against 
humanity. We need an account that moves us from ‘harm’ or ‘interest’ to ‘jurisdiction.’  
 One might want to stop me at this point and object that this third worry about May’s 
analysis is unfair – he should not have the burden of justifying criminal law in order to show 
how there is international jurisdiction for crime against humanity. To this kind of worry I 
want to say: fair enough. May is not required to justify the criminal law. However, he does 
need a general story about how to establish jurisdiction that is plausible for the international 
case. Pointing to the domestic criminal law may be sufficient if everyone could agree that the 
international prosecution of crime against humanity is relevantly similar to the domestic 
criminal prosecution. However, that is the issue in question. The question of the standing to 
prosecute these atrocities is, in part, a question about whether there is an analog of domestic 
criminal law in the international sphere. 
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Given that what we need is an account taking us from harm to jurisdiction, we can 
turn our attention to likely candidates. Luckily enough, there is an available account within 
the broadly Millian liberal tradition. The Millian explanation in question begins with 
grievance evils, and so I will refer to it as the grievance morality account. Grievance evils are 
a special class of wrongs done to specific persons. As Postema describes them, “grievance 
evils are of immediate personal concern to [the specific persons wronged]; the evils directly 
affect their own good and interest, goods in which they have a direct and personal stake.”48 
Joel Feinberg connects these kinds of wrongs to the criminal law, writing:  
When a person has been harmed in one of his vital interests, or even when he 
has been seriously inconvenienced to his great annoyance, a wrong has been 
done to him; he is entitled to complain; he has a grievance to voice; he is the 
victim of injustice; he can demand protection against recurrences; he may 
deserve compensation for his loses.49 
 
So, grievance wrongs are the kinds of things that give us the standing to do something about 
them: to complain, to protect, or to demand compensation. However, it is not enough to 
merely claim that this is the case. An explanation is needed for why it is the case.  
 Postema provides such an explanation in “Politics is About the Grievance.” The key 
move from having a grievance to having the moral standing to hold others accountable is to 
focus on the nature of the goods that one has a grievance about. The personal goods at issue 
are those that ground rights. Rights, in turn, imply duties on the part of others and accord 
particular powers to the bearers of them. Three important powers or competencies, in 
particular: 1) the right to make claims and the right to voice grievances; 2) that others are 
answerable to the rights-bearers to respect the rights in question; 3) rights-bearers can call 
                                                 
48 Gerald J. Postema, “Politics is About the Grievance: Feinberg on the Legal Enforcement of Morals,” Legal 
Theory 11 (2005): 307.  
 
49 Joel Feinberg, The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law: Volume IV, Harmless Wrongdoing  (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1990), 67. 
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upon others to act on their behalf and hold people to duties owed to them, as well as make 
such people answerable for violations of those duties.50 
 This third power or competency is key to getting the moral entitlement to punish off 
the ground. We recognize that, in part, having a right is dependent on having a mechanism 
for enforcing that right. This recognition is manifested in this third power of the rights-
bearer. Combining the power to call upon one another to hold people accountable for 
respecting this right with the assumed presence of an at least minimally legitimate public 
authority in our community, we come to what Postema labels the fourth power of a rights-
bearer: the ability to demand protection of her rights from public authorities. If this power is 
to be meaningful, it must be the case “that public authorities, acting in the name of the 
political community as a whole, have standing to respond to rights-bearers’ calls for 
protection.”51 In this way, we transition from grievance evils being wrongs to particular 
persons, to wrongdoers being answerable to public authorities.  
 I do not think we can borrow this story. There are two important points of tension 
between May’s harm to humanity analysis and the grievance morality account that I want to 
touch on. To begin, notice that in the grievance morality account of the moral standing to 
prosecute it is not the fact that the community is harmed that generates the jurisdiction of the 
political community. Rather, it is the relationship between the rights-bearer and the political 
community, as well as the nature of rights (what it means to have a right to something) that 
provides the normative foundation for jurisdiction. This suggests that discussion of harm to 
humanity as such would be unnecessary, as the normative heavy lifting for the grievance 
                                                 
50 Postema, 307-8. 
 
51 Postema, 309.  
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morality comes in the way in which communities ensure the rights of individuals, not in harm 
to the community itself.  
A further tension between May’s harm to humanity and grievance morality is in what 
he identifies as harm to humanity. Recall from above that the evil in question is setting back 
humanity’s interest in the group-based harm to the individual. Although May’s analysis of 
harm to humanity is meant to preserve a kind of focus on the individual human beings who 
are victims of atrocities, it does not focus on what we might take to be the most obvious (and 
important) ways that these atrocities harm individuals. For example one might think that the 
harms of crimes against humanity are: subjecting the victims to incredible pain, anguish, 
terror, torture, and the like. These are severe harms, and serve as the moral core of our 
analysis of crime against humanity in Chapter One.  These severe harms are absolutely 
grievance evils – they set back the most vital interests of the victims. This is not to deny that 
failing to treat persons as individuals is morally wrong, or that it is an important feature of 
crime against humanity. What I mean to suggest is that May’s harm to humanity is not the 
kind of thing that gets us the grievance morality account up and running. The issue is what 
entities May has playing the particular roles. In attributing an interest that can be set back to 
humanity, he seems to be saying that the body with the grievance is humanity itself, rather 
than the individual who have suffered severe harm.   
Having explored three worries with May’s harm to humanity strategy for solving the 
Nuremberg Problem, it is important to take stock of its virtues. This strategy has two primary 
virtues. First, in locating the normative force of the argument for standing in some kind of 
global group harm, it easily explains why the international community is the relevant 
community with the standing to prosecute the atrocities at issue. The strategy has a clear 
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explanation for why crime against humanity is something the international community (as a 
whole) has the standing to redress: the crime harmed that community.  
Second, this approach demarcates distinct realms of domestic and international 
jurisdiction. States have jurisdiction over those things that concern the people as members of 
domestic communities, or the domestic communities themselves. The international 
community has jurisdiction for those things that concern humanity itself. Having seen that 
the first statist approach has the virtue of accessibility because it respects the value of states’ 
territorial integrity – we can see the same value being respected in the harm to humanity 
approach. This second statist approach makes clear that there are different domains of 
jurisdiction. It clearly demarcates a realm in which the state is sovereign, by arguing that the 
international community’s standing is derived from the community itself being directly 
harmed or otherwise implicated by the crime.  
 Despite these virtues, and beyond the particular issues with May’s account, there are 
some general worries for anyone embracing the second statist strategy. The first is that in 
claiming that crimes against humanity harm humanity itself, one must provide an account of 
not only group harm, but harm to humanity as a group. The concept of group harm is 
notoriously difficult to make out, and moreover, intuitive cases of harming a group qua group 
are not clearly of the kind at issue in this discussion of crime against humanity if ‘humanity’ 
rather than the particular targeted group is the relevant harmed group. There is also a 
danger in arguing that crimes against humanity harm humanity, as it involves redefining 
crime against humanity away from the importance of the harm to the victims. In Chapter One 
I developed an account of crime against humanity that places central importance on the 
intolerable harm done to the victims. Arguing that we have the standing to prosecute crime 
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against humanity, because it harms all of us, runs the risk of trivializing the harm done to the 
victims.  
 
COSMOPOLITAN STRATEGY: CONDITIONAL SOVEREIGNTY  
 
I turn now to the second general strategy: cosmopolitanism. Cosmopolitans differ 
from statists in arguing that the standing of international institutions is ultimately grounded in 
the moral status or rights of individuals. The cosmopolitan strategy is to argue that a state’s 
legitimate claim to political autonomy does not entail the right to violate human rights (or 
natural law), and thus, when officials of a state do so by attacking their own citizens contrary 
to human rights (or natural law), the state no longer enjoys the right to self-governance – the 
status of sovereignty. As discussed briefly above, this position challenges the first premise of 
the Nuremberg Problem.52 It claims that (1) does not hold for, is not true of, the states in 
which crimes against humanity occur, as the violation of human rights (or natural law) 
because states that do so are not sovereign. Cosmopolitans employing this conditional 
sovereignty strategy argue that if the state is not justified in exercising its political autonomy, 
there is no moral presumption against external bodies prosecuting perpetrators of these 
crimes.53 
Andrew Altman and Christopher Heath Wellman have developed a conditional 
sovereignty account. The following is a reconstruction of this account in their “A Defense of 
International Criminal Law.”  
(1) Only legitimate states enjoy the right to self-determination.  
                                                 
52 From above, (1) in the Nuremberg Problem states: A sovereign state has the right against external 
bodies to non-interference with respect to the governing prerogatives of that state. 
 
53 Notice that this is similar to the Security Principle from May’s harm to humanity account. As the 
International Harm Principle is the unique feature of May’s account I focused on it above, however, my 
criticisms of the conditional sovereignty approach here, can also be applied to May’s Security Principle. 
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We respect the sovereignty of a state on the assumption that the authority it exercises is 
legitimate. Altman and Wellman make explicit that the right to self-determination or political 
autonomy with respect to the governing prerogatives of the state is a right of just those states 
that have legitimate authority to exercise coercion.   
(2) To be legitimate, a state must (at least) adequately secure the peace within its 
territorial boundaries and protect the basic human rights of its citizens. To 
meet this requirement, the state must neither perpetrate nor permit 
widespread or systematic violations of those rights.54  
 
This premise involves a stipulation of the definition of legitimate authority. Altman and 
Wellman begin with the normative status of human rights. For this argument, a legitimate 
state is one that does not violate (nor allow the violation of) the basic human rights of its 
citizens. The meaning of human rights here is not fully articulated, but it need not be too 
robust for their argument. No matter what human rights are, or where they get their 
normative force, they will presumably include the right not to be persecuted, killed, 
sterilized, forcibly emigrated, and the other evils that appear in the definition of crime against 
humanity.   
Looking to an argument for the same general claim given by Altman and Wellman in 
their more recent “From Humanitarian Intervention to Assassination: Human Rights and 
Political Violence,”55 we can get a sense of what is motivating this articulation of legitimacy. 
Their argument in the latter piece begins with the assumption that the moral task that justifies 
the coercion of citizens by a state is the protection of basic human rights. They claim that the 
                                                 
 
54 Andrew Altman and Christopher Heath Wellman, “A Defense of International Criminal Law,” Ethics 115 
(2004): 48. Where “widespread” as Altman and Wellman use the term “is a purely quantitative notion referring 
mainly to the number of violations: it takes account of the number of people victimized, weighted by the 
relative importance of the rights violated.”  And where systematic “is a partially quantitative notion, referring to 
acts that are part of some plan whose execution would result in many rights violations.”  
 
55 Andrew Altman and Christopher Heath Wellman, “From Humanitarian Intervention to Assassination: Human 
Rights and Political Violence,” Ethics 118 (2008): 228-257. 
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reason a state is legitimate in exercising its authority is because doing so is the necessary 
means56 to the end of protecting the basic human rights of the citizens in question. So, when a 
state fails to protect the basic human rights of the citizens it is no longer legitimate.  
This position has a certain resonance with a Lockean political view (in that it runs a kind 
of contractarian-friendly line, focusing on the normative force of human rights in a natural 
rights inspired way). Assuming that each individual is born with a set of inalienable, basic 
rights – they will only consent to transferring some of their power to a sovereign if doing so 
is necessary to the better enforcement of these rights. So, the authority of the sovereign 
comes from the consent of the subjects, and the consent would be given only when the 
sovereign protects and promotes the rights of the citizens. The sovereign is thus not acting as 
a sovereign (and should not enjoy the power of one) if it is failing to protect the basic human 
rights of the citizens.  
(3) If a states perpetrates or permits crimes against humanity, it is not legitimate 
because crimes against humanity involve the violation of basic human rights.  
 
This premise is a straightforward implication from the definition of legitimacy Altman and 
Wellman provide, the nature of crime against humanity. Given that the legitimate political 
authority of a state relies on whether it protects the basic human rights of the citizens (from 
2) and that crimes against humanity (by definition) are the violation of the basic human rights 
of the citizens, states in which these atrocities are perpetrated or permitted are not legitimate, 
and thus not sovereign.  
(4) If a state is not legitimate, it has no right to self-determination (against external 
intervention or interference).57  
 
                                                 
56 “Necessary” here means best or only effective means to accomplish this end, where the end is urgent and thus 
not something that can be given up.  
 
57 Altman and Wellman, “A Defense of International Criminal Law,” 46.  
  60
(5) If a state perpetrates or permits crimes against humanity, it has no right to 
self-determination (including a right against prosecution by external 
bodies for crimes against humanity).    
 
As a conclusion we get that when crimes against humanity (or other widespread and 
systematic violations of basic human rights) are permitted or perpetrated within the 
boundaries of a state, there is no right on the part of that state to non-intervention/interference 
with its governing prerogatives by external bodies. Thus, there is no moral presumption 
against criminal trials for crimes against humanity conducted by external bodies.   
This cosmopolitan strategy captures yet another important aspect of the standing to 
prosecute crime against humanity. It preserves the importance of harm to the victims in 
giving an adequate account of standing. As I discussed above, in both statist approaches 
individuals, including the individual victims of the atrocities, do not play a significant role in 
the justification of standing. This is a striking absence, as presumably we care about holding 
the perpetrators of crime against humanity accountable because of what they have done to 
people. Answers to the jurisdiction question that submerge or ignore the importance of the 
harm done to the victims of the atrocities miss something important.  
Again, despite this virtue, the approach is unsatisfactory. It is crucially incomplete. It 
is not enough to show that an international institution has standing to prosecute crimes 
against humanity that one show that the state in which the crimes took place does not have a 
right to object to the prosecution. The cosmopolitan argues that because the state in which the 
crimes occurred has not respected basic human rights it has no legitimate claim to resist any 
external body trying to enforce those rights. I will refer to this as the “anyone” answer to the 
jurisdiction question.  
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One might think that this objection is somewhat misplaced, as Altman and Wellman’s 
argument that states in which crimes against humanity occur have no right to object to the 
interference by external bodies, does not imply an endorsement or defense of the claim that 
any external body has the standing to intervene in the state. My attribution of the ‘anyone’ 
answer to the jurisdiction question to Altman and Wellman rests on the conception of 
sovereignty at the heart of their view. The conditional sovereignty approach assumes that 
whether a state is legitimate depends only on internal features of the state,58 and its internal 
legitimacy determines whether or not it enjoys the rights of sovereignty against external 
bodies. This way of understanding sovereignty renders this status, from the point of view of 
those outside the state, as ‘on or off’ and dependent only on internal features of the state in 
question. In so doing, the strategy fails to provide resources for constructing principles 
concerning the relationship between states.59 Insofar as it fails to provide such resources, and 
instead argues that the sovereignty status for states in which crimes against humanity occur is 
‘off,’ it addresses itself to any external body (rather than some particular external body like 
the United Nations). As the prosecution of crimes against humanity is an external matter (we 
are considering whether external bodies can have the standing to prosecute perpetrators), this 
approach is crucially incomplete.   
To see how the ‘anyone’ answer to the jurisdiction question is a shortcoming of the 
strategy, we can distinguish the prosecution of crime against humanity from humanitarian 
                                                 
58 The cosmopolitan approach need not do so (as I will argue in Chapter Three and Chapter Five), but Altman 
and Wellman’s formulation of the approach does.  
 
59 See Chapter Three for a more robust discussion of the status of sovereignty and the importance of making a 
distinction between internal legitimacy and external legitimacy.  
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intervention.60 This is an important distinction to make and explore in this context of this 
discussion because Altman and Wellman use nearly the same argument to establish a 
justification for humanitarian intervention and the standing of international law with respect 
to crime against humanity. It is tempting to provide a similar argument in both these cases, 
because the way the Nuremberg Problem construes the challenge to an external body’s 
standing invites such a comparison. Namely, because both prosecution of crime against 
humanity by external bodies and humanitarian intervention concern crossing borders of states 
by force, in response to the violation of individuals basic rights. In this section, I contend that 
the “anyone” answer that the conditional sovereignty approach leads to, is more plausible for 
the question of who can intervene for humanitarian reasons, than for the question of who has 
the standing to prosecute crime against humanity.  
To see this, imagine you are walking home late at night. You round a corner and 
encounter an assault: a large man has begun beating someone sitting on the bench waiting for 
a bus. You are moved to act and effectively break up the fight. In this situation it is natural to 
say that you justifiably intervened. Doing so may have involved violating the bodily integrity 
and autonomy of the assailant, but this was justified by the aid you provided to the victim.  
Now, imagine you are again walking home late at night. This time you do not 
encounter an assault in progress, but the end of such an assault. In response, you decide to 
conduct a trial. You collect evidence, ask other witnesses for reports of what they saw, and 
set up a courtroom in your backyard. Moreover, you hold the assailant against his will until 
                                                 
60 By humanitarian intervention I mean “the threat or use of force across state borders by a state (or group of 
states) aimed at preventing or ending widespread and grave violations of the fundamental human rights of 
individuals other than its own citizens, without the permission of the state within whose territory force is 
applied.” This definition is taken from J.L. Holzgrefe, “The Humanitarian Intervention Debate,” in 
Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal and Political Dilemmas, ed. J.L. Holzgrefe and Robert O. Keohane, 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 18.   
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the trial is concluded. You allow both parties to be represented by lawyers and each is 
allowed to present their case. You even solicit your neighbor to be the judge and decide the 
guilt (and punishment) of the assailant. I suggest that unlike in the first case, your actions in 
the second are not legitimate. In order for the action to be fully justified, you need not only 
sufficient reason to exercise certain powers, but the legitimate standing to do so. Something 
is wrong with the trial. Namely, it has some of the appearances of being a criminal trial, but 
you as a bystander do not have the standing to actually conduct a trial.  
This example can help us identify what goes wrong when the conditional sovereignty 
cosmopolitan answers “anyone” to the jurisdiction question. While atrocities are being 
committed we are primarily concerned (and rightly so) with the direct and immediate well-
being of the individual victims. Among other things, a good reason for intervening during an 
atrocity is that doing so will bring about good results. The analogy reveals the kind of 
reasoning at the heart of Altman and Wellman’s argument for jurisdiction as somewhat 
misdirected.  
The analogy in the domestic context is one of justification (contrasted with excuse), 
rather than one of jurisdiction. In the domestic context, we take the fact that you were acting 
to prevent severe harm as a reason (but, not a sufficient reason) for violating the law. In the 
example above, one is legally prohibited from engaging in the bodily assault necessary to 
stop the kind of fight described. If prosecuted for the assault, you can argue that it was 
justified, on the grounds that you were acting to prevent severe harm to someone else. 
Notice, that this is not a jurisdictional issue at all. In acting to break up the fight, you are not 
asserting that the government does not have the standing to hold you accountable for your 
actions. You are asserting that you had a reason for breaking the law.  
  64
I have presented the analogy above as a jurisdictional issue in order to make sense of 
Altman and Wellman’s argument for the standing of external bodies to prosecute crime 
against humanity. However, in doing so we can see that rather than address the jurisdictional 
question, they have given an argument for justification for breaking a law, not the standing of 
the law itself. That “anyone” could be justified in intervening is plausible, but that the 
violation of human rights grounds jurisdiction of external bodies is another matter. Whether 
or not the “anyone” answer is a plausible answer to the jurisdiction question depends on an 
argument for standing that yields this result. Furthermore, that it will have good results does 
not settle whether something is a legitimate trial.  
The conditional sovereignty approach relies on a clear standard for the external 
legitimacy of a state (that is, a standard for judging whether a state enjoys the rights of 
sovereignty with respect to other members of the international community). In this way, the 
approach is actually quite clear on domestic jurisdiction – the state enjoys the right to 
political autonomy only if it meets minimal conditions on the treatment of its citizens. What 
this approach does not address is what follows when a state fails to meet these minimal 
conditions on the rights of sovereignty. The approach is missing a positive normative account 
that grounds international jurisdiction.    
This problem can be thought of as a more general problem about how we understand 
the connection between the nature of international justice and the rights of states, sovereigns 
or political communities. Altman and Wellman seem to think that the heavy theoretical work 
is done by showing that the state in question does not enjoy the rights of sovereignty, and say 
no more about the nature of international justice or international law. Not only is this a 
feature of Altman and Wellman’s conditional sovereignty and May’s reliance on the SP, but 
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can be seen quite clearly in the War Nexus approach. May’s initial security principle runs an 
argument for the standing of external bodies to breach the sovereignty of state in nearly the 
same terms as Altman and Wellman. While, the war nexus approach, as was indicated, 
assumes a strong state right to territorial integrity.  
This heavy focus on the rights of states should not be surprising given the way that 
Nuremberg Problem is constructed. The problem is framed in terms of the governing 
prerogatives of the state, and challenges theorists to explain standing in terms of violations of 
the presumed moral standing of states. In order to solve the Nuremberg Problem, we need an 
analysis of the governing prerogatives of the state, or at least, an explanation of how to 
determine what falls within this category. As the governing prerogatives of states are often 
thought as articulated by the rights of sovereignty (political autonomy and territorial 
integrity) to provide such an analysis we will need to explore the status of sovereignty itself.  
 In the next chapter, I discuss different models of this relationship between 
international law or international justice and the status of sovereignty. After exploring 
different models provided by Hobbes, Kant, Walzer and Rawls I suggest that we adopt the 
Rawls’ model which holds that the status of sovereignty is, at least in part, constructed or 
defined by the principles of international justice. I then return to the Nuremberg Problem and 
show how the alternative response developed in like of Rawls’ model can solve this problem, 
and explore whether shares the virtue of accessibility with the more traditional responses to 
the problem.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER THREE 
ON THE STATUS OF SOVEREIGN STATES 
 
INTRODUCTION  
In Chapter Two I presented three approaches to answering the Nuremberg Problem 
that, despite their virtues, were unsatisfactory. In developing and evaluating these responses I 
identified four features of a good approach to answering the problem. An acceptable account: 
(1) is accessible – it relies on values and reasons that those subject to the law can understand 
and see as at least possible or plausible revision or extensions of the law as it is, (2) explains 
why the international community, itself, has standing to prosecute the atrocities at issue, (3) 
demarcates distinct realms of domestic and international jurisdiction, and respects the value 
of states as discrete political communities, (4) it preserves the importance of harm to the 
victims as individuals, and the moral value or standing of individual human beings more 
broadly.  
I suggested at the end of Chapter Two that in order to answer the Nuremberg Problem 
we need a better understanding of the ‘status of sovereignty’ in international justice. The 
Nuremberg Problem relies quite heavily on the presupposition that the governing 
prerogatives of state include everything that occurs within the territorial boundaries of that 
state. Altman and Wellman challenge this presupposition by recasting the rights of 
sovereignty as conditional on a state’s respect for the basic human rights of its members. 
Although I argued that their approach to undermining the presupposition that a sovereign 
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state has exclusive political authority within its borders ultimately fails, their argument sheds 
light on a promising direction for developing a new response to the problem.  
This chapter begins with the suggestion drawn from Altman and Wellman that to 
answer the Nuremberg Problem we need an account of the rights or standing of states. I will 
refer to the object of investigation as ‘the status of sovereignty.’ The aim of giving an 
account of the status of sovereignty may seem peculiar. Attributions of this status and its 
attendant rights is often, if not an implication of a more robust theory of political authority, 
then at least inseparable from such an account. Appreciating this history, I will focus on the 
role sovereignty plays in different accounts of the nature and content of international law or 
justice.  
Even recognizing that sovereignty often plays a quite particular role in such an 
account, or is embedded in a robust normative model of the international community, a 
distinction between two ways of giving an account of the status of sovereignty can help 
orient the present discussion. The distinction is between sovereignty as an internally 
determined status and as an externally determined status. For the first, one might think that 
sovereignty is a status (that carries with it certain rights, interests, claims and protections) 
conferred on states by the members of that state, such that when we turn to the nature, 
content or domain of international justice we are confronted with a normative landscape 
populated by these free-standing entities. On the other hand, one might think that this status 
of sovereignty (and its bundle of rights, obligations, and the like) is, at least in part, shaped, 
articulated or determined by or conferred on states by the principles of international justice or 
international law.61 In this second view, the content or nature of international justice is not 
                                                 
61 I am focusing here on the status of ‘sovereignty’ and have said, as yet, nothing about judgments of 
‘legitimacy.’  For our purposes, we can understand a ‘sovereign’ as an entity with a particular moral status that 
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constrained by navigating free-standing normative entities, but in part, shapes or otherwise 
determines which entities have which rights.  
In order to understand the status of sovereignty and the role it plays in accounts of the 
nature and content of international justice, I begin with the Westphalia Model. The 
Westphalia Model has been the most influential model for understanding the status of 
sovereignty and the normative structure of the international community since 1648. Rather 
than argue directly against this model, I will explore different philosophical accounts that aim 
to justify or explain the normative features of the international community and nature and 
content of international justice or international law, including the status of sovereignty. 
Through this discussion I evaluate the different philosophical accounts according to the four 
desiderata I developed in Chapter Two (indicated above). Although these desiderata were 
developed as requirements on an account of the international community’s standing to 
prosecute crime against humanity, they are also more general desiderata regarding 
explanations of the normative structure of the international community and content of 
international justice. 
This philosophical discussion includes a brief outline of the positions put forward by 
Thomas Hobbes and Immanuel Kant. These accounts provide background for a more 
thorough presentation of the models provided by Michael Walzer and John Rawls. The aim 
of this discussion is not to provide an argument from elimination against these four views. 
Rather, I will use the insights provided by these accounts, and critical discussion of them, to 
develop the resources for the model of the international community I endorse and build in 
Chapter Four and Chapter Five. This project of construction is not one of splicing together 
                                                                                                                                                       
implies a bundle of presumptive rights to political authority and territorial integrity. The status of sovereignty is 
importantly related to the judgment that the entity is ‘legitimate’ and I will return to this relationship below.  
  69
interesting features of standing positions. Instead, the construction is accomplished through a 
critical discussion of these canonical figures. This chapter concludes with a basic skeleton of 
a model of the nature of the international community (and particularly state sovereignty) that, 
when developed in later chapters, answers the Nuremberg Problem and meets the desiderata 
above.  
 
THE WESTPHALIA MODEL 
 
The Westphalia Model of the international community dominates both everyday and 
theoretical understandings of the nature of the international community. It is the conception 
of the international legal order created through or first articulated by the Peace of Westphalia 
in 1648 (ending the Thirty Years War in Europe). This conception of the international 
community is often thought of as constituting “a paradigm shift in the development of the 
present state system.”62 Mark Janis characterizes the shift this way:  
The Peace of Westphalia legitimated the right of sovereigns to govern their 
peoples free of outside interference, whether any such external claim to 
interference was based on political, legal or religious principles…Sovereignty 
as a concept, formed the cornerstone of the edifice of international relations 
that 1648 raised up. Sovereignty was the crucial element in the peace treaties 
of Westphalia, the international agreements that were intended to end a great 
war and to promote a coming peace. The treaties of Westphalia enthroned and 
sanctified sovereigns, gave them powers domestically and independence 
externally.63 
 
The importance of ‘sovereignty’ in the Westphalia Model is especially important for our 
purposes. This description of the model focuses on the meaning of sovereignty that emerged 
                                                 
62 Stephane Beaulac, “The Westphalian Model in Defining International Law: Challenging the Myth,” 
Australian Journal of Legal History 8 (2004): 182.  
 
63 Mark Janis, “Sovereignty and International Law: Hobbes and Grotius” in Essays in Honor of Wang Tieya, ed. 
Ronald St. John Macdonald (New York: Springer, 1994), 391.  
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during this paradigm shift, and which has come to be very important in international relations 
and international law since its inception.  
Following James A. Comporaso we can identify the heart of the Westphalia Model as 
the view of the international order as: 
a system of territorially organized states acting in an anarchic environment. 
These states are constitutionally independent (sovereign) and have exclusive 
authority to rule within their own borders.64 
 
The international community is an assemblage of sovereign states, which respect one 
another’s right to non-interference, and which generate obligations and rules with respect to 
one another primarily through intentional and explicit treaty or alliance, or tacitly through 
custom.  
The Westphalia Model is recognized by many as providing the conceptual framework 
for the development of international law since 1648. In particular, the status of states as 
sovereign and equal agents. The fundamental importance of this sovereign equality of states 
to international law can be seen directly in the first principles of the Charter of the United 
Nations: “The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its 
Members.”65 As well as in interpretations and textbook presentations of the content of the 
international law: 
The sovereignty and equality of states represent the basic constitutional 
doctrine of the law of nations, which governs a community consisting 
primarily of states having a uniform legal personality.66  
 
                                                 
64 James A. Caporaso, “Changes in the Westphalian Order: Territory, Public Authority, and Sovereignty” 
International Studies Review 2 (2000): 2. 
 
65 United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, 24 October, 1945. 1 UNTS XVI, available at:  
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b3930.html 
 
66 Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, Sixth Edition (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2003), 287. 
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This status of sovereign equality attributed to states is taken to imply three basic norms or 
general principles for international law: 
The principal corollaries of the sovereignty and equality of states are: (1) a 
jurisdiction, prima facie exclusive, over a territory and the permanent 
population living there; (2) a duty of non-intervention in the area of exclusive 
jurisdiction of other states; and (3) the dependence of obligations arising from 
customary law and treaties on the consent of the obligor.67  
 
These general principles reflect what I referred to as the view at the heart of the Westphalia 
Model above: international law and relations as governing territorially discrete and 
independent states, which have exclusive political authority within their borders.  
From this brief characterization we can distill four important features of the status of 
sovereignty within the model: it applies to states (and states alone), states are taken to enjoy 
exclusive political authority, they are independent, and they are territorially bound. The 
revolutionary nature of the Westphalia Model comes, in part, from the first feature. The 
treaty solidified the international community for purposes of international law as composed 
of states (governmental bodies). These states are taken to be those things with political 
authority that can legitimately exercise coercion within their physically defined borders. 
Finally, the states are taken to be independent entities in the international community, with 
equal standing, such that any binding instrument of international law is binding in virtue of 
the consent of the state parties or through tacit agreement established through custom or state 
practice.  
As mentioned above, for our discussion we will take the Westphalia Model as the 
starting point, through which we can understand interesting features and innovations of the 
philosophical models. I will not directly critique the Westphalia Model, but use it as a frame 
for our discussion. It is particularly useful for these purposes because of its influence on the 
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development of public international law. With that, I turn now to the philosophical models, 
beginning with a brief discussion of Hobbes.  
 
HOBBES: AUTHORITY WITHIN THE STATE 
  For Hobbes, ‘justice’ concerns relations between individuals. That is, the actions that 
we evaluate as just or unjust are those that concern individuals with respect to one another.  
Hobbes asserts this feature of justice, contrasting it with actions that can be evaluated in 
solitude, writing:  
Justice and injustice are none of the faculties neither of the body nor mind. If 
they were, they might be in a man that were alone in the world, as well as his 
senses and passions. They are qualities that relate to men in society, not in 
solitude. 68  
 
Not only does Hobbes hold that justice concerns the relationship between individuals in 
society, he holds that it requires common principles or public rules. In order to judge 
something as just or unjust we need a common metric to evaluate the actions. This metric 
cannot be merely in the minds of the individuals, as there is no common way of knowing or 
evaluating these private judgments about what ought to be done.  
Moreover, not only does justice require a common, public standard of evaluation, this 
common standard must be backed by the power to enforce the rules or principles. Thus, 
justice requires a common power over the individuals in a society. Hobbes expresses this 
feature of justice by identifying its absence in the state of war:  
To this war of every man against every man, this also is consequent: that 
nothing can be unjust. The notions of right and wrong, justice and injustice, 
have there no place. Where there is no common power, there is no law; where 
no law, no injustice.69  
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Further explaining the need for a common power and the identification of a common power 
of a certain kind with the existence of justice:  
before the names of just and unjust can have place, there must be some 
coercive power to compel men equally to the performance of their covenants, 
by the terror of some punishment greater than the benefit they expect by the 
breach of their covenant, and to make good that propriety which by mutual 
contract men acquire in recompense of the universal right they abandon: and 
such power there is none before the erection of a Commonwealth.70  
 
The common power necessary for justice takes the form of a Commonwealth. This is most 
commonly understood as a domestic level governing body or institution.  
This familiar account of the nature of justice from Hobbes is an important starting point 
as it puts on the table two important points of discussion going forward. The first is that it 
makes explicit the relationship between justice and public, articulated and enforced rules. 
This political or legal conception of justice may not include all judgments of what is just. For 
example, one may use the term ‘just’ in a moral sense, free of political claims. However, it 
sets an important relationship on the table that I will adopt. When discussing law or political 
conceptions of justice we are discussing common rules, backed by some power of 
enforcement.71  
The second point from this brief discussion of Hobbes is that it draws attention to two 
ways in which the term ‘sovereign’ can be used.72 The first is as a judgment about the 
authority of some person or body with respect to the subjects of the political community. 
This is the sense of sovereignty that Hobbes is primarily concerned with in the Leviathan – 
the internal or domestic political authority of the sovereign. This is a vertical relationship 
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71 This is not to say that I adopt the strong position often attributed to Hobbes that this conception of political 
justice does not allow for actual laws being unjust. 
 
72 This dual reference to the internal and the external domains will appear again in Walzer’s discussion of two 
kinds of judgments of legitimacy below.  
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between the subjects and rule-maker and enforcer. This use of ‘sovereignty’ can be 
contrasted with the notion of sovereignty from the Westphalia Model that emphasizes the 
horizontal relationship between these different governing bodies. This second sense of 
sovereignty is the one of interest in this discussion.73 
Hobbes says little about this horizontal relationship between these domestic level 
sovereigns or how to extend the principles he develops in the domestic context into the 
international arena. Rather than attempt to do so on his behalf, trying to arbitrate textual 
interpretations and the use of Hobbesian resources in international relations,74 I will turn now 
to Kant’s account of international justice. Kant’s model builds on the account of political or 
legal justice above, but explicitly addresses the nature of international justice (and, at the 
same time, is critical of Hobbes’ theory even for domestic justice), and thus, provides a more 
robust picture to work with moving forward.  
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74 A thorough extension of Hobbes’ argument to the international case would take us quite far a field at this 
point. Much has been made of the Hobbes’ theory of justice in international relations, and arbitrating and 
evaluating this literature is a project unto itself. I will, however, note that the passage from Leviathan, Chapter 
13, often taken as evidence that Hobbes’ himself argued against the possibility of international justice does not 
seem to imply such a strong claim. There he writes:  
in all times kings and persons of sovereign authority, because of their independency, are in 
continual jealousies, and in the state and posture of gladiators, having their weapons pointing, 
and their eyes fixed on one another; that is, their forts, garrisons, and guns upon the frontiers 
of their kingdoms, and continual spies upon their neighbours, which is a posture of war. But 
because they uphold thereby the industry of their subjects, there does not follow from it that 
misery which accompanies the liberty of particular men.  
Rather than an argument against the possibility of international justice, this passage seems to imply that Hobbes 
thinks that because sovereigns are able to provide sufficiently stable conditions for the security and industry of 
their members while remaining in a state of war with other sovereigns, the reasons to pursue a global sovereign 
are not as strong as the reasons we have for pursuing domestic sovereigns. Of course, the political authority of 
the domestic governments would not be exclusive under a global sovereign. A global sovereign could not be a 
sovereign over other (proper) sovereigns. Notice, that even this initial sketch of the options seemingly available 
to Hobbes: either (A) no binding international law, or (B) global sovereign, is strikingly un-Westphalian.  
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KANT: RECHT, FREEDOM AND THE PACIFIC FEDERATION 
 
To understand Kant’s model it is best to start with the basic features of his more 
general political philosophy. Kant’s philosophy of Recht (right) begins with a distinction 
between two kinds of law giving: ethical and juridical. Ethical lawgiving makes an action a 
duty and also makes ‘that the action is required,’ i.e. supplies, the incentive to perform the 
action. Whereas, juridical lawgiving also makes an action a duty, but the incentives to 
perform the action can be inclinations or aversions, rather than duty itself.75 Recht concerns 
just the juridical duties, which govern external, practical relations of one person to another. 
The domain of actions is further restricted to those that are freely done.76  
Unlike Hobbes, the value motivating Kant’s political philosophy is freedom, 
particularly external freedom (contrasted with self-preservation). He writes in the 
Metaphysics of Morals:  
There is only one innate right. Freedom (independence from being constrained 
by another’s choice) insofar as it can coexist with the freedom of every other 
in accordance with law.77  
 
This sense of freedom – independence from being constrained by another’s choice, I will 
characterize as external freedom, contrasted with the transcendental freedom which occupies 
other parts of Kant’s moral and theoretical philosophy.  
 Compulsion or coercion (as a way to create incentives/aversions) comes into the 
picture of Recht through the concept of external freedom as freedom from interference 
compatible with freedom of others under law. Kant’s argument for the role of and need for 
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coercion for establishing external freedom is perhaps one of the best known parts of Kant’s 
political philosophy. Let’s look at it directly:  
If then my action or my condition generally can coexist with the freedom of 
everyone in accordance with a universal law, whoever hinders me in it does 
me wrong; for this hindrance (resistance) cannot coexist with freedom in 
accordance with a universal law…Resistance that counteracts the hindering of 
an effect promotes this effect and is consistent with it. Now whatever is wrong 
is a hindrance to freedom in accordance with universal laws. But coercion is a 
hindrance or resistance to freedom. Therefore, if a certain use of freedom is 
itself a hindrance to freedom in accordance with universal laws (i.e., wrong), 
coercion that is opposed to this (as a hindering of a hindrance to freedom) is 
consistent with freedom in accordance with universal laws, that is, it is right. 
Hence there is connected with right by the principle of contradiction an 
authorization to coerce someone who infringes upon it.78  
 
As violations of Recht are hindrances (or otherwise infringements or violations of) freedom, 
it is consistent with the principle of universal freedom (external freedom of all) that those 
hindrances themselves be “hindered.” Or rather, that we use coercion legitimately when it is 
used against violations of Recht because doing so is consistent with universal freedom for all.  
 This background reflects the insight from Hobbes that political or legal justice 
concerns public rules, backed by enforcement. Unlike Hobbes, however, Kant goes on to 
address international justice explicitly, using these resources. The most interesting aspect of 
Kant’s rich political philosophy for our discussion of sovereignty and international justice is 
his claim that the three aspects of public Recht (constitutional, international and 
cosmopolitan) are interdependent. In “The Doctrine of Right” Kant is direct and explicit 
about this interdependent relationship, writing:   
There is hence cause to conceive, subordinate to the concept of public right, 
not only constitutional right, but also international right. Since the earth is not 
an endless surface but a finite contained surface, the two together inevitably 
lead to the idea of right of a state of peoples or cosmopolitan right. If the 
principle that limits external freedom by means of laws is lacking in only one 
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of three possible forms of juridical condition, then the artifice of all others is 
inevitably undermined and must ultimately collapse.79 [emphasis added] 
 
This position, in contrast to Hobbes’ near silence, is striking and strong. Kant’s position is 
that in the absence of a juridical condition in one of the domains of public right, the others 
are destabilized or otherwise precarious.  
To explain this strong relationship, we can turn back to the value of freedom 
motivating the account. Consider a situation in which one is a member of just state (that is, 
characterized by a juridical condition compatible with constitutional right), where this state 
does not, itself, stand in such a relation to the neighboring states. The external freedom 
established for the individual members of this state is not stable. The encroachment on the 
state by neighbors (conquest, war, or other forms of coercion) destabilizes the internal system 
established by such a state. To have domestic stability, the state must stand in peaceful 
relations with other states. Moreover, even in situations in which the stability of the internal 
ordering of a state is not at issue, disputes about claims to property across states, for example, 
claims to the use of fishing waters in the North Atlantic, require a determinate and lawful 
ordering of these claims at the international level in order for the individuals as members of 
states to be properly said to have a claim to fish particular waters.  
We can see this interdependence of international and constitutional Recht from the 
other direction as well. A juridical condition between states – one that is characterized by 
treaty agreements and respect for the territorial borders and political authority of a state with 
respect to its own people is possible only when the states themselves are stable. That is, when 
they are ordered in a way that treats ongoing treaties (past any particular leader) as binding. 
Moreover, this kind of stability and the lawful ordering of claims required for a rightful 
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condition often requires some kind of just ordering (or the perception of a just ordering) 
within the state, so that it is not subject to revolution or other internal instability.  
With this interdependence on the table, how does Kant understand the nature and 
content of international right? International right concerns not only the relationship between 
states, but between individual persons belonging to one state and individuals belonging to 
another, as well as between individuals and the entire other state.80 Kant begins building the 
model by taking states as individual agents, analogous to individual persons. Just as persons 
require a common power to articulate and enforce rules at the domestic level,    
Peoples, as states, can be judged as individual human beings who, when in the 
state of nature (that is, when they are independent from external laws) bring 
harm to each other already through their proximity to one another, and each of 
whom, for the sake of his own security, can and ought to demand of others 
that they enter with him into a constitution, similar to that of a civil one, under 
which each is guaranteed his rights.81 
 
In the international context, this common power takes the form of a federation rather than a 
state.82 The federation is primarily characterized by a standing peace treaty between 
individual states. Kant explains the federation in this way:  
But peace can be neither brought about nor secured without a treaty among 
peoples, and for this reason a special sort of federation must be created, which 
one might call a pacific federation. This federation would be distinct from a 
peace treaty in that it seeks to end not merely one war, as does the latter, but 
rather to end all wars forever. This federation aims not at the state’s 
acquisition of some sort of power, but rather at its securing and maintaining 
the freedom of a state for itself and also the freedom of other confederated 
states without these states thereby being required, as are human beings in the 
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82 Kant thinks there is a contradiction in the existence of ‘a state of states,’ Toward Perpetual Peace 8:354. This 
is a quite interesting passage, but rather than delve into its complexities I will continue building Kant’s model 
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state of nature, to subject themselves to public law and coercion under such 
laws.83 
 
Notice, the standing relationships between the confederated states is meant to realize the 
freedom of the members. Through participation in the pacific federation, the states establish 
an order between themselves that guarantees and makes determinate the freedom 
(independence) of the states. It establishes spheres of operation (territories), safe from 
external interference (exclusive political authority).  
 Although this model begins with an analogy to the domestic case, Kant highlights an 
important point of disanalogy. Unlike domestic political institutions, the pacific federation 
does not have the political authority to compel compliance with the law. This is an important 
feature of the federation picture, because the non-coercive aspect of the model puts 
restrictions on the content of international Recht. The principles of the federation are 
restricted to just those that are voluntarily agreed to by the member parties, and are largely 
“you don’t attack me and I don’t attack you.”  
Kant’s model of the international community and state sovereignty is state-centric. 
However, unlike the picture that appears in the Westphalia Model, the states come to acquire 
a right to external independence through the federation or international law, rather than 
coming to the table as “free agents.” States must secure and enjoy the right to external 
freedom (the driving force of Kant’s political theory) through a juridical condition with 
respect to other states. This is compatible, for Kant, with the state’s authority with respect to 
its own people being conferred or created by an internal relation of constitutional right. The 
proper juridical condition internal to the state is, in this respect, independent from the 
external juridical condition. However, despite being established in different domains, 
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constitutional and international Recht are interdependent. Both are necessary for the stability 
(perhaps, the existence) of the other. The status of sovereignty itself is complicated on Kant’s 
model. Clearly there is a sense in which a state has political authority with respect to its own 
subjects prior to participation in the pacific federation. However, the state’s independence 
(understood as its right to non-interference) is established only through participation in the 
federation. With respect to the status of sovereignty, political authority is established by the 
former, and autonomy or independence is realized through the latter. This is quite different 
from the picture of independent, authoritative bodies in the Westphalia Model, capable of 
making binding treaty agreement by mutual consent even though under no world authority or 
power.  
 
WALZER: POLITICAL COMMUNITIES AND SELF-DETERMINATION 
 
In contrast to the figures we have already briefly explored, Michael Walzer’s account 
of the status of sovereignty and nature of international community is grounded in a more 
pluralistic manner. Whereas Hobbes and Kant can be understood as responsive to one 
primary principle or value (external freedom for Kant and self-preservation for Hobbes), 
Walzer draws on a more complex set of values in constructing his theory of just war. 
Walzer’s position on the status and nature of sovereignty reflects the integrity of the common 
life of communities, as well as respect for individuals of these communities. He posits a 
complicated relationship between individuals, their communities and their governments.  
Walzer’s account of the rights of political communities begins with the rights of 
individuals.  
The rights [of political communities] are summed up in the lawbooks as 
territorial integrity and political sovereignty. The two belong to states, but 
they derive ultimately from the rights of individuals, and from them they take 
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their force…Individual rights (to life and liberty) underlie the most important 
judgments that we make about war. How these rights are themselves grounded 
I cannot try to explain here. It is enough to say that they are somehow entailed 
by our sense of what it means to be a human being…States’ rights are simply 
their collective form.84 [emphasis added] 
 
Walzer grounds the Westphalia Model’s rights of states in the rights of individual members 
of the communities. The right to political autonomy combines both the state’s external 
independence and its internal political authority. This story, so far, seems familiar from 
Hobbes, as the status of sovereignty is determined by the vertical relationship between the 
individuals and the government of the state.  
 The rights of states, where states are understood as a union of the people of a political 
community and the government of that community, are an articulation of the moral standing 
of the state. The status of sovereign states is given by these two rights of states. Moreover, as 
assumed by Altman and Wellman’s conditional sovereignty approach, the status of any 
particular state is conditional on an internal feature of it. However, for Walzer, it is not 
conditional (directly) on respecting the basic human rights of the members, but rather on 
whether the political autonomy and territorial integrity of the state protects the common life 
of the members of the state.  
The moral standing of any particular state depends upon the reality of the 
common life it protects and the extent to which the sacrifices required by that 
protection are willingly accepted and thought worthwhile. If no common life 
exists, its own defense may have no moral justification. But most states do 
stand guard over the community of their citizens, at least to some degree: that 
is why we assume the justice of defensive wars. And given a genuine 
“contract” it makes sense to say that territorial integrity and political 
sovereignty can be defended in exactly the same way as individual life and 
liberty.85 [emphasis added] 
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This changes the understanding of Walzer’s model just developed. At the domestic level, he 
is not advocating a vertical relationship between each individual and the government, but 
rather a horizontal relationship between the individuals that constitutes a political 
community, and a vertical relationship between this entity and the government.   
To understand Walzer’s model, one needs to understand why protecting these rights 
of political communities (political autonomy and territorial integrity) is the best (perhaps 
only) way to respect, protect or promote the common life (and thus, the life and liberty) of 
the members of these communities. Although the status of sovereignty seems to be derived 
from an internal relationship (namely, that between the government and the political 
community) these rights of states are claims against external bodies. So, we need to 
understand the reasons external bodies have for respecting these rights, and what it means to 
do so. Walzer’s defense of this position draws heavily on John Stuart Mill’s essay on the 
duty of non-intervention. 86 
The value that supports this tight relationship between the rights of political 
communities and the rights of individuals is that of the self-determination of the people of the 
political community. Walzer defines the right to self-determination as the right of a people to 
“become free by their own efforts” if they can, and claims that “nonintervention is the 
principle guaranteeing that their success will not be impeded or their failure prevented by the 
intrusions of an alien power.”87 To better understand this conception of self-determination 
and the correlative duty of non-intervention we can turn directly to Mill’s essay.  
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Walzer, following Mill, maintains a close relationship between the value of self-
determination and the duty of non-intervention. For Mill, this relationship is established 
through empirical claims about how a free society comes about. Writing about the dangers of 
intervention, Mill observes:  
There can seldom be anything approaching to assurance that intervention, 
even if successful, would be for the good of the people themselves. The only 
test possessing any real value, of a people’s having become fit for popular 
institutions, is that they, or a sufficient portion of them to prevail in the 
contest, are willing to brave labour and danger for their liberation…the evil 
is, that if they have not sufficient love of liberty to be able to wrest it from 
merely domestic oppressors, the liberty which is bestowed on them by other 
hands than their own, will have nothing real, nothing permanent.88 [emphasis 
added] 
 
In this passage Mill explains that from the perspective of those outside any particular state, 
evaluating whether intervention is justified, the best evidence that such an intervention would 
be successful or valuable to the people it is meant to benefit, is that the people of the 
community have pursued (and perhaps, attained) this end for themselves.   
Expanding on the conditions required for successful institutions of this kind, Mill 
writes:  
No people ever was and remained free, but because it was determined to be 
so; because neither its rulers nor any other party in the nation could compel it 
to be otherwise. If a people - especially one whose freedom has not yet 
become prescriptive – does not value it sufficiently to fight for it, and 
maintain it against any force which can be mustered within the country, even 
by those who have the command of the public revenue, it is only a question of 
how few years or months that people will be enslaved.89 [emphasis added] 
 
In both this passage and the one above, Mill’s primary test of a people being fit for a political 
regime characterized by liberty is that the individuals of the community place the proper 
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value on or have a sufficient love for liberty and are willing to fit and sacrifice for it. This 
kind of attachment to or value placed on liberty, Mill thinks, is also something that must be 
cultivated internally (and cannot arise from intervention). Rather,  
When a people has the misfortune to be ruled by a government under which 
the feelings and virtues needful for maintaining freedom could not develop 
themselves, it is during an arduous struggle to become free by their own 
efforts that these feelings and virtues have the best chance of springing up.90 
[emphasis added] 
 
Through these passages we can see that Mill’s argument against intervention is primarily “it 
will not work.” He claims we are not able, through forceful intervention from the outside, to 
create a condition where institutions characterized by liberty are valued by or valuable to the 
members of the intervened in state. The language he uses to describe this can be difficult to 
read from a modern point of view – particularly because he describes communities as ‘fit’ for 
liberty. However, the point that forceful interventions in other nations with the end of 
creating liberal governments cannot, by their nature, accomplish the ends they are aimed at is 
a point one may find plausible or at least worth taking seriously.  
Walzer recognizes an element of truth in Mill’s essay and builds an account of the 
value of self-determination and its political manifestation from it. Quite strikingly, Walzer 
recognizes in these passages a right-headed articulation of the value of self-determination, 
rather than as I did above, recognizing in Mill’s essay a plausible empirical generalization 
about the efficacy of intervention in other states. Walzer claims that Mill has identified the 
value and importance of the self-determination of peoples, and in so doing, given a 
characterization of the political value: self-determination. Walzer further argues that it is 
precisely this value that is manifested by the status of sovereignty, writing:  
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These are the truths expressed by the legal doctrine of sovereignty, which 
defines the liberty of states as their independence from foreign control and 
coercion. In fact, of course, not every independent state is free, but the 
recognition of sovereignty is the only way we have of establishing an arena 
within which freedom can be fought for and (sometimes) won.91 [emphasis 
added] 
 
Walzer’s characterization of the value of self-determination is rooted in a people’s being able 
to create a sphere in which freedom is possible. He takes from Mill that this kind of freedom 
can only be established within a state. Moreover, he thinks that this value of self-
determination is so important that the rights of political communities express or protect it. 
Since the rights of states are determined by the reality of the common life they protect, 
respect for a state’s rights is dependent on whether non-interference establishes a legitimate 
sphere of freedom within which the community can exercise this right to self-determination. 
Moreover, the right to self-determination is characterized in such a way as to build into it the 
duty of non-intervention.  
With the normative foundations of the account more squarely in view, we can return 
to Walzer’s model of the nature and content of international justice. As the rights of states are 
political autonomy and territorial integrity, justice between states is primarily concerned with 
specifying what count as legitimate and illegitimate crossings of borders. Walzer builds these 
principles of legitimate border crossing in a ‘legalist paradigm,’ indicating that the 
obligations identified are binding and can be enforced. However, unlike Kant, he does not 
think that this legalist paradigm takes the form of an institution, even one as minimal as the 
pacific federation. The state’s right to political autonomy precludes, for Walzer, participation 
in an international institution that ‘makes and enforces law.’ The power to enforce the rights 
of states is instead decentralized to the states themselves. Enforcement takes the form of 
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forceful interference or violation of territorial integrity – war.  War, when just, is the 
enforcement of international justice, namely, the rights of states. When war is unjust, it is an 
international crime – the violation of the rights of states.92  
The second principle of the legalist paradigm draws together Walzer’s account most 
clearly:  
This international society has a law that establishes the rights of its members 
– above all, the rights of territorial integrity and political sovereignty…these 
two rest ultimately on the right of men and women to build a common life and 
to risk their individual lives only when they freely choose to do so. But the 
relevant law refers only to states, and its details are fixed by the intercourse of 
states, through complex processes of conflict and consent.93 
  
This principle incorporates four important features of Walzer’s account. The first is that he 
thinks there is something properly referred to as ‘law’ between the states in the international 
society. The principles he identifies are not moral rules or norms – they are laws.  Secondly, 
here he returns to the rights of individual persons as the primary normative building blocks of 
the account. At the same time, (and thirdly), the principles of international justice or the 
international law take only states as their objects and subjects. That is, the international law is 
binding on states, and concerns the rights of states. Finally, the law is created by the states 
themselves. Although the process of creation is unclear, he seems to indicate that agreement 
of the states plays a significant role in the nature and content of international law.  
Even with this concise statement of the rights of states, it is not clear how Walzer 
understands the status of sovereignty. In the initial discussion of the rights of political 
communities he seems to claim that these rights of states are conferred on states, in a 
complicated way, by the members of the particular political community. In this initial 
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discussion, sovereignty appears to be an internally conferred status. However, in discussion 
of the second principle of the legalist paradigm, Walzer is clear that the international 
community of states establishes the rights of the states. This confusion is due to an important 
distinction he makes in a paper responding to critics of this initial articulation of his account 
between external and internal judgments of legitimacy.  
 The distinction between internal and external judgments of legitimacy can be put this 
way:  
states can be presumptively legitimate in international society and actually 
illegitimate at home. The doctrine of legitimacy has a dual reference…The 
two justifications do not coincide because they are addressed to different 
audiences. First, then, a state is legitimate or not depending upon the ‘fit’ of 
government and community, that is, the degree to which the government 
actually represents the political life of its people. When it doesn’t do that, the 
people have a right to rebel…The second set of arguments concerns the 
presumptive legitimacy of states in international society….They are not to 
intervene unless the absence of ‘fit’ between the government and community 
is radically apparent.94  
 
Notice that, for Walzer, not only are there two different standards for making judgments 
about the legitimacy of a state, the external standard is weaker than the internal standard. 
This is expressed by his first claim in the section quoted above: states can be legitimate in 
international society and illegitimate at home. Despite there being two different standards, 
the judgment that a state is legitimate, in both cases, refers to a fit between the people and 
their government. This suggests that rather than think of the internal and the external as 
different standards for judging whether a state is legitimate, we should think of them as 
different thresholds for making this judgment along the same dimension.  
There are two different standards because these are two different positions one could 
occupy in judging whether a government fits its people. One could make this judgment from 
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the point of view of the members of the state, and one could make this judgment from the 
point of view of those outside the state. As a member of a state, one has a privileged point of 
view for two reasons. The first is the people of a state have access to information or 
knowledge about this relationship of fit between the people and the government that no 
outsider to the state can know or understand (an epistemic reason), and the second is that 
people of a state have a unique and morally important relationship to the government (a 
normative reason). 
 Although Walzer appeals to both reasons (the epistemic and the normative), the 
epistemic reason for the different thresholds for judging legitimacy or fit is somewhat weak. 
It is not clear why we should think that because someone is subject to a government, they 
have a better understanding than someone not subject to that government of the fit between it 
and the people it rules. The normative reason is stronger, but requires more explanation. In 
particular, to accept the normative reason we need to understand why the unique relationship 
between the people and the government of the people is morally salient, and morally salient 
in such a way that it justifies a different threshold for attributions of legitimacy. 
 Returning to the discussion of the nature and value of self-determination above, we 
can construct the grounding of Walzer’s normative reason on his behalf. Recall, the judgment 
that a state is legitimate from the external point of view is the judgment that we, as an 
external body, ought to respect the state’s rights to political autonomy and territorial 
integrity. The rights of states are contingent on the state’s protecting the common life of its 
members, and can only be said to fail in doing so when it is so repressive that self-
determination (as the ability to struggle to be free) nearly impossible (as in the case of 
massacre or enslavement). The internal judgment (and actions that manifest or result from 
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this judgment) that the state is illegitimate is part of a community’s exercise of the right to 
self-determination – and as such, it is up to the community to decide when and how it 
exercises this right. The external judgment that a state is illegitimate is not part of this 
important practice, and can only be acted on when doing so does not violate this right of the 
community. Presumably, the threshold for a community exercising its right to self-
determination by rebelling against, or otherwise challenging the legitimacy of its government 
will be different (and perhaps lower) than the threshold at which external interference does 
not violate this right of the people. 
 Recognizing the asymmetry in the internal and external positions, Walzer argues that 
the external judgment of legitimacy must express or reflect this lack of knowledge:  
The state is constituted by the union of people and government, and it is the 
state that claims against all other states the twin rights of territorial integrity 
and political sovereignty. Foreigners are in no position to deny the reality of 
that union, or rather, they are in no position to attempt anything more than 
speculative denials…Hence their conduct, in the first instance at least, cannot 
be determined by either knowledge or judgment. It is, or it ought to be, 
determined instead by a morally necessary presumption: that there exists a 
certain ‘fit’ between the community and its government and that the state is 
‘legitimate.’…This presumption is simply the respect that foreigners owe to a 
historic community and to its internal life…So long as it stands, however, the 
boundaries of international society stand with it.95 [emphasis added] 
 
In the face of limited information and the difference normative relationship, external bodies 
show respect for other communities by acting on the presupposition that there does exist 
some fit between the people and their government. This respect for other communities 
reflects not only our fallibility as external bodies, but: “our recognition of diversity and our 
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respect for communal integrity and for different patterns of cultural and political 
development.”96 
Although Walzer argues that external judgments of legitimacy must begin from the 
presupposition that there does exist a fit, or union, of people and government, there can be 
externally illegitimate states. When even external bodies can determine that there is a radical 
failure of fit between the government and its people we, as external bodies, can treat the state 
as illegitimate (that is, not respect its rights to political autonomy and territorial integrity). 
Although Walzer has a near universal ban on any aggressive crossing of the borders, his 
legalist paradigm includes exceptions when respecting the rights of states is not compatible 
with the underlying moral value of self-determination. For our purposes, the most interesting 
reasons for lifting the ban is the third:  
The ban on boundary crossings is subject to unilateral suspension, specifically 
with reference to three sorts of cases where it does not seem to serve the 
purposes for which it was established… - when the violation of human rights 
within a set of boundaries is so terrible that it makes talk of community or 
self-determination or “arduous struggle” seem cynical and irrelevant, that is, 
in cases of enslavement or massacre.97 
 
On this point, Walzer seems to have a position quite similar to Altman and Wellman. The 
rights of states are conditional on an internal feature of the states themselves (in this case 
‘fit,’ for Altman and Wellman ‘respect for basic human rights’). When external bodies are in 
a position to evaluate this failure of the internal condition (mass human rights violations of 
the kind in cases of massacre or enslavement), they can be justified in intervening.  
 The status of sovereignty in Walzer’s model cannot be neatly captured with our 
orienting distinction. Sovereignty seems to attach to the second (external) sense of legitimacy 
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for Walzer. That is, the sovereignty rights of states are what is under discussion in the 
judgments about external legitimacy. However, the object of the judgment is an internal 
feature of the state. The ‘fit’ between the people and the government. Thus, what confers the 
status on the state seems to be this internal fit – which is then recognized internationally.  
There are many important and interesting features of Walzer’s model, and I find the 
structure of Walzer’s position quite attractive. He argues that we respect the rights of states 
because doing so protects what is valuable to and for individuals. For Walzer, this is the 
common life of the members of the community and their right to self-determination. What I 
find potentially problematic about this position is how he understands the values placed 
within the structure, and how they are weighted. In particular, I worry about Walzer’s 
characterization of the nature and value of ‘self-determination.’  
As he characterizes it, self-determination “is the right of a people ‘to become free by 
their own efforts’.”98 This is a quite narrow and particular conception of self-determination, 
and seems to imply a similarly narrow conception of liberty and its value. In contrast, one 
might hold that liberty consists in individuals having access to basic goods and enjoying 
basic rights that allow them to shape their lives as they see fit. This is not to say that freedom 
from interference is not a central aspect of even this conception of liberty, however, it does 
not assume that non-interference is the hallmark of it, or even the best tool for achieving it. 
Walzer, while arguing that non-interference is instrumentally valuable, defines the value of 
self-determination in terms of non-interference. This strikes me as mistaken.  
To see the trouble, take for example the freedom of expression. Freedom of speech is 
not freedom from interference with respect to personal expression for its own sake (or even 
defined as freedom from interference), but valuable insofar as it contributes to the pursuit of 
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truth, or experiments in living, or the development of individuality. If we value the self-
determination of individuals and communities (another distinction Walzer is not quite clear 
about in articulating his own position), it is not clear that the empirical conjecture that being 
left to one’s own devices is the only way to achieve it is true, or properly aimed at what is 
valuable about liberty.  
A general diagnosis of my unease with how Walzer fills in the values in this 
argument can be expressed as the worry that his account rests on and amplifies a 
romanticization of the relationship between a people and its government (let alone the 
relationship between members of a community). His picture, despite beginning with the 
rights of individuals, quickly loses sight of these individuals. David Luban captures this 
worry quite sharply, arguing:  
National sovereignty, it was thought, gives people their most important 
entitlement: a state the expresses their traditions, history and unity – their 
“national soul.” Attack the state, and you attack the soul of its people. 
Nationality may have originated as an ideology of liberation and tolerance: in 
our century it is drenched in blood….The violence of modern nationalism and 
its indifference to basic human rights arises, I believe, from the conviction that 
the only right which matters politically is the right to a unified nation-state. Its 
picture of the nation-state, however, is a myth. It emphasizes a nation’s 
commonality, affinity, shared language, and traditions and history, what 
Mazzini called “unanimity of mind.” The picture glosses over intramural class 
conflict, turmoil, violence, and repression; these it represents as inscrutable 
processes akin to national destiny.99 
 
This objection, what I refer to as the romanticization objection, challenges Walzer to explain 
why membership in a nation is more valuable to individuals than other rights. Luban 
attributes to Walzer the position that ‘being a member of a nation’ is not merely valuable to 
or for individuals, but of such value that it ought to be taken as the primary right or good of 
individuals in the international context (trumping basic security and subsistence rights for 
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individuals, as may be recommended by a less state-centric view, except in very extreme 
circumstances).  
The romantic position relies on a nostalgic and white-washed conception of a nation 
as a unified community, characterized by affinity, shared traditions and history (that are, 
themselves, valued by or valuable to the members of the community and significantly 
contribute to the individuals’ flourishing, self-conception, and the like).  This view of the 
value of the nation to individuals is romantic insofar as its conception of a nation is at odds 
with what nations are (or at least, have been the recent history). It ignores that nations are 
often internally diverse or pluralistic, if not (as if often the case) openly repressive, 
oppressive with respect to some members of the community, and sometimes violent. If we 
view nations as communities characterized, at least in part, by difference (and sometimes 
conflict of the kind Luban identifies) the value of membership in a nation to individuals is 
quite far from clearly greater than the value of basic security and subsistence rights. At most, 
membership in a nation is one value among others to and for individuals, or valuable 
contingent on its providing other goods or rights for individuals (perhaps basic security and 
subsistence rights).   
 
RAWLS: PEOPLE AND PEOPLES 
Rawls, in contrast to Kant, Hobbes and Walzer, is not best understood through the 
values or principles he is responsive to in constructing the principles of international justice. 
Instead, we can understand Rawls’ work as aimed at articulating and defending the proper 
philosophical process, procedure and point of view for determining the principles of 
international justice. Rawls, like Kant, begins his model of the nature and content of 
international justice with a domestic analogy: “This account of the Law of Peoples conceives 
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of liberal democratic peoples (and decent peoples) as the actors in the Society of Peoples, just 
as citizens are the actors in domestic society…”100 The content of the Law of Peoples 
(principles of international justice) draws on the account of justice Rawls develops for the 
domestic case. We envision an international original position, where the agents behind the 
veil of ignorance are liberal peoples rather than free and equal individual persons. 
Representatives of the peoples are:  
(1) reasonably and fairly situated as free and equal, and peoples are (2) 
modeled as rational. Also their representatives are (3) deliberating about the 
correct subject, in this case the content of the Law of Peoples…Moreover, (4) 
their deliberations proceed in terms of the right reasons (as restricted by the 
veil of ignorance). Finally, the selection of the principles for the Law of 
Peoples is based (5) on people’s fundamental interests, given in this case by a 
liberal conception of justice.101 
 
We determine the content of the Law of Peoples through this process of determining the 
hypothetical agreement of agents of this kind.  
 Notice in this account Rawls has seemingly introduced a new moral entity (or named 
something new as a starting point): a people. Understanding ‘peoples’ is important for 
understanding the model, particularly its innovations. As a first pass, we know that peoples 
are not states, and have their own moral character. Rawls writes:  
I use the term “peoples’” to distinguish my thinking from that about political 
states as traditionally conceived, with their powers of sovereignty included in 
the (positive) international law for the three centuries after the Thirty Years’ 
War (1618-1648)…The powers of sovereignty also grant a state a certain 
autonomy in dealing with its own people. From my perspective this autonomy 
is wrong…The term “peoples,” then, is meant to emphasize these singular 
features of peoples as distinct from states, as traditionally conceived, and to 
highlight their moral character and the reasonably just, or decent, nature of 
their regimes.102 
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Further specifying then nature of peoples as agents in the international sphere, and thus 
having interests that shape the agreement in the international original position:  
These interests of liberal peoples are specified by their reasonable conception 
of political justice. Thus, they strive to protect their political independence 
and their free culture with its civil liberties, to guarantee their security, 
territory, and the well-being of their citizens. Yet a further interest is also 
significant: applied to peoples, it falls under what Rousseau calls amour-
propre. This interest is a people’s proper self-respect of themselves as a 
people, resting on their common awareness of their trials during their history 
and of their culture with its accomplishments…What distinguishes peoples 
from states – and this is crucial – is that just peoples are fully prepared to 
grant the very same proper respect and recognition to other peoples as 
equals.103  
 
In many ways this position is similar to Walzer’s account of states or political communities. 
What Rawls rejects is Walzer’s view that the government of the state, itself, is part of this 
moral entity.  
States, for Rawls in the Law of Peoples, figure into the picture of international justice 
only once the principles of international justice have been articulated. It is what liberal and 
decent peoples would agree to that determine this content. Strikingly, Rawls thinks that the 
Law of Peoples: 
will restrict a state’s internal sovereignty or (political) autonomy, its alleged 
right to do as it wills with people within its own borders…We must 
reformulate the powers of sovereignty in light of a reasonable Law of Peoples 
and deny to states the traditional rights of war and to unrestricted internal 
autonomy…It is significant that peoples’ rights and duties in regard to their 
so-called sovereignty derive from the Law of Peoples itself, to which they 
would agree along with other peoples in suitable circumstances.104  [emphasis 
added] 
 
More radically than any other model thus far, Rawls argues that status of sovereignty and the 
rights of sovereignty are determined by the hypothetical agreement of the peoples, not by the 
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internal relationship of a people and its government. In other words, sovereignty is conferred 
by the process or content of international justice.105  
“Peoples” are not only contrasted with states, but also with individual people. Just as 
Rawls is clear that international justice is not a matter of the agreement (expressed, tacit or 
hypothetical) of states, he is clear that it is not a matter of or for individuals in the sense 
explained below. Rawls contrasts his view with a cosmopolitan view, writing:  
Some think that any liberal Law of Peoples, particularly any social contract 
such law, should begin by first taking up the question of liberal cosmopolitan 
or global justice for all persons. They argue that in such a view all persons are 
considered to be reasonable and rational and to possess what I have called 
“the two moral powers”…From this starting point they go on to imagine a 
global original positions with its veil of ignorance behind which all parties 
are situated symmetrically. Following the kind of reasoning familiar in the 
original position for the domestic case, the parties would then adopt a first 
principle that all persons have equal basic rights and liberties.106 [emphasis 
added] 
 
This conception of cosmopolitanism is a quite narrow one. It begins with a specific 
attribution of the powers of individuals as well as a specific conception of the appropriate 
order of questions, the relevant choice situation, and what is and is not behind the veil of 
ignorance. Working from all this, including the equal moral status of all individuals, Rawls’ 
cosmopolitan then determines that in light of the above (including equal moral status) we 
ought adopt a global original position, which has the result of a first principle of global 
justice that posits equal and basic rights and liberties of all persons.  
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Rawls objects to this kind of cosmopolitanism on the grounds that it assumes from the 
outset something that ought to be the result of a process of articulating the content of 
international justice.   
To proceed this way…amounts to saying that all persons are to have the equal 
liberal rights of citizens in a constitutional democracy. On this account, the 
foreign policy of a liberal people – which it is our concern to elaborate – will 
be to act gradually to shape all not yet liberal societies in a liberal direction, 
until eventually (in the ideal case) all societies are liberal. But this foreign 
policy simply assumes that only a liberal democratic society can be 
acceptable. Without trying to work out a reasonable liberal Law of Peoples, 
we cannot know that nonliberal societies cannot be acceptable. The 
possibility of a global original position does not show that, and we can’t 
merely assume it.107  
 
The cosmopolitan, in attributing to each individual basic and equal (liberal) rights and 
liberties has put the cart before the horse. This attribution of these rights (i.e. “the equal 
liberal rights of citizens in a constitutional democracy”) ought not to be considered ‘basic’ 
and ‘foundational’ but ought to be the outcome of the process of constructing the content of 
international justice or the shape of international law, it is not a starting point for such a 
construction. These cosmopolitans do what the Westphalians do with the state – they assume 
a moral status (with all its attendant rights) going in, and this status ought to be the result of 
the process of determining the principles of international justice.  
This is not to say that individuals play no role in Rawls’ model of the content of or 
domain of international justice. In fact, Rawls makes room for human rights108 that constitute 
part of international justice, and play the important role of bounding or shaping the rights of 
sovereigns.  
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Human rights are a class of rights that play a special role in a reasonable Law 
of Peoples: they restrict the justifying reasons for war and its conduct, and 
they specify limits to a regime’s internal autonomy.109  
 
The rights in question are those that are urgent (freedom from slavery and serfdom, security 
from mass murder or genocide, some liberty of conscience), and “the violation of them is 
condemned by both reasonable liberal peoples and decent hierarchical peoples.”110 Their 
status in international justice comes from agreement by the peoples, but they refer to 
individuals. The role of human rights in the model is three-fold, derived from the more basic 
part in the system of setting “a necessary, though not sufficient, standard for the decency of 
domestic political and social institutions.”111 The three roles are:  
1. Their fulfillment is a necessary condition of the decency of a society’s 
political institutions and of its legal order 
2. Their fulfillment is sufficient to exclude justified and forceful intervention 
by other peoples, for example, by diplomatic and economic sanctions, or 
in grave cases by military force. 
3. They set a limit to the pluralism among peoples.112  
 
In Walzer’s language – a government’s respect for the human rights of its citizens is the 
standard for the external legitimacy of the state.  
Despite finding much of what Rawls says both right and radical, I have some worries 
about the model. The first is whether the Law of Peoples is truly global in the sense set out in 
the second desideratum of a good account in the introduction and in Chapter Two. Rawls’ 
model is clearly trans-national, that is, the Law of Peoples ranges over the liberal and the 
decent peoples. However, it is difficult to see how to extend the model to the cases that we 
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are concerned with in this thesis, and whether the account has a role for the international 
community itself.  
Rawls addresses the relationship between the Society of Peoples and burdened 
societies (economically and socially disadvantaged, such that liberal or decent ordering is not 
possible), as well as with outlaw states (regimes that refuse to comply with a reasonable Law 
of Peoples). With respect to the liberal and decent peoples’ foreign policy for engaging with 
outlaw states (presumably the class of states the capture perpetrators of crime against 
humanity) Rawls discusses the importance of “the long-run aim to bring all societies 
eventually to honor the Law of Peoples and to become full members in good standing of the 
society of well-ordered peoples.”113 He claims that achieving this aim is not a matter of 
political philosophy, but of political wisdom (and some luck). He then suggests institutions 
for joint advocacy, practices of criticism, economic sanctions and withdrawal of other 
mutually beneficial practices can be useful for achieving this end.  
This discussion indicates quite clearly that the non-member societies are, in an 
important sense, not bound by the Law of the Peoples. By definition, the outlaw states are not 
moved by the Law of Peoples. They have reason to be, they ought to, but they are not. Well-
ordered peoples have foreign policies with respect to outlaw states that set goals to pursue 
with respect to these states, and prescribe and prohibit some means for doing so. The well-
ordered societies can by authorized by the Law of Peoples to use force (in certain 
conditions), which can cause the well-ordered societies to, at least minimally, act in 
accordance with the content of the Law of Peoples. However, the well-ordered societies and 
the outlaw states are not under ‘a common law.’  Their relationship is not a juridical 
condition, characterized by mutual accountability to shared rules. In fact, it is not clear that 
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the well-ordered societies can hold the outlaw states accountable (as this would imply a 
reciprocal relationship and common rules); they can only attempt to force them to act in 
certain ways. Rawls’ suggested tools for engaging with outlaw states are means of 
convincing, controlling or coercing these governments, not holding them accountable. What 
Rawls’ model does not provide are resources for answering the Jurisdiction Question on its 
own terms. At best, Rawls’ account may give reasons for pursuing some kind of international 
criminal tribunal, but when the accused demands to know why the court has standing, Rawls 
cannot appeal to a common law to which the perpetrator is being held accountable. 
My second worry with the model concerns Rawls’ use of ‘peoples’ as the primary 
moral agents or entities. As in response to Walzer, it is not clear whether the value of peoples 
is a romanticization inherited from a different time, and thus whether Rawls’ account runs 
the risk of falling prey to the romanticization objection above. On the one hand, Rawls does 
not significantly discuss the value of nations or nationality to individuals; on the other, he 
builds into the account robust and rich interests of peoples (including the individual members 
of a people valuing their shared history and customs). Moreover, he privileges the 
perspective of peoples by taking the proper philosophical point of view for determining the 
principles of justice to be that of peoples. The difficulty with assessing whether his view falls 
prey to this objection comes from the idealized nature of the account. Rawls begins by 
stipulating peoples as normatively robust entities, and it not clear whether ‘there are no 
things in the world that manifest those traits’ or ‘peoples are not really like that’ are 
objections to his view. 
Raising the specter of the romanticization objection is not to deny that Rawls makes 
more room for basic human rights (and the importance of individuals in constructing the 
  101
principles of international justice) in his model than Walzer. However, one cannot help but 
be left cold by Rawls’ actual list of human rights. I agree with Rawls that an articulation of 
the human rights ought to be the outcome of the process of articulating the principles of 
international justice; however, his account of what grounds this process (hypothetical 
agreement of peoples) is problematic. Arguing that hypothetical agreement of peoples is the 
proper philosophical process for determining the content of the human rights norms seems to 
beg the question of whether national membership (or peoples-membership) is more valuable 
than other goods to individuals, by assuming that the point of view of peoples is the proper 
philosophical point of view for determining the content of international justice. If 
membership in a people (or nation) were just one value among others, it would not follow 
that international justice takes the form of a Law of Peoples, and not a Law of People (in 
which the rights of peoples are given, like the rights of states, by the philosophical process of 
articulating the norms).  
 
PROPOSAL FOR A NEW MODEL  
Reflecting on this discussion we have found a way to move forward. Taking over 
from Hobbes and Kant, we see the need for common rules, backed by some kind of 
enforcement for political or legal justice at the international level. Given this positivist 
framework, Rawls’ strong position (and Kant’s) on the status of sovereignty as an externally 
conferred status is most fitting. As the status of sovereignty concerns claims states can make 
with respect to one another (and other external entities), grounding the status requires 
common rules or norms for the states (or other international actors). Within this framework, 
the status of states is determined by or articulated by or given content through the principles 
of international law or international justice. On this account, what it means to be sovereign is 
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not something we can determine prior to process of international articulation (whatever that 
may be). So, states are not the primary normative entities from which we build an account.  
Rawls and Walzer, in recognizing an important gap between people of a community 
and the government in that community, focus the construction of their models on these 
groups (political communities or peoples).114 However, in so doing, they reify or romanticize 
the nature and importance of these groups. Their aim in beginning in this way is to capture 
the importance of political communities (a role for states in our desiderata-language), but 
they do this at too high a cost to the importance of individuals. This suggests room for 
beginning from the individuals and building an account that incorporates the value of local 
political communities (rather than the other way around).   
In Chapters Four and Five I develop just such an account, which I refer to as the 
Alternative Cosmopolitan Account (ACA). The ACA begins by taking individuals as the 
primary normative entities and takes sovereignty to be a status determined by the 
international law. The ACA’s commitment to cosmopolitanism is developed and defended in 
Chapter Four, and the argument for the international community’s standing to prosecute 
crime against humanity constitutes the whole of Chapter Five.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
114 This is not to imply that the questions Walzer and Rawls set out to answer are the same, or the same as ours 
in this thesis. However, the model of the international community is something that we can talk about across 
theories aimed at answering different questions, because these models are accounts of the normatively basic 
entities and principles that any question of international justice must use or take into account.   
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER FOUR 
 
THE CONTENT OF COSMOPOLITANISM 
 
 
MINIMAL COSMOPOLITANISM 
In Chapter Three I suggested an Alternative Cosmopolitan Account (ACA) to 
responding to the Nuremberg Problem. This Alternative Cosmopolitan Account is an 
individualist account that takes persons as the primary or basic normative entities (as 
opposed to states, nations or peoples) for purposes of constructing the principles of 
international justice. In order to move forward, this cosmopolitan commitment needs to be 
spelled out more clearly.  
As a first pass at identifying the nature of such a commitment, we can define it in 
contrast to statist accounts. The Westphalia Model takes states as the primary normative 
entities in the global or transnational domain. It holds that states are the objects and subjects 
of international law, and the claims and interests of states are taken as relevant fundamental 
normative reasons for evaluating the law (both particular law, the principles of international 
law and existence of institutions of international law). In contrast, a cosmopolitan account 
takes the claims and interests of individuals as the fundamental normative reasons salient to 
or grounding the claims about the principles of international justice. However, this negative 
characterization does little to suggest how we might move forward. What does it mean to 
take individuals as the basic normative entities in the international context?  
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As a second pass, we can further locate the cosmopolitan position by recognizing that 
individualism need not imply cosmopolitanism. Take individualism as the position that 
value-claims are grounded in moral features (including interests) of individuals. This position 
is compatible with a statism or nationalism in the international context. It could be the case 
that, as in Walzer’s view, the moral claims individuals make on one another are captured by 
or otherwise properly fall within the proper purview of local political communities, which 
then serve as the primary normative entities for constructing the principles of international 
justice. In Chapter Three I argued against this kind of individualism, suggesting that we 
develop an individualist account that is also cosmopolitan: an account on which, in the 
context of international justice, the basic normative entities are individuals.  
 In this chapter I will continue building this account by articulating the content of the 
commitment to cosmopolitanism at the core of this alternative account. The term 
‘cosmopolitanism’ refers to a range of normative theories in both moral and political 
philosophy. Although theories of cosmopolitanism vary greatly,115 I follow Thomas Pogge in 
identifying the central idea of cosmopolitanism as the tenet that “every human being has a 
global stature as an ultimate unit of moral concern.”116 The cosmopolitan holds that each 
individual human being is a primary unit of moral concern for every other human being.117 
This family of views is often contrasted with those that locate the source of moral obligations 
                                                 
115 For very useful taxonomies and introductions to the cosmopolitan tradition see: Pauline Kleingeld “Six 
Varieties of Cosmopolitanism in Eighteenth-Century Germany,” Journal of the History of Ideas 60 (1999): 505-
524, and Samuel Scheffler’s “Conceptions of Cosmopolitanism,” in Boundaries and Allegiances: Problems of 
Justice and Responsibility in Liberal Thought (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001).   

116 Thomas Pogge, “Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty,” Ethics 103 (1992): 49.  
117 Being human is a sufficient condition for moral concern for many theories of cosmopolitanism, although not 
necessary for all such theories.  
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or limit the scope of moral concern to interpersonal relationships, or other more local 
attachments, as in fellow citizenship in a state, or shared local culture. 
For the cosmopolitan each human being counts in a global moral community. When 
we talk about the demands of morality, the obligations of morality, or the principles of 
morality, we take into consideration the global moral community of which every human 
being is a part.  With this initial identification of the family of views under the name 
cosmopolitanism, we can ask: what does it mean to say that each individual gets counted in 
the global moral community?  
Some theorists give content to this commitment by claiming that we think of each 
person as having duties of humanity or obligations of humanity to all other human beings. 
We owe one another basic respect, or we see one another as the kinds of things that can put 
us under moral obligation, or we take other people as counting in our moral considerations, 
or that can make a legitimate claim on us. This way of fleshing out cosmopolitanism is often 
explained in the language of rights. For many, the commitment to taking each individual as 
an object of moral concern means to treat each person as the bearer of human, natural or 
innate rights (the difference between these modifiers is not important here). We find this 
commitment in the very first clause of the Preamble to the United Nations Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights: “...recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and 
inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice 
and peace in the world.”118  
As explained in Chapter Three, Rawls argues against this way of understanding 
cosmopolitanism. He argues that in taking each individual as an ultimate unit of moral 
                                                 
118 UN General Assembly, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 10 December 1948, 217 A (III), available 
at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b3712c.html . 
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concern and interpreting it in a certain way and using it with certain other assumptions, the 
cosmopolitan commitments herself to a system of equal liberal rights for all individuals, and 
thus is committed to a political position on rights the status of which ought to be the outcome 
of the process of determining the substantive content of international justice, rather than its 
starting point. In this chapter, I take up this challenge to cosmopolitanism. I present a 
minimal cosmopolitan that avoids this political commitment to the existence of robust rights 
(or some other articulation of a political status), but saves the normative foundations of 
international justice as the value and nature of individual human beings.  
This project of articulating a minimal cosmopolitanism can be contrasted with giving 
a substantive cosmopolitan account. Here, I am concerned with the normative structure or 
features of the relationship itself, rather than with articulating norms, principles, rules or 
rights that are implied by this relationship or are otherwise characteristic of it. In part, this is 
in response to Rawls’ worry about cosmopolitans begging the interesting questions by 
building into their normative resources claims about rights and duties that ought to be the 
outcome of the process of articulating the principles of justice.119  
With that said my aim is to identify and explain the commitments of what I think of as 
the commonsense moral position that is shared by different cosmopolitan theorists. The 
commonsense moral position is that found in the United Nations Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights above, it is a commitment to the inherent dignity of all members of the family 
of humanity. This language is all around us, and although often presented as mere political 
rhetoric, the language points to something that we can all identify. It is the commonplace 
                                                 
119 In Chapter Five, I provide an argument for the need for institutions (and how they can come to articulate the 
substantive claims one may expect in this discussion), based on the more formal features I identify and develop 
here. 
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belief that human beings bear an important relationship to one another as human beings, and 
this relationship has a moral character. 
As a first step toward an articulation of this minimal cosmopolitanism, we can begin 
by recognizing that we need not ground or justify the commitment to cosmopolitanism using 
either rights talk or a global original position. Peter Singer’s famous three-step argument in 
“Famine, Affluence and Morality” does not require rights, but merely the premises (1) that 
suffering (no matter where it occurs) is bad, and that (2) we ought to prevent bad things from 
happening if we can do so without giving up something of significant moral worth.120 His 
argument is consistent with cosmopolitanism as formulated, and in fact, quite a bit more 
radical than many ways of filling out the normative foundations of the commitment, as it 
holds that all things that can suffer (a much greater group than human beings alone) are 
objects of moral concern.  
The philosophical task of this chapter is to give an account of minimal 
cosmopolitanism that is sufficiently robust to ground the principles of international justice 
but which does not posit basic liberal rights. Beyond recognizing that we need not capture 
such a commitment in rights language, it is important to notice that cosmopolitanism is a 
commitment that crosses normative moral theories. It is a kind of commitment that is not the 
result of a particular normative theory, but a position shared by otherwise quite different 
theorists. As characterized briefly above, cosmopolitanism can be the belief that each human 
being has an inherent dignity, or counts in the moral calculus, or is a potential locus of 
(morally salient) suffering. The challenge to the articulation of the nature of this commitment 
in part comes from this diversity. It can at once render the commitment to cosmopolitanism 
                                                 
120 Peter Singer, “Famine, Affluence and Morality,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 1 (1972): 229-243. 
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so empty that it appears trivially true, or so implausibly demanding (both morally and 
psychologically) that it is clearly false.  
 I contend that the commitment to cosmopolitanism is a theoretical and practical 
commitment to the existence of a basic moral relationship that holds between all human 
beings, characterized by co-membership in the moral community, which centrally involves 
taking oneself and others as beings as sources of moral concern.  
 
THE BASIC MORAL RELATIONSHIP 
Informed by the commonsense moral position on the moral nature of the family or 
community of humanity, we can give an initial characterization of minimal cosmopolitanism 
as commitment to a basic moral relationship characterized by co-membership in the moral 
community. To give content to this claim, we must understand what is meant by ‘basic moral 
relationship.’ I use the term ‘relationship’ to capture the aspect of minimal cosmopolitanism 
that posits some kind of moral bond between individuals.  
To make sense of the bound-to-one-another aspect of the co-membership relationship, we 
can characterize individuals as recognizing one another as having a kind of standing with 
respect to one another. They recognize one another as co-members in the moral community. 
‘Recognition’ here is not a psychological claim. Not only would a psychological explanation 
of recognition fail to explain the normative commitments of cosmopolitanism, it is most 
likely a false.121 Instead, recognition in this context is normative. The cosmopolitan holds 
that we ought to recognize all other persons as co-members in the moral community, and act 
in ways compatible with this recognition.  
                                                 
121 Despite the commonplace and commonsense moral position above, the psychological reality of actually 
recognizing each other individual as a co-member of the moral community is not a likely explanation of why we 
find the moral claim true, or even plausible.  
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The question of why we ought to do so is an important one and can be raised seemingly 
whenever a normative claim is posited. For our purposes, the question of ‘why’ is not the 
project. This is not to say that there is no answer to why we ought to be cosmopolitans, or 
why we ought to recognize all persons as co-members of the moral community. It is simply 
to say that there is no general answer to this question, because it depends on the details of 
how you fill out the view. Although answering this particular justificatory question is not the 
project of this chapter, the view I articulate is compatible with different ways of giving this 
answer and is in conversation with such projects.  
I use the modifier ‘moral’ in both ‘basic moral relationship’ and ‘moral community’ to 
indicate that this is a non- or pre-political conception of standing. The way we recognize 
other human beings in this relationship is not as beings with politically recognized and 
backed rights, or to whom we have enforced obligations. In other words, the standing of co-
membership in the moral community is not a status conferred on the bearers by political 
bodies or institutions.122 Distinguishing the basic moral relationship of co-membership from 
a political characterization of status does not imply that this relationship is also somehow a-
social or pre-social. The features of this relationship can be (and I believe are, in fact) 
distinctly social in nature.  
In order to identify features of the basic moral relationship that give more content and 
depth to the position, I turn now to a critical discussion of three important works: Peter 
Strawson’s “Freedom and Resentment,” Thomas Scanlon’s What We Owe to Each Other, 
and Joel Feinberg’s “The Nature and Value of Rights.” The first feature I identify is that 
members of the moral community engage in participatory reactive attitudes. They take one 
another as participants or agents rather than mere objects. The second is that members of the 
                                                 
122 This gap proves important for the move to the political, which will be addressed in Chapter Five.  
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moral community value living in a way that is justifiable to other members. Finally, the third 
is that members of the moral community understand justification to one another, at least in 
part, as concerning impersonal institutions or practices, among which can be the practice of 
making claims on one another.  
 
FEATURE #1: PARTICIPANT REACTIVE ATTITUDES 
In “Freedom and Resentment” Peter Strawson identifies adopting the “participant” (rather 
than objective) reactive attitudes with respect to other people as fundamentally important to 
understanding attributions of moral responsibility. Strawson distinguishes these two kinds of 
reactive attitudes in virtue of what kind of being the reactor takes the reacted to, to be:  
To adopt the objective attitude to another human being is to see him, perhaps, 
as an object of social policy; as a subject for what, in a wide range of sense, 
might be called treatment; as something certainly to be taken account, perhaps 
precautionary account, of; to be managed or handled or cured or trained; 
perhaps simply to be avoided, though this gerundive is not peculiar to cases of 
objectivity of attitude. The objective attitude may be emotionally toned in 
many ways, but not in all ways: it may include repulsion or fear, it may 
include pity or even love, though not all kinds of love. But it cannot include 
the range of reactive feeling and attitudes which belong to involvement or 
participation with others in inter-personal human relationships; it cannot 
include resentment, gratitude, forgiveness, anger, or the sort of love which 
two adults can sometimes be said to feel reciprocally, for each other.123 
 
This passage from Strawson is quite dense, so further explanation of this distinction between 
classes of reactive attitudes is in order.  
Take, as a starting point, the example of a thunderstorm. When I am home in the 
middle of the night and hear a thunderclap and pounding rain, I react to the thunderstorm as 
an object. I can be frustrated with the thunderstorm because it is going to interfere with my 
morning commute, or I can be afraid of the thunderstorm because during the last one a tree 
                                                 
123 Peter Strawson, “Freedom and Resentment,” in Free Will, 2nd Edition, ed. Gary Watson, (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2003), 7.  
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branch fell and crushed my car. However, I cannot (reasonably) resent the thunderstorm, as 
this would imply that it could be held accountable for being a thunderstorm. Resentment 
would imply that my relationship to the storm is one characterized by reciprocal standing to 
hold accountable to moral norms. However, I cannot take the thunderstorm as an agent and, 
appropriately, react to it as such.124  
Both ways of reacting to other beings, as objects and as participants, can be adopted 
with respect to other persons. I can react to my younger brother in the same way I react to the 
thunderstorm: as a being that is caused to act, manifests certain kinds of behavior as a result 
of the circumstances, and can be changed or controlled by external events and actions. Given 
his only recent emergence from the turmoil of teen-dom, the objective attitude (in point of 
fact) characterized many of my reactions to him in recent memory. However, unlike with the 
thunderstorm, if I only take up the objective attitudes with respect to my brother (that is, in 
all cases I view him as an object and react to him as such) I am failing to treat him like a 
person.125 I am failing to attribute to him the participant status that includes an attribution of 
moral responsibility and thus, commits me to a relationship that is partially characterized by 
mutual accountability to moral norms.  
With the distinction between objective and participant reactive attitudes in view, we 
can ask: why ought we take up this participant attitude with respect to other persons? Why is 
it inappropriate to adopt only the objective attitudes to other human beings? Strawson’s 
response to these questions is that they are misplaced. He identifies “taking of others and 
                                                 
124 “Appropriately” is important here. Sometimes we talk of resenting the weather – but this is a metaphorical 
use of resentment. It is taking up an inapt attitude, in order to express a kind of reaction that is as if the 
thunderstorm is an agent.  
 
125 And, in fact, this is a formal way of putting his frequent complaints about the family’s collective adoption of 
the objective reactive attitudes with respect to him.   
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oneself as participants rather than objects” as fundamental to the human experience, as a 
basic feature of social human life. He goes so far as to say we are unable to sustain any 
attitude but the participant attitudes to other people, writing:  
A sustained objectivity of inter-personal attitude, and the human isolation 
which that would entail does not seem to be something of which human 
beings would be capable.126 
 
The taking of the participant attitudes with respect to ourselves and other people (that is, 
reacting to our actions and those of others in a way characteristic of attributing moral 
responsibility and thus a mutual relationship of accountability to shared moral norms) is a 
basic feature of human social experience.  
 It is important to note that this taking up of the participant reactive attitudes is not 
merely a way of viewing other entities in the world. It cannot be captured entirely by the 
existence of beliefs about what kind of status is appropriate for ourselves and others. It is, in 
its nature, practical. It is about the in-the-world responses and practices of which we are a 
part. The reactive nature of the attitudes brings this out most clearly. Strawson is highlighting 
a way we react to and interact with one another. Most importantly, he draws attention to how 
our attributions of participant-status are manifested in our holding ourselves and one another 
accountable.  
Strawson’s discussion of the importance of the reactive attitudes sheds light on the 
nature of co-membership in the moral community. Part of what it means to be a person is to 
have these attitudes with respect to one another. At the very least, he identifies a relationship 
that is both unique and valuable (or central to human life). It is unique in that it exists only 
between certain kinds of beings: those who can and do take up the participant attitudes with 
respect to one another. Secondly, it is valuable in that it is characteristic of what it means to 
                                                 
126 Strawson, p. 9.  
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live as a person, with other people. If we take up only the objective attitudes with respect to 
others we give up something central to human nature, and what it means to live a human life. 
The value of human nature, or living a human life, is not something Strawson argues for 
directly, and something it would be too difficult to address here. What is important for the 
current discussion is the claim that the reactive-attitudes are taken to pick out a central and 
important ‘human characteristic’ the loss of which would make life less human as we 
understand it. 
As the basic moral relationship is the central commitment of minimal 
cosmopolitanism, one may worry that characterizing it through the participant reactive 
attitudes is problematic. The reactive attitudes are responses to others in relative proximity. 
When someone steps on my foot and doesn’t apologize, I resent them. When someone in 
North Dakota steals a television, if I even ever find out about it, resentment is not the 
standard response (if, indeed, I respond at all). How could the reactive attitudes explain the 
any kind of relationship between people on opposite sides of the globe?  To answer this 
question, we can turn to the second feature of co-membership in the moral community and 
how it deepens our understanding of the first.   
 
FEATURE #2: THE VALUE OF JUSTIFICATION 
In What We Owe to Each Other Thomas Scanlon argues for a contractarian account 
of right action: “an act is right if and only if it can be justified to others.”127 This position is 
explained and defended at great length, however for our purposes we need only focus on his 
discussion of why this account of right action gives us reason to act. One question Scanlon 
must answer in justifying his account of right action is: why would ‘that an action can be 
                                                 
127 T. M. Scanlon, What We Owe To Each Other, (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 2000), 189.  
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justified to others’ give us reason to act? If this account of right action is to be binding on us, 
it should explain why it provides us with reasons (perhaps conclusive) to act in the way 
required by the theory. Scanlon responds to this question by arguing that “being justifiable to 
others” gives us reason to act because acting in a way that is justifiable to others is valuable 
to us as people.  
This response, stated plainly here, is not terribly illuminating. To see what his 
response means let’s turn to a case Scanlon presents to motivate this thought:  the political 
atmosphere of the United States in the early 1960’s 
In the 1950’s many Americans believed, naively, that their institutions were 
uniquely justifiable; that America was free of class barriers, and that it was a 
society in which benefits were fairly earned. They therefore felt that they 
could enjoy these benefits in the comforting confidence that the institutions 
through which they had acquired them, though not perfect, were closer than 
any others to being ones that no one could reasonably object to. The combined 
blows of the civil rights movement and movement that arose in reaction to the 
war in Vietnam shattered these illusions beyond repair. Different people 
reacted to this in different ways, some by protesting against the war and 
working for civil rights, others by vehemently denying that the charges of 
injustice at home and criminality abroad had any foundation. What these 
reactions had in common was a deep sense of shock and loss; both testify, I 
believe, to the value people set on the belief that their lives and institutions 
are justifiable to others.128 [emphasis added] 
 
Again this explanation is quite dense, so some unpacking is in order. Scanlon’s explanation 
of the passion and turbulence of the political movements of the 1960’s is that members of the 
community believed that the political institutions of their community were justifiable to all 
those subject to them. When the civil rights movement and protests against the war in 
Vietnam challenged this belief, people reacted either by joining in the call for change so that 
the institutions would be justifiable, or by passionately defending the institutions as they 
were. Both reactions can be explained by the value of living according to rules and under 
                                                 
128 Scanlon, p. 163.   
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institutions that are justifiable to others. Notice that in Scanlon’s explanation of this case, it is 
not the content of the reasons that is important for explaining the reactions. In his example, 
all parties to the conflict reacted with the same kind of energy and concern. It is the more 
formal feature of ‘being justifiable’ that motivates each of the parties.  
Just as Strawson appeals to an “impossible to do otherwise” feature of human social 
life in explaining the importance of participant reactive attitudes, Scanlon takes the value we 
place on living in a way that is justifiable to others as explanatorily bedrock. He claims that 
placing value on justifiability characterizes what it means to live a human life, writing:  
what is particularly moving about charges of injustice and immorality is their 
implication for our relations with others, our sense of justifiability to or 
estrangement from them….when we look carefully at the sense of loss 
occasioned by charges of injustice and immorality we see it as reflecting our 
awareness of the importance for us of being ‘in unity with our fellow 
creatures’.129 
 
This adds a further element to the basic moral relationship. In particular, it brings into the 
picture the importance of being able to give one another reasons for what we do, and a 
commitment to the practice of doing so.  
 This insight gives depth to the first feature of co-membership in the moral 
community. The value of being justifiable to others enriches our understanding of what it 
means to take others as participants rather than objects. Not only do we respond to other 
people in a way that implies mutual accountability to moral norms, we value that they believe 
the shared moral norms are those they cannot reasonably reject. We value being able to give 
reasons for the norms to which we hold one another to account. In the same way that 
Strawson claimed that engaging in the participant reactive attitudes is a central part of human 
life, Scanlon attributes the value of justification to people. Both are presented as empirical 
                                                 
129 Scanlon, p. 163. 
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generalizations, although not of the kind whose truth could be demonstrated by a survey. 
Rather, they are claims about the nature and importance of living a human life in the context 
of constructing a moral or political theory, clearly influenced by experience, but not further 
justified by normative principles or empirical demonstrations.  
 Finally, this discussion suggests a social feature of the basic moral relationship that 
was submerged in the discussion of the participant reactive attitudes. It helps us to see how 
someone in North Carolina could stand in a meaningful moral relationship with respect to the 
person who stole the television in North Dakota. They are both embedded in social groups 
that have shared moral norms, practices and perhaps institutions. Valuing that the norms, 
practices and institutions that I participate in and shape my life are justifiable to others 
subject to them is how I can have a co-membership relationship to people I will never meet. 
In recognizing other people as participants rather than objects, I value their being able to 
accept (or not reasonably reject) or my being able to give reasons for shared norms, practices 
and institutions.  
 As the aim of this dissertation is to establish the standing of an international 
institution, I am particularly interested in this social feature of Scanlon’s discussion. From 
what has been said thus far, co-membership in the moral community does not imply the need 
for a public institution, only that if there is one we value it being justifiable to those subject 
to it. In Chapter Five I develop the further argument that the full account of co-membership 
in a moral community, and the model of international justice and state sovereignty suggested 
in Chapter Three leads to the need for such an institution. With that said, I will turn to 
Feinberg and the third feature of co-membership in the moral community which will deepen 
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the analysis of this social feature of the basic moral relationship add more richness to the 
content of cosmopolitanism. 
 
FEATURE #3: SOCIAL PRACTICES 
 To move forward in explaining what ‘co-membership in the moral community’ 
means, we must ask whether and how this value of justification and the importance of the 
participant reactive attitudes can serve as characterizations of an impersonal relationship. It is 
absurd to claim that each person has a personal relationship with each other person, and it 
would be bad for cosmopolitans should they be committed to a view that implies otherwise. I 
suggested above that to avoid this problematic way of understanding the commitment we 
begin by observing that human communities are characterized by customs, practices and 
institutions that mediate the relationships between individuals. These structural features of 
human communities make it possible to see how individuals could stand in an impersonal, 
co-membership relationship. Namely, as participants in these common, shared practices or 
institutions.  
As said above, participant reactive attitudes and the value of justification contribute to 
our understanding of the basic moral relationship. This raises the question: how does or could 
an institution reflect the participant reactive attitudes and the value of justification? As an 
answer to this question, I will point to the practice of claiming and how it is manifested in 
shared practices and institutions. This renders the third feature of minimal cosmopolitanism 
somewhat different than the first and the second. For this third feature I offer an example of a 
practice that fulfills a particular role – it could be one among many social practices 
(manifested in institutions) that serves the purpose of mediating individuals in a community 
compatible with the value of justification and participant reactive attitudes. This need not be 
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the only practice that fulfills this role. The importance of this feature in developing the 
account of minimal cosmopolitanism is not in the claiming relationship itself (although I 
think it is very illuminating), but in the existence of social, shared practices and institutions 
that reflect or instantiate the importance of the participant reactive attitudes and the value of 
justification.  
To see how the practice of ‘claiming’ is an example of the relevant kind, we first need to 
step back and say something about ‘rights.’ As mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, 
rights are often used to explain the content of cosmopolitanism. The attribution of basic 
human rights to all individuals in virtue of being human is often taken to be, if not the core of 
cosmopolitanism at least a central implication of such a commitment. Even recognizing the 
limitations and problems inherent in a rights-based cosmopolitanism, we need not throw 
discussion of rights out the window. The prevalence of rights talk indicates that rights 
language expresses an important aspect of the commonsense moral position that the basic 
moral relationship aims to capture. Thus, rather than posit rights as normative bedrock or 
primary explanatory content, it is helpful to think of rights as (sometimes, in some places) 
part of a practice that itself realizes the recognition of individuals as co-members in the moral 
community. To see how rights can be thought of as features of a practice that supports or 
realizes by a more fundamental relationship we can turn to Joel Feinberg’s “The Nature and 
Value of Rights.”  
Feinberg locates the central normative importance of rights in the nature of claiming, and 
the value of being able to make claims on one another. He illustrates the importance of this 
practice through the well-known “Nowheresville” thought experiment. I am going to quickly 
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present the case, but will not linger over it, as Feinberg’s discussion of the ‘claiming’ 
relationship is of primary interest for our current discussion. With that said,  
Try to imagine Nowheresville – a world very much like our own except that 
no one, or hardly any one (the qualification is not important), has rights. If 
this flaw makes Nowheresville too ugly to hold very long in contemplation, 
we can make it as pretty as we wish in other moral respects. We can, for 
example, make the human beings in it as attractive and virtuous as possible 
without taxing our conceptions of the limits of human nature. In particular, let 
the virtues of moral sensibility flourish. Fill this imagined world with as much 
benevolence, compassion, sympathy, and pity as it will conveniently hold 
without strain. Now we can imagine men helping one another from 
compassionate motives merely, quite as much or even more than they do in 
our actual world from a variety of more complicated motives.130  
 
To this fictional world we add: “duties, but only in the sense of actions that are, or believed 
to be, morally mandatory, but not in the older sense of actions that are due others and can be 
claimed by others as their right.”131 From which we get duties of positive law, and of charity. 
We also add: personal desert, where “desert is simply a kind of fittingness between one 
party’s character or action and another party’s favorable response, much like that between 
humor and laughter, or good performance and applause.”132 From which we get practices 
like: grading students, judges awarding prizes, tipping wait staff and similar judgments of apt 
or fitting reward.   
Finally, we add to Nowheresville a Sovereign Monopoly of Rights. The Sovereign 
Monopoly of Rights introduces a notion of rights, but not one of subjective rights. In this 
case, there are no rights against the sovereign (the sovereign can harm but not wrong the 
subjects). The sovereign can create and enforce obligations that subjects have with respect to 
                                                 
130  Joel Feinberg, “The Nature and Value of Rights,” in Rights and Duties: Conceptual Analyses of Rights and 
Duties, Carl Wellman (ed), (New York: Routledge, 2002), 243. 
 
131 Feinberg, 244.  
 
132 Feinberg, 247.  
  120
one another, but where these obligations are not owed to one another. They are owed directly 
or indirectly to the sovereign. With this addition we can derive practices of property 
ownership, bargains, deals, contracts, promises, appointments, loans, marriages, and other 
practices of a functioning polity.  
 Even acknowledging the important social practices that we can ground in the moral 
building blocks provided by Nowheresville, it is missing something present in our own moral 
community. The same inaptness that is felt when we considered taking up the object-attitude 
with respect to my younger brother reoccurs when we consider whether Nowheresville is a 
morally complete world. So, what’s wrong with Nowheresville?  Feinberg’s answer is:  
The most conspicuous difference, I think, between the Nowheresvillians and 
ourselves has something to do with the activity of claiming. Nowheresvillians, 
even when they are discriminated against invidiously, or left without the 
things they need, or otherwise badly treated, do not think to leap to their feet 
and make righteous demands against one another though they may not hesitate 
to resort to force and trickery to get what they want. They have no notion of 
rights, so they do not have a notion of what is their due; hence they do not 
claim before they take.133 
 
Nowheresville lacks a particular kind of relationship citizens can have to each one another. It 
lacks the relationship of mutual status to claim one’s due from others.  
However, it is not enough to merely note that Nowheresvillians cannot have this 
relationship, if the relationship itself is of no importance. Thus, Feinberg argues that this 
ability or standing to claim one’s due is of great moral value.  
Having rights, of course, makes claiming possible; but it is claiming that gives 
rights their special moral significance. This feature of rights is connected in a 
way with the customary rhetoric about what it is to be a human being. Having 
rights enables us to ‘stand up like men,’ to look others in the eye, and to feel 
in some fundamental way the equal of anyone.134  
 
                                                 
133 Feinberg, 249.  
 
134 Feinberg, 252.  
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The moral value of being able to stand in the claiming relation to others is tied to the nature 
of living as a person with other persons. It is the value of seeing yourself and others as 
having a kind of special status of equal worth or standing. Rights, and the attendant 
institutions that support rights, are features of living a valuable human life.  
Feinberg’s discussion of the moral difference and importance of rights has many 
resonances with Strawson’s discussion of participant reactive attitudes. They both identify a 
practice of holding accountable to moral norms as a central and valuable feature of human 
social life. Strawson identifies this practice through interpersonal interactions and attitudes. 
We hold one another responsible for behavior and actions in everyday life through the 
reactive attitudes. Feinberg identifies the same relationship through the public practice of 
claiming and institutions that support this practice. The basic moral relationship, in this case, 
is mediated through public structures. Feinberg’s account of rights emphasizes not just the 
interpersonal aspect of the basic moral relationship, but the way in which it can be (and often 
is) realized through public practices. The basic moral relationship is manifested in personal 
interactions, as well as can be manifested through the social practices and public institutions 
that govern our lives.  
 The claiming relationship also deepens the understanding of the value of justification. 
It shows one way for this value to be manifested in practice. The social practice of ‘claiming 
one’s due’ is that of demanding that other persons act in a particular way with respect to 
oneself or provide sufficient reason for failing to do so. When someone brings a lawsuit 
against another person, for example, by claiming the use of a certain piece of property, she is 
demanding that the other person recognize her as owning that property, act in accordance 
with the norms of property ownership, or give sufficient reason why not. The practice of 
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claiming also provides a model for how the participant reactive attitudes can be manifested in 
public structures. Institutions through which people make claims (for instance, the courts) 
take the parties to the practice as participants. They are not treated as objects – subject to 
social control or conditionng. Rather, they are beings holding one another to shared norms, 
by giving and demanding reasons for their actions.   
 
WHERE WE ARE IN BUILDING THE ACA 
 
 With the three features of the basic moral relationship on the table, as well as their 
relationship to one another, we can take stock of how far we have come in building the ACA. 
Recall from the concluding remarks in Chapter Three, the ACA takes individuals as the 
primary normative entities for constructing a model of the nature and content of international 
justice, and takes the status of sovereignty to be conferred by the principles of international 
justice. In Chapter Three I explained what it means for the status of sovereignty to be 
externally conferred, and gave reasons for this view of the status of sovereignty over the 
‘internally conferred’ conception of sovereignty.  
In this chapter, we set out to explain what it means for individuals to be the primary 
normative entities. In the first case, it is that the moral standing of individuals is not 
explained in virtue of moral norms or principles ultimately derived from another source. 
Individuals are the basic or ultimate sources of moral concern. Moreover, the moral standing 
attributed to individuals is not politically characterized, such that the status is the result of a 
process of articulating the content of political norms.  
Recognizing that to understand this kind of cosmopolitanism we need more to say 
than ‘primary normative entity,’ I developed minimal cosmopolitanism, meant to capture the 
commonsense moral understanding of the importance of recognizing in our actions (or 
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through our institutions) the moral character of the community of humanity. Minimal 
cosmopolitanism holds that people stand in a basic moral relationship with other people, 
characterized by co-membership in the moral community. Co-membership in the moral 
community can be further characterized as having three important features. The first is that 
the individuals recognize and respond to one another as participants rather than as objects. 
This recognition manifests a belief that co-members of the moral community can and do hold 
each other accountable to shared moral norms.  
The second feature is that co-members of the moral community value that the shared 
moral norms (as well as practices and institutions) to which they are holding one another 
accountable are justifiable to the other members. This value of justification reveals not only 
the impersonal yet social nature of the basic moral relationship (it can hold between people 
who will never even meet one another), it reveals how recognizing others as having the 
participant-status is a commitment to giving people reasons, or engaging in practices of 
reason giving.  
Finally, the third feature is that co-members of the moral community participate in 
social, shared practices and institutions that reflect or instantiate the importance of the 
participant reactive attitudes and the value of justification. This feature not only highlights 
the importance of social practices for capturing the nature of the moral community, but lends 
richness to the first two features.  
The aim of the ACA is to provide an answer to the Nuremberg Problem, and explain 
why the international community has jurisdiction with respect to crimes against humanity. 
Although we have made progress toward this goal by articulating the fundamental normative 
building blocks of the account (individuals as co-members in the moral community) we do 
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not, as yet, have the full account. In the next chapter I take up the starting point developed 
here, and show how an account of the international community’s standing to prosecute 
crimes against humanity can be built from these resources.  
  
 
CHAPTER FIVE 
GROUNDING THE STANDING TO PROSECUTE ATROCITIES 
 
PULLING IT ALL TOGETHER 
In Chapter One I developed an account of crimes against humanity. There I argued 
that we should understand crimes against humanity as widespread and systematic attacks on 
civilian populations, where widespread refers to the number of victims, and systematic refers 
to both the nature of the perpetrators (organized in such a way and powerful and enough to 
execute a plan of attack) and the manner of the execution, and ‘attack’ picks out actions that 
cause severe harm that deprives or risks depriving the victims of the basics that make life 
possible, tolerable or decent.  
This characterization of crimes against humanity combined with the recognition that 
the perpetrators of such crimes are often the officials of institutions governing the civilians 
makes crimes against humanity a particularly interesting and important category for 
international justice. These atrocities raise a unique question for international justice because 
they are often committed within the territory of a state, and thus, assumed to fall within the 
jurisdiction or domain within which the state has political authority.  
In Chapter Two I presented this jurisdictional puzzle about crime against humanity as 
the Nuremberg Problem, along with responses to this problem that were ultimately 
unsatisfactory. Through this discussion I identified four conditions on a good or adequate 
response. An acceptable account: (1) relies on values and reasons that those subject to the 
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law can understand and see as at least possible or plausible revision or extensions of the law 
as it is, (2) explains why the international community, itself, has standing to prosecute the 
atrocities at issue, (3) demarcates distinct realms of domestic and international jurisdiction, 
and respects the value of states as discrete political communities, (4) preserves the 
importance of harm to the victims as individuals, and the moral value or standing of 
individual human beings more broadly.   
This discussion of unsatisfactory responses to the Nuremberg Problem also suggested 
the importance of understanding the status of sovereignty in responding to the problem. The 
Nuremberg Problem formulates the jurisdictional puzzle as one concerning what falls within 
the ‘governing prerogatives’ of a sovereign state. Responding to the problem requires an 
account of what it means to be a sovereign state, and the rights, obligations and interests that 
come from or with this status.  
In Chapter Three I took up this suggestion and engaged in a critical discussion of 
different models of the nature and content of international justice and the status of 
sovereignty, focusing on those provided by Michael Walzer and John Rawls. Through this 
discussion I argued for developing an Alternative Cosmopolitan Account (ACA), in which 
individuals are the primary normative entities for constructing the nature and content of 
international justice, and the status of sovereignty is articulated by the principles of 
international justice.  
Building on this in Chapter Four I gave an account of minimal cosmopolitanism that 
explains what it means to take individuals as the primary or basic normative entities for the 
ACA. Minimal cosmopolitanism holds that people stand in a basic moral relationship with 
other people, characterized by co-membership in the moral community. Co-membership in 
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the moral community can, itself, be further characterized as having three important features. 
The first is that the individuals recognize and respond to one another as participants rather 
than as objects. The second is that the co-members of the moral community value that the 
shared moral norms (as well as practices and institutions) to which they are holding one 
another accountable are justifiable to the other members. Finally, co-members of the moral 
community participate in social, shared practices and institutions that reflect or instantiate the 
recognition of the participant status of members of this community and the value of 
justification. 
With these resources on the table, this final chapter completes my development of the 
ACA by showing how the moral relationship of minimal cosmopolitanism gives us moral 
reason for an international political institution that can articulate the content of international 
law and hold violators of it accountable. After constructing this bridge between the moral and 
the political, I argue that the prohibition on crimes against humanity is a plausible part of 
international law. Finally, I return to the Nuremberg Problem to explain how the ACA 
answers the problem, and meets the four desiderata on a good or adequate account.  
  
MOVING TO THE POLITICAL FROM THE MORAL 
Turning now to the argument for the international community’s standing to prosecute 
perpetrators of crime against humanity. We begin with individual people in a web of moral 
relationships, needs, demands and claims. Recall minimal cosmopolitanism’s 
characterization of the co-membership relationship: individuals recognize one another as 
participants (rather than objects) and value practices and institutions that respect this status of 
others and in which people give one another reasons such that the common norms are 
justifiable to those held accountable to them. Although the basic moral relationship is 
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undoubtedly social in nature, it is not a political relationship. Minimal cosmopolitanism does 
not include norms, rules or laws that are publicly articulated and enforced by a common 
power.  As answering the jurisdiction question (a question about political institutions) is the 
aim of this chapter, we face the question of how this moral relationship provides moral 
reasons for the standing of a political institution at all, and if it does what kind of institution 
(and with what scope).  
To build this bridge between the moral co-membership relationship and the political 
standing of an institution, we can begin with what we have: co-membership in the moral 
community. In the absence of a political institution (which articulates and enforces rules in 
the way required by the political/legal conception of justice introduced in Chapter Three), we 
run into a problem. To see why, let’s look at an example from Jeremy Waldron. 
Suppose A and B are struggling for control of a portion of land. Each of them 
is a conscientious moral thinker, and each strives to reason responsibly about 
their rights. They both acknowledge – let’s say they acknowledge correctly – 
that an equal division would be unjust, but in their individual thinking they do 
not come up with the same conclusion: A is convinced that he is entitled to 60 
percent of the territory and B is convinced that he (B) is entitled to 60 percent 
of the territory.135 
 
We have a problem here. Both A and B have conscientiously tried to reason about what to do 
in this situation and have come to different conclusions. The matter is of great importance, so 
they cannot just walk away. Bargaining is not guaranteed to work for either of them, nor is 
fighting. Furthermore, this is not just a problem for A and B - but for A and B and however 
many other human beings they find themselves sharing the planet with. As Waldron puts it, 
imagine: “a quarter of a billion highly opinionated Kantians who are offering (and preparing 
to act upon) their rival individual assessments about the proper distribution of resources in a 
                                                 
135 Jeremy Waldron “Kant’s Theory of the State,” in Toward Perpetual Peace and Other Writings on Politics, 
Peace and History, ed. Pauline Kleingeld, trans. David L. Colclasure, (New York: Yale University Press, 2006), 
192. 
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large and fruitful territory.”136 This problematic situation can be described as a failure of 
private reason with respect to concerns of justice.137 The example shows us the limitations on 
any one individual’s ability to use her own private reason to determine the right action in the 
context of actions that change the moral landscape for all.  
I want to stress from the outset that this problem is not just a strange way of 
explaining a prisoner’s dilemma where the problem is taken to be that we find ourselves in a 
position of rationally acting against our best interests in the absence of a mechanism for 
enforcing cooperation. Rather, it is what I will refer to as an indeterminacy problem. In the 
absence of publicly shared, articulated, coherent, univocal, enforceable set of laws, the 
minimal cosmopolitan moral commitment to take one another as objects of moral concern 
with respect to actions that change the moral landscape for all has no determinate content.  
Some of our actions are public actions in that they change the moral situations of 
other people. Perhaps with respect to one another, as in the case of entering a contract with 
someone else, or with respect to things, as in the case of property with which we began. 
Although you, on your own, may be able to generate a coherent set of principles about these 
actions this will not be sufficient to solve the problem. The problem of indeterminacy gets off 
the ground exactly because of the privacy of these judgments. Thus, we need some kind of 
institutional mediation of our relationships with one another that can not only articulate a set 
of coherent rules (and thus the content of the moral obligations we have to one another), but 
also enforce (in some manner) these rules.  
                                                 
136 Waldron, 193.  
 
137 That this indeterminacy exists between all members of the moral community, including those we will never 
directly encounter, is an important aspect of the problem moving forward.  
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My articulation of the indeterminacy problem may strike some as quite strong, even 
after limiting the domain of concern to public actions. Tracing the indeterminacy problem to 
its Kantian roots, we see that Kant himself thought that the problem arose in situations like 
property claims (as in the example above), but did not necessarily extend to moral concern 
and obligations in general. Why think that in the absence of political institutions, our 
commitment to taking others as co-members in the moral community has no content (full 
stop)?  
The first thing to say in response to this worry about the scope of the indeterminacy 
problem is to emphasize that I am concerned with the relationship between people 
understood as co-members of the moral community. There are many contexts in which we do 
not engage with other people as “co-members of the moral community,” but rather, as 
friends, as family, as colleagues or as neighbors. When I consider whether I ought to edit my 
sister’s Master’s Thesis this evening, the answer comes from reflection on what I owe Cate 
as my sister. This reflection does not require institutional mediation.138 In fact, in these cases 
we are suspect of political institutions giving content to these moral obligations. Not only 
would a political or legal institution be unable to do so (or only able to do so poorly), we 
think it ought not. It is consistent with my position to hold that special relationships of the 
kind listed above do not require institutional mediation for determinate moral obligations. In 
interpersonal relationships we build practices, traditions, habits, rules, and norms that give 
determinate content to our obligations (and have private mechanisms through which we hold 
one another accountable to them). Or, we can understand our special relationships as 
characterized by a commitment to a shared process of building a relationship where 
“determinate content to our obligations” is an unhealthy or otherwise unwelcome way of 
                                                 
138 Although, until we were adults similar cases definitely required parental mediation.  
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understanding the relationship.139 History, proximity, special ties or a joint commitment to 
creating a relationship are not characteristic of the basic moral relationship. In fact, ‘co-
membership in the moral community’ exists between people who have never and will never 
meet. So, the resources we drawn on in these special relationships for figuring out what we 
ought to do are not present in the case at hand.  
A more complete answer to the worry about my seemingly strong formulation of the 
scope of the indeterminacy problem can be given by returning to the characterization of 
minimal cosmopolitanism I developed in Chapter Four. Recall, minimal cosmopolitanism is 
formal rather than substantive. It holds that individual persons stand in a co-membership in 
the moral community relationship with other individuals, characterized by taking one another 
as participants (rather than objects), who value being justifiable to one another (and not just 
with respect to particular actions, but to rules or norms that govern them). Moreover, 
individuals participate in practices and institutions that reflect this value. Understood this 
way, our moral landscape initially prescribes only that we manifest in our actions and 
practices these formal features of the relationship (that we view one another as participants 
rather than objects, and act in a way that is justifiable to others, or have the rules and 
institutions be those justifiable to others). This requirement constrains the domain of right 
action, but remains in need of content.  
To illustrate what I mean by ‘remains in need of content,’ we can ask the question: 
how do I recognize in my actions and practices others as a participants rather than objects? In 
part, the answer to this question depends on the actual shared practices taken to indicate such 
standing. For example, recognition of participant standing in the United States seems to 
include the punishment of violent offenders – punishment is the practice through which we as 
                                                 
139 I apologize to those I love and care about for failing to recognize this fact. I will continue to work on it.  
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a community indicate that a perpetrator is being held accountable to a shared rule. In 
contrast, during the Truth and Reconciliation Commission hearings in South Africa, 
punishment was not part of the practice of recognizing one another as participants and 
holding accountable to shared norms.140 In this way, not even the most basic prescription of 
minimal cosmopolitanism (treat others as participants) gives us particular rules, obligations 
or norms. This is not to say that certain actions won’t violate this basic prescription of 
minimal cosmopolitanism. Some actions will violate this requirement (in fact, crimes against 
humanity are a paradigm case in which it is clear that the victims are not being treated as 
participants), and that they do so provides reasons for judging those actions morally wrong.  
Given the need for clear, coherent and consistently articulated public rules, we require 
an institution that mediates our co-membership in the moral community. Institutional 
mediation requires at least two things: determination and enforcement. By determination I 
mean the process of making something a public rule with specified content (articulating 
explicit, coherent, consistent prohibitions and permissions with respect to public actions). 
This process of making determinate the content of obligations need not assume that there is 
no private overlapping consensus on the wrongness of some action. Consider again crimes 
against humanity. These atrocities are horrific evils, the wrongness of which we think all 
reasonable people ought to acknowledge. The process of making determinate a prohibition 
on crimes against humanity is not the process of making it the case that crimes against 
humanity are wrong, but the process of articulating the exact prohibition as a public rule, 
consistent with a body of public rules. Reflecting on this, we notice two different things that 
                                                 
140 Archbishop Desmond Tutu identifies a South African cultural value ‘ubuntu’ as creating a context in which 
the Truth and Reconciliation Commissions could play a ‘holding accountable’ role for the community that such 
commissions may struggle to fulfill in Western cultures. In, No Future Without Forgiveness, (New York: 
Image, 1999).  
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the process of determination could do with respect to any particular rule: it could make it the 
case that some action is wrong (perhaps, as in the example of traffic laws, where we need 
coordination, but no moral difference is made by picking the left or the right side of the road 
for us all to drive on); or it could make as a matter of public rule that some action is wrong 
(as in the case of murder or crimes against humanity).  
The ability to enforce the rules is also an important feature of institutional mediation. 
It is only through the efficacy of the rules that they are given any real content. In the first 
place, it would not solve the indeterminacy problem to have a list of rules that are not 
enforced. This list would at best be another voice among others. The ability to enforce the 
laws is necessary for the laws fulfilling the role of public rules. Without the guarantee of 
general compliance with the laws that the power to enforce them in part ensures, individuals 
cannot rely on the laws in the their own conduct. Enforcement is not only important for 
making the content of the rules themselves determinate, but also settles the proper response 
to violations of the rules. Through mediating the relationships between individuals, the 
institution takes on the role of judging (or creating procedures for judging) whether some 
action counts as a violation of the rule and dictates the proper response to such violations. 
Take the US domestic criminal law as an example. Not only does the federal government 
mediate the relationships between individuals by making law which gives determine content 
(explicit permissions and prohibitions) to the obligations the members of the United States 
have with respect to one another (as co-members of the political community), it settles who 
properly responds to violations of these rules (itself or the states), and articulates rules for 
‘holding to account.’ The state articulates rules for what count as fair criminal trials (i.e. - 
  134
due process) as well as for proper punishment (i.e. – the prohibition on cruel and unusual 
punishment, or minimum sentencing laws).   
Although institutional mediation is required for determinacy, the rule or law made 
determinate is not necessarily the ground for or reason that the action prohibited by the rule is 
wrong.141 The moral wrongness of a particular action that is made a crime by the institution 
(say, murder) is a different matter than whether that action is a crime. I can (rightly) have 
reasons for the judgment that crimes against humanity are morally wrong, and it can fail to 
be the case (as it was for thousands of years) that any law (domestic or international) makes 
the prohibition on crimes against humanity a public rule. In this way, the moral wrongness of 
some action is neither necessary nor sufficient for something being a public rule.  
Moral wrongness, however, can serve as a ground for reasons to create as a law a 
prohibition on some action, or as a standard for evaluating or criticizing particular rules. 
Given that institutional mediation is required by the basic moral relationship, we can use the 
moral prescriptions and character of the basic moral relationship to critique or criticize the 
institution. Consider, as an illustration of this point, political protests of capital punishment. 
The US federal government prohibits cruel and unusual punishment in the Eighth 
Amendment to the Constitution, and also determines whether and which sentencing laws fall 
to the individual states to make determinate. The particular states make this prohibition 
determinate by stipulating whether or not those found guilty of certain crimes (through courts 
of law, that themselves have certain rules and regulations for fair treatment of suspected 
perpetrators, etc) can be sentenced to capital punishment. Some citizens object to capital 
punishment on the grounds that it fails to treat the perpetrator as a person (perhaps, 
                                                 
141 The difference between rules that make it the case that something is wrong and rules that make it a matter of 
public rule that something is wrong is important here.  
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participant) or that it is not justifiable. These protesting citizens appeal to the features of the 
basic moral relationship to criticize (and hopefully change) the institution charged with 
mediating these relationships.    
Just as the moral character of the co-membership in the moral community relationship 
can be used as an external standard for criticizing the institution charged with mediating the 
relationship, it is a ground for a moral reason to pursue such an institution.  For co-members 
of the moral community to stand in the proper relationship to one another (including 
recognizing one another as participants, acting in ways that are justifiable to one another and 
participating in social practices that manifest recognition of the participant status and the 
value of justification) we require a public, political institution that mediates these 
relationships. In this way, co-membership in the moral community can be said to give us, as 
members of the moral community, reason to create, participate in, or promote such 
institutions.142  
We need, and have reason to pursue or promote, a public structure that mediates the 
basic moral relationship between individuals, making determinate the content of our 
obligations with respect to one another. I will refer to these public structures as states.143 To 
get a full picture of how states are a solution to this practical problem, we need to look more 
closely at what it means for the state to mediate the relationships of the members of it.  The 
                                                 
142 Before moving on, let me pause a moment and note that the way I have presented the picture thus far is 
potentially misleading. The state of nature tone of my presentation of the problem may suggest that I have a 
robust picture of what individuals are like without a state, or worse yet, a historical conjecture about how the
existence of moral demands on individuals lead to the creation of states. I do not mean to suggest either of these 
things. I have presented the role of states in this way to draw attention to how states mediate morally salient 
relationships. This is consistent with the relationships only existing after some kind of public structure came 
into place. All we need to move forward in answering the jurisdiction question is a picture of individuals 
standing in a web of morally salient relationships with others, that are mediated by the state (regardless of 
which came first).  
 
143 Notice that this local public structure need not be a state (in the traditional sense conjured up by the term “the 
Nation-State”). I am going to work with the term state because we have states, and it captures the intuitive idea 
of a public structure that mediates and shapes relationships of the members of it.  
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mediation of a relationship can occur in many ways. At its core, mediation involves being a 
third party agent that can structure and allow for the host of relationships we stand in with 
one another. It creates a space for agreement and sets the rules by which people interact with 
one another. This is not a passive role, but is quite active. In this role, the mediator is an 
agent, acting on behalf of the community that charges it with doing so. It must create and 
constitute the foundations of the community and the institutions through which we can 
interact (or not) with one another.  
 Let’s look at an example of how the state mediates relationships between individuals. 
Take a straightforward kind of relationship: strangers in a local community – say, the small 
town where I went to high school, Holt, Michigan. When I was a kid I lived up the street 
from Valhalla Park. The local parents would play softball there on Saturday nights during the 
Summer. In order to have a summer softball league, the people of Holt needed to have 
something or someone like a public recreation department that coordinated the baseball 
fields, and who was sanctioned to remove people from the field who did not follow the 
community rules for using it.  
Notice that this kind of enforcement is not possible in a one-to-one manner. You, as a 
softball team member, can threaten the other people using the field, but this is the behavior of 
a thug. It does not establish that you have a claim to the field – that you are using it by rights, 
or that they are in the wrong to stay. To do this, one needs a central body that has articulated, 
coherent and enforceable rules charged with the task of coordinating the use of the park. 
Thus, something like a public recreation department (in concert with a kind of police power) 
becomes a mechanism for mediating relationships between individuals (whether they know 
each other or not) in a community.  
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The need for determinate, articulated, coherent (within the context of a system of 
laws) and enforceable rules about what one may do will permeate very significant and 
seemingly insignificant aspects of our daily lives. We need answers to questions like: Can I 
build a restaurant here? Can my children attend this school? Can I take this shirt? Can I fire 
this person because I found out he has different religious beliefs than I do? Can I defend my 
property with lethal force? The only way to give these answers is through a public 
institutional structure.  
 Having given an argument for the need for a state level institution, I want to take 
stock of how far we have come in solving the indeterminacy problem. Recall that we began 
by acknowledging that every human being is an object of moral concern, and this, combined 
with the argument from indeterminacy, led to the need for a state. But, notice, the state 
considered on its own is not a complete solution to the problem. Moreover, the existence of 
states causes a second indeterminacy problem. Let’s look at these in turn.  
It is fairly straightforward to see how a state is not a complete answer to the 
indeterminacy problem. States mediate the relationships of individuals living within a certain 
discrete territory. But individuals in a particular discrete territory (that is not fully global) do 
not exhaust the members of the moral community, and thus does not cover all of the 
relationships for which we will need mediating institutions.   
In addition to not providing a complete solution to the indeterminacy problem, the 
problem itself reappears in a new way with the introduction of states. Once states are on the 
scene not only do we have each individual person in the moral community, but now, these 
people have constituted state-level mediating institutions that are in some way agents acting 
on behalf of these individuals, that themselves must interact with one another. So, we have 
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agents acting on behalf of communities of individuals that stand in relationships with other 
agents doing the same thing.  
These different and overlapping relationships, and the ways in which they create 
indeterminacy problems, are better brought out in a specific case than in the abstract. So, let’s 
consider the example of Michigan, Wisconsin, Illinois and Indiana (the four states that border 
Lake Michigan) imagining that there is no such thing as the United State of America, and the 
question of their respective claims to use the lake for drinking water. So, how do we describe 
the case? There are two different morally salient relationships at issue: state-to-state, and 
individual-to-individual.  
Let’s consider state-to-state first. The states of Michigan, Wisconsin, Indiana and 
Illinois are institutions that mediate relationships within their territorial borders. Part of this 
(let’s say) involves distributing clean drinking water. The states have laws, rules, and 
regulations with respect to drinking water that apply within their borders. However, when 
they must engage with one another over access to a common resource, Lake Michigan, they 
are in the same position that A and B were with respect to one another. There is no coherent, 
univocal, articulated, enforced set of rules that give content to their obligations with respect 
to one another and the use of the water.  
Now, let’s return to the second kind of relationship, the individual-to-individual. This 
is the relationship with which we began. In the context of the use of Lake Michigan, we can 
see why the existence of a state is insufficient for solving the indeterminacy problem between 
individuals. Even as members of states, we do not get determinate content for all of our 
obligations, because there are people who are not members of our states who continue to be 
objects of moral concern. So, the same individual level indeterminacy problem persists into 
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our drinking water case. As a Michigander I have a morally salient relationship with each of 
the Wisconsinites that still needs to be made determinate.  
With the reappearance of the indeterminacy problem we can mobilize the same 
argument as above to the conclusion that we need a public structure, charged with the task of 
mediating certain relationships. The solution is a global mediating institution that articulates 
a coherent, univocal, determinate body of law. Moreover, given the twofold indeterminacy 
problem, this body of law will have two parts: that which governs the relationship between 
individuals understood as members of the global moral community (rather than more specific 
communities) and that which governs the relationships between states. I will refer to these as 
cosmopolitan law and international law, respectively.144  
The full nature of cosmopolitan law can be obscured by merely saying that it is part 
of a solution to the problems caused by the need to mediate individual-to-individual morally 
salient relationships. As I presented it in the example above, it could appear that I am saying 
that cosmopolitan law makes determinate the obligations between individuals understood as 
bare individuals. However, this is not the only possibility, which can be seen when we think 
about what individuals are. Individuals are embedded within many different communities, 
and have constituted states as mediating institutions that can act as agents on their behalf. So, 
cosmopolitan law can also include rules about how states (and other political institutions) 
interact with non-member individuals, as in the case of political asylum for refugees. 
Moreover, the other individuals to whom we have morally salient relationships outside the 
borders of our own state are also members of cultural and political communities. So, 
                                                 
144 This distinction can be found in Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, trans. Mary J. Gregor, (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2003).  
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cosmopolitan law can include the relationship between our state as our agent, and groups of 
other non-member people, as in the case of foreign famine aid.  
Thus far my development of the ACA does not address whether crimes against 
humanity are under the jurisdiction of the global mediating institution. To answer this 
question we first need to step back and be clear about what it would take to show that any 
particular kind of crime would fall under the jurisdiction of the global mediating institution. 
Are we asking whether it necessarily does? Or, whether it could? Rather than explore both of 
these options here I will focus on showing that it could be the kind of thing for which 
someone could be held to account through a global mediating institution.  
My contention is that it could be, as it could be a rule of cosmopolitan law. To see 
why, recall that cosmopolitan law makes determinate the content of our obligations to 
members of other states. Part of what our state does for us is act as a mediator for our 
relationship to people who are not members of our own state. So, what we need to show is 
that the global mediating institution could make an obligation to people who are not members 
of our own state determinate in a way that includes this prohibition on crime against 
humanity. Answering for sure whether this prohibition really is part of cosmopolitan law is 
in part an empirical question that we do not have the space or resources to answer here. In 
particular it will depend on how this prohibition and its particular articulation fit into an 
internally coherent system of rules.  
The work of systematizing and making coherent the various elements of public 
international law is something best left to international lawyers and legal theorists. However, 
we as philosophers have a bit more to say than merely that it is possible that this prohibition 
is part of a coherent system of cosmopolitan law. We can say that it is a plausible part of 
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such a system. Insofar as the rules are about making determinate the obligations holding 
between people as members of the moral community, it is plausible to think that part of what 
we owe other people as objects of moral concern is access to mechanisms of accountability 
for the kinds of widespread and systematic atrocities that we call crimes against humanity.  
I want to directly address a worry one might have about the need for an institution to 
make determinate a prohibition on crimes against humanity. The examples I gave above to 
explain the central moves in my account are situations in which reasonable, right-minded 
people can easily disagree. I argued that because private judgment is insufficient for settling 
these questions we need a public institution that can make the content of these obligations 
determinate. One might object that crimes against humanity, unlike property disputes, are so 
horrific that all reasonable people know that they are violations of what we owe to one 
another. This raises the question, how does the argument from indeterminacy shed light on 
the standing of an institution that redresses these atrocities?  
Although crimes against humanity are so horrific it is reasonable to expect that all 
people should agree that they are violations of what we owe to others, some atrocities are not 
actually viewed as such. An example of this is the only recent classification of rape as a 
weapon of war. It was only in 1996 that rape was treated as such. Prior to the indictment of 
Bosnian Serbs for sexual assault through the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia 
rape was not recognized as a distinct war crime.  
Even assuming that there are no disputes about the moral evil of crimes against 
humanity, institutional mediation is still required to establish the prohibition on them as a 
public rule, rather than a private belief. Its status as a public rule makes the prohibition 
something to which an institution speaking in the name of the community, as a mediating 
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agent charged with the task, can hold people to account. The publicity of the rule makes the 
redress of its violation something more than and different than being bullied by a thug. A 
vigilante state that takes it upon itself to hold officials of another state accountable may be a 
well-meaning moral avenger, but in acting on its private judgment it acts as a thug none-the-
less. Moreover, it settles that the institution in question is the proper agent, through settling 
the proper response.  
With that, we have the elements of the ACA on the table and argued for. It has been a 
long and somewhat winding road, so before turning to evaluating whether the ACA answers 
the Nuremberg Problem and meets the desiderata on an acceptable account, it will help to 
bring the various threads of back together into one big picture.  
The principles of international justice, including the status of state sovereignty (with 
its attendant rights and claims), are given content and made determinate by a global 
mediating institution. The ACA does not give substantive content to these principles (as the 
approach holds that it is part of the mediating institution’s role to do so), but it does require 
that the institution reflect the participant status of those subject to it, and the value of 
justification. In this way, the ACA recommends a global mediating institution as a public 
institution that reflects and manifests the co-membership in the moral community 
relationship identified as minimal cosmopolitanism. The existence of an institution of this 
kind is justified according to its playing this (required) role. We as co-members of the moral 
community have reason to promote, pursue, and participate in such an institution because, 
through it, we stand in the proper co-membership relationship to others in the moral 
community. This relationship requires an institution that makes the obligations we have to 
one another determinate as public rules to which individuals can be held accountable.  
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Such an institution has the standing to prosecute perpetrators of crimes against 
humanity insofar as it makes determinate a prohibition on these crimes, and makes 
determinate that jurisdiction over these cases is a matter of international law (rather than 
exclusively domestic law). As above, whether or not the institution actually does so is not 
something the approach can stipulate. However, from the point of view of the ACA a legal 
prohibition (at the international level) on crimes against humanity is a plausible part of the 
cosmopolitan law, because a prohibition of this kind at the international level would create a 
mechanism of accountability for perpetrators of actions and creators/enforcers of political 
policies that radically fail to treat persons as participants rather than objects or to be 
justifiable to those subject to them. Moreover, as crimes against humanity are often carried 
out by those in power within a state against civilians of the state, a prohibition on them at the 
international level would provide a mechanism of accountability, the existence of which is 
usually systematically denied to the victims of such crimes at the domestic level. In the 
absence of a global mediating institution, we, as members of the moral community, have 
reason to create, pursue or promote the creation of such an institution, and to advocate for it 
making determinate a prohibition on crimes against humanity.  
 
ANSWERING THE NUREMBERG PROBLEM  
With the ACA now fully spelled out we can evaluate it as a response to the 
Nuremberg Problem. Recall, the Nuremberg Problem is an argument against the standing of 
external bodies to prosecute perpetrators of crimes against humanity. Responses to the 
problem must either object to one of the premises, or show how the conclusion, otherwise, 
does not follow. The argument is:  
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(1) A sovereign state has the right against external bodies to non-interference 
with respect to the governing prerogatives of that state. (Premise) 
 
(2) A political or legal response to self-regarding events is a governing 
prerogative of a sovereign state. (Premise) By definition, a self-regarding 
event is an event that occurs wholly within the territorial boundaries of a 
single sovereign state, is carried out only by members of that state, and is 
carried out only against members of that state. 
 
(3) So: A sovereign state has the right against external bodies to non-
interference with respect to a legal response to self-regarding events. (1, 2) 
 
(4) Crimes against humanity (i.e., systematic and widespread attacks on 
civilians by the civilians’ sovereign state) can occur wholly within the 
territorial boundaries of a sovereign state, are carried out only by members of 
that state, and are carried out only against members of that state. (Premise) 
 
(5) So: Crimes against humanity can be self-regarding events. 
 
(6) So: sovereign states can have a right to non-interference against external 
bodies with respect to the legal response to crimes against humanity in 
some cases (viz., those cases where the crime against humanity is a self-
regarding event).  
 
The ACA gives a straightforward answer to the Nuremberg Problem: it denies (2).  That a 
crime against humanity took place within a state does not imply that the political or legal 
response to the crime (some kind of accountability holding) is within the exclusive governing 
prerogatives of the state in which it occurred. The scope of the political authority of a 
sovereign state is, in some part, determined by the international law as made determinate by 
the global mediating institution.  
Returning now to our four conditions on an adequate response to the Nuremberg 
Problem. Recall the first condition is accessibility. The accessibility criterion requires that the 
principles of the account be compatible or consistent with the values or principles 
underpinning the law as it is, such that the recommendations can be seen as revisions (or  
extensions) of that law. That I have met the accessibility requirement is somewhat difficult to 
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establish in the context of this argument as it concerns a close legal analysis of public 
international law. I do not have the resources here to fully establish accessibility, but will 
instead establish that the ACA is consistent with some key features of the public international 
law. To that end, I will discuss two features of my account and their compatibility with some 
important features of public international law: sovereignty as an externally determined status, 
and minimal cosmopolitanism.   
Taking up whether sovereignty as an externally determined status is compatible with 
public international law, a careful look at the discussion of the reserved domain of state 
sovereignty in public international law is important. “Reserved domain” is a technical term 
that refers to what falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of domestic legal systems, that is, the 
international legal principles of reserved domain establish what falls within the governing 
prerogatives of states (as opposed to international or otherwise transnational bodies). Ian 
Brownlie presents and describes reserved domain in this way:  
Matters within the competence of states under general international law are 
said to be within the reserved domain, the domestic jurisdiction, of states. This 
is a tautology, of course, and as a matter of general principle the problem of 
domestic jurisdiction is not very fruitful…The general position is that the 
‘reserved domain’ is the domain of state activities where the jurisdiction of the 
state is not bound by international law: the extent of this domain depends on 
international law and varies according to its development...As a separate 
notion in general international law, the reserved domain is mysterious only 
because many have failed to see that it really stands for a tautology.145  
 
Particularly interesting for our project is his claim that those engaged in the debate about 
reserved domain often fail to recognize the description of what falls within domestic 
jurisdiction as a tautology. By this he means that from the point of view of international law, 
the principles of reserved domain cannot be used to show that some action is not within the 
                                                 
145 Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, Sixth Edition, (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2003), 290-291 
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jurisdiction of an international court because, by definition, the content of international law 
determines what does and does not fall within the international jurisdiction.  
Understood this way, the legal articulation of ‘reserved domain’ conforms with my 
account of sovereignty as an externally conferred status. My position holds that the rights of 
sovereignty are given through or by international law, including the domain of a state’s 
exclusive political authority. To the extent that this aspect of public international law reflects 
my position that it is the content of international law that determines the rights of states (what 
it means to be sovereign, and that some entity is sovereign), this aspect of the law supports 
my view as accessible.  
Furthermore, as Brownlie notes, this feature of public international law is not merely 
as a matter of principle (what the law says), but what international bodies do (a matter of 
practice).  
In practice United Nations organs…have taken action on a wide range of 
topics dealing with the relations of governments to their own people. 
Resolutions on breaches of human rights, the right of self-determination and 
colonialism and non-self-governing territories have been adopted 
regularly…Certain issues, principally those concerning the right of self-
determination and the principle of non-discrimination in racial matters, are 
regarded as of international concern by the General Assembly, apart from 
express reference to any threat to international peace and security.146  
 
The UN, and members of it, claim to have a legitimate interest in the self-regarding affairs of 
states. This claim is manifested in the UN’s regular adoption of principles concerning the 
states’ treatment of their own citizens. This practice element is especially important for our 
purposes, as state practice is taken as a source of international law (that is, to be appealed to 
in determining what the law is), and thus, again, supports the claim that my view is 
accessible.  
                                                 
146 Brownlie, 293.  
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 Turning now to the second element of my position that I will address with respect to 
meeting the accessibility criterion: minimal cosmopolitanism. As discussed in Chapter Four, 
the first clause of the Preamble to the United Nations’ Declaration of Human Rights:  
..Recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of 
all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and 
peace in the world.147  
 
In the public international law, we have this foundational document, along with a host of 
other decisions, treaties, and conventions that make reference to and entrench in the law a 
commitment to the universal dignity of persons.148 Including, but not limited to: the Preamble 
to the Charter of the United Nations, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
American Convention on Human Rights, International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, the Helsinki Accords, the UN Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of 
Prisoners, the UN Declaration on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, and the 
UN Declaration on the Use of Scientific and Technological Progress in the Interests of Peace 
and for the Benefit of Mankind. 
 In some ways, the meaning of dignity makes the commitment to the normative status 
and importance of individuals for international justice even more robust in the public 
international law than in the ACA. The law takes ‘human dignity’ to support substantive 
claims about human rights. In the ACA I give a formal account of the relationship between 
persons as human beings that makes sense of why we would engage in the political process 
of articulating these rights. The minimal cosmopolitanism of the ACA in not only compatible 
with the recognition of individuals as important normative entities for constructing the 
                                                 
147 United Nations General Assembly, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 10 December 1948. 217 A (III), 
available at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b3712c.html . 
 
148 See Oscar Schachter’s “Human Dignity as a Normative Concept,” The American Journal of International 
Law, Vol. 77, No. 4 (October 1983), p. 848-854.  
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principles of international law justice, but explains why the UN (or a similar institution) 
would rightly engage in the process of articulating the content of human rights.   
The second criterion on an acceptable account is that it clearly address and make 
room for the role of the international community, itself. Recall, the conditional sovereignty 
approach failed to do so, by providing only the negative claim that states in which crimes 
against humanity occur cannot object to external bodies crossing their borders, rather than a 
positive argument that the international community has an interest in the commission of 
crimes against humanity. The ACA meets this desideratum, as it identifies a global institution 
as having this standing to hold perpetrators of crimes against humanity accountable. Above, I 
argued that there is a unique role for a global mediating institution, and thus, have identified 
the international community as having the standing to hold to account perpetrators of crime 
against humanity. The commitment to moral cosmopolitanism assures that the ACA is fully 
global (as the moral relationships in need of mediation hold between all persons), as the 
indeterminacy problem arises whenever there are at least two political bodies that do not 
stand under a common institution.  
The ‘international community’ in ACA is a term used not only for the collection of 
states (as is often assumed by more traditional state-centered accounts), but refers to the 
entire constellation of individuals, local institutions and the global mediating institution 
itself. In this way, ‘international community’ comes to mean all of us, together with the 
bodies we have charged with mediating the basic moral relationship along with more local 
relationships (as with compatriots, neighbors, those we share a continent with, etc).  It is in 
this sense that the ACA is a deeply federal account, which makes room for not only 
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individuals, but sits comfortably with the existence of different political institutions at 
various levels.   
The third criterion on an acceptable account is that it respect and demarcate different 
domains of jurisdiction – domestic and international. My federalist view involves clearly 
demarcating what role states play and over what they are sovereign. States mediate 
relationships of strangers in proximity, often with shared values or cultural ties. The 
international institution mediates the relationship of these states to one another and the 
relationship of members of the global moral community, as members of the global moral 
community. The value of domestic level political institutions is preserved in this picture, as 
they will play a vital role in constituting and shaping the lives of members of those 
communities. The ACA places a different value in the domestic political communities than 
other accounts we have seen, as it does not hold that domestic political communities are 
valuable for their own sake. However, this difference does not mean that the ACA fails to 
recognize the importance of local bodies – only that the range of options available to 
individuals with respect to the nature and constitution of such political institutions is in some 
part constrained by principles of international justice.  
Finally, the fourth criterion is to recognize the importance of persons in the overall 
picture. The ACA has at its normative foundation not only individual persons, but a view on 
which all individuals are morally bound to one another. The global mediating institution has 
standing to prosecute crime against humanity because it makes determinate the content of the 
demands of justice that hold for all members of the global moral community. Thus, an 
international institution that prosecutes crimes against humanity fulfills obligations that we 
all have, as co-members of the moral community, with respect to the victims of the atrocities. 
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The reason we have, as individuals, to create, promote or otherwise pursue the existence of 
such an institution is that we, as individuals, require such an institution to mediate the moral 
obligations we have to one another. In this way, the ACA provides an account on which the 
standing of the global mediating institution is not only rooted in the nature and value of 
individuals, but the existence of such an institution is necessary to fulfill (by making 
determinate) the obligations we all have with respect to the victims (and perpetrators) of 
atrocities.  
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
 
In this thesis I set out to answer the jurisdiction question: Could an international 
tribunal have the standing to prosecute perpetrators of crime against humanity, and if so, in 
virtue of what does it have this standing? To answer this question I developed the Alternative 
Cosmopolitan Account, which gives, as an answer to the first part of this question, a 
resounding “it depends.” The ACA holds that the standing of international institutions, 
including particular international tribunals, is grounded in or justified by the institution’s 
mediation of the basic moral relationship between individuals. It is in virtue of the need for 
such an institution and the cosmopolitan commitment to the moral importance of the co-
membership in the moral community that such an institution has the standing to hold those 
who violate international law accountable.  
The ACA is, in many ways, a formal (rather than substantive) account. It does not 
prescribe particular principles of international justice or particular content for public 
international law. Rather, it prescribes that there be such a process, and that the process 
recognize the status of individual persons as participants (rather than objects) as well as the 
value of justification. It is for this reason that the ACA also answers “it depends” to the 
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question of whether crimes against humanity are included in the content of public 
international law (and fall under international jurisdiction). I have given reasons for crimes 
against humanity falling within the domain of international law and jurisdiction namely, that 
it being an international law (and enforced by an international institution) provides a 
mechanism for holding perpetrators accountable that is often unavailable in domestic 
contexts, and in so doing, it respects the victims of such atrocities as people who have been 
wronged. However, it is an important feature of the view that such specific content as the 
prohibition on crimes against humanity is given by the actual institutions, themselves.  
The ACA addresses the worry raised by Arendt from the Introduction. Arendt reports 
a worry raised by Israelis at the time of Eichmann’s prosecution by the State of Israel, that 
the Nuremberg Tribunal’s prosecutions of those responsible for the Holocaust, in taking 
crimes against humanity to be crimes against us all, ignored that the atrocities were carried 
out against the victims. The worry is that international prosecutions express that the crime is 
against humanity and merely carried out on the bodies of the victims, rather than against the 
victims themselves. The ACA does not construe crimes against humanity as crimes against 
the international community or against all of humanity, itself. Instead, it holds that the crimes 
are committed on and against the victims. An international institution’s role is to make it the 
case that the actions are, in fact, crimes (rather just radically morally wrong), and to provide 
a mechanism through which the perpetrators can be held accountable for what they did to the 
victims.  
This commitment to the standing of an institution depending on its mediating 
relationships by articulating and enforcing laws raises an important question about the 
standing of current international institutions, as well as the legitimacy of actual prosecutions 
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of crimes against humanity which many think of as ex post facto prosecutions. From what I 
have argued in this thesis, we cannot answer the charge raised by Mohammad on the 
International Criminal Court’s behalf. The grounding I have provided for the standing of 
international institutions provides us with some resources to evaluate whether particular 
institutions can have standing. We can ask of an institution: does it articulate a coherent, 
consistent body of law? Were the norms to which the perpetrators are being held accountable 
determinate public rules? Does the institution respect individuals as participants? Do the 
practices of the institution manifest the value of justification by giving reasons that those 
subject to the institution can reasonably accept (or not reasonably reject)?  
It is in only providing some (but not all of the necessary) resources for evaluating 
particular institutions that the ACA can only establish necessary conditions (rather than 
sufficient conditions) for legitimate international prosecutions of perpetrators of crimes 
against humanity. This is not to say that the ACA makes no progress on these further 
conditions. At the very least, it sets an agenda for the further questions that need to be 
explored. With the resources of the ACA on the table we can go on to ask what more would 
be required to demonstrate that an international institution is legitimate. Knowing that it is 
charged with the task of mediating relationships between individuals as co-members of the 
moral community, and between the political institutions charged by these individuals with 
mediating more local communities, we must go on to ask what is required for the institution 
to exercise its authority to do so. Must the institution be democratic in nature – such that 
those subject to it (explicitly, tacitly, or hypothetically) consent to it exercising this power? 
Can we force people and state level institutions to obey the laws of an international 
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institution? If the institution must be democratic, which bodies must consent – the 
individuals, or the agents charged with representing the individuals?  
  Finally, the ACA provides us with a starting point for evaluating questions about the 
legitimacy of institutions in transition. Throughout this thesis I have discussed institutions as 
fully formed entities. In the context of international justice this is an idealization. The pubic 
international law is dynamic; it is evolving and changing seemingly every day. The ACA 
prescribes that we create, promote or pursue an international institution that can fulfill the 
role of a mediating institution. This prescription can seem to have limited utility in the 
context of a developing institution. We know that we ought to pursue its existence, but how 
do we do so?  What tools can we use in doing so? The ACA does not provide conclusive 
answers to these questions, but it does tell us where to look. The institutions in transition can 
be evaluated according to whether they advance the goal of developing an institution that 
plays the role stipulated by the ACA. Moreover, the account prescribes a moral foundation to 
appeal to in these judgments: the value of persons as participants (rather than objects) and the 
requirement that the institution make determinate the obligations of co-members of the moral 
community.  
 Although through developing the ACA I have completed the first step toward 
answering the jurisdiction question and developing a moral theory of international criminal 
law, there is important work yet to be done.  
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